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3ABSTRACT
Lord Minto's policy towards the Indian Nationalist 
movement has heen examined in this thesis.
Curzon had ignored the Indian National Congress. Minto, 
on the other hand, recognized it as an important factor in 
Indian political life. Besides his policy towards the
»
Congress, we have diaoussed his attitude towards the 
partition of Bengal and Puller's administration of East 
Bengal and Assam.
Special attention has heen paid to Minto's policy 
towards various 'interests' in India, particularly tKe. 
Muslim*. An attempt has heen made to trace the origin and 
growth of the Simla Deputation of 1 October 1906, with 
particular reference to the hypotheses of previous writers, 
and the Muslim political awakening as a whole. Muslim 
efforts to secure separate representation have also heen 
discussed.
Unrest in the Punjab, the growth of a militant group 
in Bengal and Maharashtra and Minto's policy towards 
militant nationalism has heen studied in the light of new 
materiaj.
The origin and growth of the reforms and the enactment 
and enforcement of the Indian Councils Act of 1909
have heen discussed in great detail.
This thesis is hased on the unpublished private 
papers of Minto and Morley, the official records of the 
Government, parliamentary papers and debates, newspaper 
reports and other sources.
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6Introduction
On Curzonfs resignation, Minto was appointed the Viceroy 
of India in 1905. Although Lady Minto was "immensely proud 
that the choice should have fallen upon" him, she thought his 
appointment "most unexpected" and "a bolt from the blue".
She was pleased because it meant Minto's following in the 
footsteps of his great-grandfather. But the reasons why she 
thought this appointment "a bolt from the blue" were that 
Minto had "no parliamentary experience" and "disliked 
politics and the methods of politicians" and that he was 
succeeding "one of the most brilliant men of the day".
Minto was also conscious of the fact that the Conservative 
Government which had appointed him was tottering and that
2
soon "he would be the servant of a very different government".
He knew that the task before him was not an easy one.
In India there was no Parliament but there was the 
problem of British parliamentary interference in Indian 
administration; there were no party politics as such but 
there was a political party with aspirations, and there was 
the aftermath of Curzon's administration. Curzon had ruled 
India, "but without the necessary sympathy which would have
1. Mary, Countess of Minto - India^ Minto and Morley, 1905- 
1910, London 1934, p.6 . Minto himself was surprised on his
appointment though it was "the greatest appointment I
have ever hoped for",
John Buchan - Lord Minto, London, 1924, p.210.
2. John Buchan - op.cit. p.210.
7endeared him to the people."^ Curzonfs lack of'Isympathy"
had enraged a number of Indians, There was little that Curzon
did which did not cause these Indians, Congressmen mostly, to
pile up resentment not against individuals only but against
2
the entire regime and the system of government, Gokhale, 
in his presidential address to the twenty first Congress, 
1905, summed up Curzon's achievement and administration and 
found a parallel in Aurangzeb, It was "an attempt at a rule 
excessively centralised and intensely personal". According 
to Gokhale it had "the same strenuous purpose, the same 
overpowering consciousness of duty, the same marvellous 
capacity for work, the same sense of loneliness, the same 
persistence in a policy of distrust and repression, 
resulting in bitter exasperation all round". His conclusion 
was that "the most devoted admirer of Lord Curzon cannot 
claim that he has strengthened the foundations of British 
rule in India," Gokhale was conscious of the new Viceroy's 
difficulties as well. He knew that these difficulties of 
the situation were not of Mintofs creating and that he had a 
right to expect the co-operation of both the officials and
1, Lady Minto - My Indian Journal, Vol.I. 1905-6, pp.5-6. 
Indian Institute, Oxford. This Journal was a record of 
views and events which she started compiling even before 
the Mintos left for India,
2, Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915). Moderate Indian 
Congress leader; a Maharashtra Brahman, started his career 
as a teacher. Took a keen interest in the Congress since
1899. Member Bombay Legislative Council, 1900-1901; 
Viceroy's Legislative Council, 1902, President of the 
Congress 1905.
the public in his endeavours to terminate a state of tension# 
Minto realized that it was his responsibility to 
restore the confidence of Indians in the British Government, 
He, therefore, decided to base his administration on the 
maxim "that many a race has been won by giving the horse a
p
rest in his gallops." While Curzon*s watchword was 
"efficiency", Minto, without proposing to sacrifice 
efficiency, adopted "sympathy" as his watchword.*^
In India, after a succession of religious and social 
reform movements, a political party had been founded in 1885.
A.0.Hume ^  a retired Civil Servant, was one of its founders 
and Lord Dufferin, the then Viceroy of India, showed great 
interest in its origin, because he was anxious to ascertain 
the wishes of the people, which in the absence of a political 
party was not possible. The Congress started as an 
association of moderate Indians who met annually at different 
places, debated certain problems, passed a number of 
resolutions and dispersed# Its membership was small and its
1. Report of the I.N.C. 1905. Gokhale'a Address, p.7.
2. Speeches by the Earl of Minto, Calcutta, 1911. p.8.
3. The earliest mention of this word "sympathy" is found in 
Lady Minto's Journal. Vol.I, 1905-6, pp.5-6.
4. Allan Octavian Hume (1829-1912). Civil Servant, 1849-1882; 
awarded C.B. in i860. Served mostly in North West 
Provinces (later U.P.). On 1 March 1883 addressed a 
circular letter to the graduates of the Calcutta 
University. Called the first session of the I.N. Congress
in December 1885. Left India in 1894. Continued working 
for the Congress until his death in 1912.
5. Sir William Wedderburn - Allan Octavian Hume, C.B.,
London 1913- pp.59-60,
smembers enjoyed good social positions. Most of them were 
liked by the officials in their individual capacities. Its 
resolutions, meetings and particularly its activities in 
England did unnerve a number of bureaucrats, yet on the 
whole this organization worked well and grew steadily.
Besides securing political concessions from the Government, 
its aim was to develop into a national organization 
embracing all Indians, irrespective of sect, caste and 
religion. It was an uphill task, yet some of its leaders 
worked to achieve this end. What it required was a first 
class political slogan to bring itself closer to the masses. 
There was another snag. The Muslims had not taken very 
kindly to the Congress and refrained from joining it in any 
number.1 Thus before Curzonfs regime though the Congress had 
grown in size it had not become a popular or national 
organization. Its reaction to Curzon*s administration and 
particularly to the Partition of Bengal made it popular 
amongst the Hindus, but further disillusioned the Muslims. 
Whatever justifications and reasons might be put forward for 
it, the partition and the way it was carried out gave a 
stimulus to the Congress activities. The Russian defeat at 
the hands of the Japanese in 1905 further encouraged Indian 
self-confidence, as a success of Asians over Europeans,
Hence on his arrival Minto found the Congress a very
1. See Appendix I. p. o rO
formidable factor in Indian political life.
Prom its very early days the Congress had been asking
for certain political reforms. The methods its leaders
adopted to achieve these demands were constitutional and
moderate. They approached the Government through resolutions,
n.
deputations and petitions. As the personnels of the 
Government kept on changing, so did correspondingly the 
fortunes of the Congress leaders. Some looked into their 
demands sympathetically, some brushed them aside. In the 
first category was Dufferin and in the second Curzon. Curzon 
loved India and her agricultural masses but intensely 
disliked the educated ^abus1. He considered the Congress 
demands extravagant and impracticable. This antipathy of 
the Government towards the moderate Congress aspirations 
encouraged the rise of a new group whose ideas seemed more 
attractive to the younger generation. They were tired of the 
Mendicant1 methods of the moderate leaders and started 
thinking of other methods to force the Government to accept 
their demands. While the moderates were asking for "self 
rule" on the model of "self ruling colonies", they demanded 
complete Swara.j (independence). The moderates believed in 
the use of slow constitutional methods to achieve their 
ends, they wanted immediate results and did not hesitate to 
adopt extreme methods. Thus grew an extremist school within 
the Congress threatening its very existence as a moderate 
political party.
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One of the factors behind the rise of this extremist 
group was a revulsion against Western culture. Many feared 
that before it their own culture and religious heritage 
might disappear. The effects of the Brahmo Samaj and its
i
off-shoots further horrified them. It was thought that
India might be Europeanised as a result of British rule.
Consequently religious movements developed which glorified
2
Hinduism and belittled Western culture. The Arya Samaj 
aimed at the revival of the past glory of Hinduism and of 
faith in the infallible Vedas,^ In the Punjab Lala Lajpat 
Rai^ was not only its staunch supporter but a congressman 
with extreme views. In Bengal B.C.Pal  ^ and the brothers
1. The Brahmo Samaj was a reform movement started by Raja 
Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833) in 1828, in the hope of 
rationalising and liberalising Hinduism in the light of 
modern science, Western deistic philosophy, Christianity 
and Islam. The movement was later on divided <jnfcother 
groups, like that of Keshab Chandra Sen's group, which 
seSSred more offensive to the orthodox Hindus. B.C.Pal 
was an exception as he was a member of the Brahmo Samaj 
and a leader of the extremist group.
2. It was mainly as a result of the insistence of the 
extremists that in 1906 the Congress passed a resolution 
urging the people to set up educational institutions Mon 
national lines and under national control" - Report of the
I.N.C. 1906. p.98.
3. It was started by Swami Dyanand Saraswati in 1875 at 
Calcutta.
4. lala Lajpat Rai - (1865-1928). Social reformer, Arya 
Samajist and Congressman, belonged to the extremist group 
of the Congress. Visited England with Gokhale in 19065 
deported in 1907; President of the Congress in 1920.
5. Bepin Chandra Pal - (1858-1932). Started as a teacher.
Soon attracted great attention, because of his extreme 
views. Toured Madras and Bengal in 1907 lecturing on 
various topics. Convicted to simple imprisonment for six 
months in 1907; left for England in 1908 and started from 
London a fortnightly journal, Swaraj.
Aurobindo and Barindra Ghose ^  were leaders of the extreme 
group in the Congress. In Maharashtra its leader was
B. G.Tilak.2
Tilak's speeches and writings denounced the activities 
of the moderate leaders as ineffective and aroused a militant 
Hindu nationalism, which, because it affected them as well, 
antagonised the Muslims. Prom the Governments point of view 
the activities of the extremists had become very serious. 
Some hot-headed young men from Bengal and the Maharashtra 
had also organized themselves as a militant group.
Imitating in their ways the techniques of European terrorists 
and anarchists, they took their cue in the main from the 
Irish Sein Be in and other European revolutionaries.
The Muslims had held themselves aloof from political 
activities, mainly because of their backwardness in western
1. Aurobindo Ghose - (1872-1950), Brought up in England, 
his brother Barindra was born there. Won distinction . 
as a student, passed I.C.S. exam but failed^nrT^he—  
riding test. Returned to India in 1893, became 
closely attached to Tilak and started writing in 
Yugantar, started by Barindra; associated himself with 
"the English weekly Bande Mataram, was implicated in the 
Alipore conspiracy case, after his release took asylum 
in Pondichery in 1910,
2, Bal Gangadhar Tilak - (1856-1920). A chitpavan Brahmin, 
started Ganpati and Sivaji festivals, leader of the
extremist group. Twice imprisoned in 1897 and 1908. Left 
the Congress for some years in 1907.
13
education. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan,^“ who had become a prominent 
Muslim leader, faced immense opposition from the Conservative 
Muslims, when he advised his co-religionists to learn 
English. His main aim was to enable the Muslims to overcome 
their sense of humiliation and grief, at the loss of their 
power and to avail themselves of the new opportunities by 
acquiring western education and professing their loyalty to 
the British. Despite opposition in certain quarters his 
movement was gaining strength and English education was 
becoming popular. But the Hindus had become politically and 
socially awakened. Earlier in the century Raja Ram Mohan
p
Roy had made them conscious of the advantages of learning 
English and rationalising and liberalizing Hinduism. The 
Brahmo Samaj contributed to some extent towards the political 
consciousness of the Hindus. Dwarkanath Tagore*s Land Lord's 
Association was founded in 1833 and in 1851 was founded the
1. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898). Entered the service of 
the E.I. Co. in 1837 and rendered valuable services 
during the Mutiny. Visited England in 1876 and after his 
retirement in 1875 started the M.A.O. College at Aligarh. 
Member of the Legislative Council of N.W.Provinces and a$n 
additional member of the Governor General's Council, 
1878-1882. Worked very hard for the Muslim cause. Wrote 
many books. His selfless service and sincere devotion to 
his cause inspired a great majority of the Muslims,
2. Raja Ram Moham Roy (1772-1833)* Organizer of the Brahmo 
Samaj Society, educationist, served the E.I. Co. visited 
England and spoke before a Committee of Parliament, where 
he represented the case of the Mughal Emperor.
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British Indian Association, mainly consisting of the rising 
middle-class Bengali Hindus, though its organ the Hindu 
Patriot helped to spread its activities "beyond Bengal, The 
educated Hindus were also deriving their inspiration from 
such English thinkers as Burke, Sheridan, Pox and Mill,
These political currents running through India also affected 
those Muslims who were receiving an English education. Sir 
Syedfs Translation Society founded in 1864 at Ghazipur hut 
later transf-wSSked to Aligarh, enabled Muslims to read 
translations of Rollins' Ancient History, Mill's Political 
Economy, Elphinstone1s History of India, and Malcolm's 
History of Persia* In April 1865 the Muhammadan Literary 
Society was formed by Nawab Abdul Latif of Bengal,'*" Its 
activities acquainted the Muslims of Bengal, if not of 
other provinces, with some aspects of western culture and 
English literature, though it did not play any significant 
part in creating political consciousness among them. Sir 
Syed succeeded in establishing the Muhammaden Anglo-Oriental 
College at Aligarh in 1875. It was the fulfilment of Sir 
Syed's aim. The College became the centre of Muslim 
activities and produced the future Muslim leaders of India*.
Though in a speech on 10 May 1866, before the British
1, Nawab Abdul Latif (1828-1893) entered Government service 
as Deputy Magistrate in 1846; founded the Muhammadan 
Literary Society in 1863? retired from the Government 
Service in 1884; made Nawab in 1880; C.I.E. in 18835 and 
Nawab Bahadur in 1887*
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Indian Association, Sir Syed did talk about the need of a
body which could make known to the British Parliament their
requirements and wishes, he remained aloof from any political
1activity even to the extent of declining Syed Ameer Ali's 
invitation to lend his support in the formation of the
p
Central National Muhammedan Association in 1877. It was, 
in Ameer Ali*s opinion, the birth of the Indian National 
Congress which opened Syed's eyes.
When the Congress was founded in 1885, Sir Syed felt 
bound to advise the Muslims about the line they should adopt. 
His aim was not to separate the Hindus and the Muslims, but 
he had the best interests of his community at heart. He 
clearly saw the superiority of the Hindus and the Muslim 
backwardness in the field of education. He was convinced 
that western political institutions were quite unsuitable 
to the Indian people, Por centuries India, in fact, had 
been without politics or at least without any party politics 
and a thorough grounding in western education was
1, Syed Ameer Ali - (1849-1928). Called to Bar in 1873, 
started practice at Calcutta High Court; Pellow of the 
Calcutta University 1874; Magistrate and Chief Magistrate 
Calcutta, 1878-81; member Bengal Legislative Council, 
1878-83; Governor Generali Legislative Council, 1883-85; 
Tagore Law Professor, 1884; C.I.E. 1887; High Court Judge 
1890-1904; left India and settled in England. Member 
Privy Council 1909. Pounded Central National Muhammadan 
Association in 1877.
2. Syed Ameer Ali, Memoirs in Islamic Culture. Vol.V. No.4; 
p.540. "In 1877 when I founded the Central National 
Muhammadan Association, we respectfully invited him
[Sir Syed] to give his valuable support but he declined".
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indispensable for any political understanding.^ The Congress
itself was a loyal organization and its aims were not
revolutionary, hut he felt that Muslim alignment with any
political organization would jeopardize the mission of his
life. They were not yet ready for political activities. To
keep their attention away from this predominantly Hindu
organization he founded the Muhammadan Educational Congress
in December 1886 (the word Congress* was changed to
Conference in 1890). The Conference met regularly and the
Muslims remained aloof from the Congress with few exceptions
2and despite the attempts of some of the Congress leaders.
1. R.B. M.R. Hassaan, - The Educational Movement of Sir Syed 
Ahmed Khan (1858-1898;, tii.D. thesis I960, University
of London; suggests that Sir Syed's educational programme 
was not devoid of political consideration. It was meant 
to prepare the Muslims for political understanding and 
solidarity amongst themselves.
2. The number of Muslim delegates attending the Congress 
sessions between 1885 and 1905 amply suggests that they 
were not much interested in it. Fluctuation in their 
numbers was due mostly to the convenience of the place 
where the session was held. Between 1885 and 1910 there 
were only two Muslim Presidents of the Congress out of 
26. Badruddin Tayabji, Madras 1887; and M.R. Sayani, 
Calcutta, 1896. See Appendix I. S.N.Banerjea, A Nation 
in Making, London 1925, p.108; says that the Muslim 
delegates were even given return fares. In the 4th 
Congress a resolution was passed which forbade the 
introduction of resolutions for discussion if one 
community strongly opposed it. Even then the Muslims 
did not join the Congress in any number.
IV
This Conference proved to he a forerunner of the All-India 
Muslim League as most of the leaders who attended this 
Conference in 1906 formed themselves into a political party. 
On 28 December 1887 Sir Syed openly attacked the 
Congress in a speech which he delivered before a large 
gathering of prominent Muslims in Lucknow.1 He made three 
main points - that the Hindus and Muslims were "two different 
nations" in spite of many things in common; that 
representative institutions were unsuited to Indian 
conditions as this system would lead to the permanent 
subjugation of the Muslims by the Hindus because of their 
numerical strength; and that Indian Muslims must depend on 
the British for the safeguard of their interests and their 
effective representation in administration. In short, the 
Congress aims were not suitable to Indian conditions and 
the Muslim alignment with such an organization would lead 
them no where.
Mery speeches and writings of the extremist Hindu 
leaders had powerfully stirred the imagination of young
p
Hindus, some of whom had even committed serious crimes.
This political stir amongst the Hindus affected the younger 
generation of the Muslims also. They too began to feel
1. The Pioneer, 11,12 January 1888, The Times, 16 January 
1888, also referred to the speech as "one of the most 
remarkable political discourses ever delivered by a 
native of India".
2, Communal riots in Poona and Bombay, 1893* Rand murder in 
1897 etc, Rowlett Commitee's Report puts the blame on 
Ganpati festival. See. p.l.
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restive.^
The Indian Councils Acts of 1892 further brought home to 
the Muslims that if Government policy was moving towards a 
representative or responsible form of government it was 
high time for them to do something to safeguard their 
interests. As a minority community they had not been 
able to secure their due share under the new elective 
system. The Government's attempt to nominate some Muslims, 
to the Legislative Councils had failed to satisfy the 
Aligarh School. Sir Syed himself, after the passage of 
the 1892 Act had realized that the time had come when 
the Muslims should unite politically for the safeguard 
of their interests. The meeting of the leading Muslims 
on 30 December 1893 and the formation of the Muhammadan 
Anglo-Oriental Defence Association of Upper India were 
the signs of a change in his attitude towards Muslim 
political associations.
Though differences between the Hindus and Muslims
1. The Moslem Chronicle, 9 May 1895.
19
were old, the Levanagri-Persian script controversy in 1900,^
2
the agitation at the time of the Partition of Bengal and 
the Congress claim to he the sole representative national 
party, while it had only a few Muslim members, perturbed 
the Muslim leadership after Sir Sye&.'s death in 1898 and 
posed it an anxious problem. They started thinking of 
various methods for safeguarding the Muslim interests and 
preventing the younger generation from joining the Congress. 
Thus at the time of Minto *s arrival in India, the Muslims 
were very anxious to embark on a political career.
All of Minto*s difficulties were not in India, In 
England the Conservative Ministry resigned in December 1905, 
and a Liberal Government came into power.^ The well-known
1. It was in 1868 that some Hindus approached the Government 
of North West Provinces (later U.P.), to introduce the 
Nagri script in place of the Persian script in Courts, 
but their attempt failed because of strong Muslim 
opposition. Again in 1898 a Hindu deputation waited on 
Sir Antlony MacDonnell, the Lieutenant-Governor and 
prayed for the substitution of the Nagri Script in the 
Courts and Offices. On 18 April 1900, the Government
of the N.W.P. and Oudh, passed a resolution permitting 
the use of the Levanagari script in official transactions 
and making its knowledge a sine qua non of ministerial 
appointments, vide - Resolution No,585/III-343-C -8,
18 April 1900, Lord Curzon*s Government approved it, vide 
letter dated 14 June 1900.
This resolution called forth a storm of opposition 
particularly among the Muslims of North India. Meetings 
were held, resolutions were passed and pamphlets were 
published,.See Hamid Ali Khan - The Vernacular Controversy, 
Lucknow 1900.
2. S.N.Banerjea, op.cit. p.124.
3* In 1906 General Election 377 Liberals, 83 Irish
Nationalists and 53 Labour members were returned to the 
House of Commons as against 157 Conservatives. The Annual 
Register, 1906. London, 1907, p.12,
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Liberal John Morley assumed charge of the India Office, His 
views and his past record were well-known, so his appoint­
ment as Secretary of State for India put new heart into 
Indian sympathizers in general and the Indian leaders in 
particular, Gokhale welcomed his appointment and the Congress 
considered this liberal advent as the "return of hope and 
joy" for India, Morley was conscious of this effect of the 
change of events as he put it in his Recollections, "this 
copcidence between the uneasy stir there and the ascendency 
here of parliamentary groups all agreeing strongly in a 
general temper of reform constituted a serious element in 
the situation at Simla and Whitehall alike,"'*’ Minto, though 
Conservative by temperament and political proclivities* was 
not averse to change and like Morley sensed from the 
beginning that something had to be done to pacify the 
irritated educated Indians, They both agreed on principles 
but differences occurred in details, Morley was extremely 
sensitive on certain points and tended to interfere in the 
details on Minto's administration. As a philosopher he was 
sceptical and as a politician he was cautious, Minto, being 
a practical man, learnt quite early that he had to be 
extremely tactful in his relations with Morley.
For a very long time the Indian nationalists had been 
trying hard to secure supporters in Parliament through whom
1, John Viscount Morley - Recollections, Vol.II, p.150.
Indian views on various problems concerning India could be
brought to the notice of the British public. Though an
attempt was made in 1889f it was not until 1893 that an
Indian parliamentary Committee was finally established. Sir
William Wedderburn,'1’ W,S.Caine ^  and J.E.Ellis^ were its
founders. By 1906, this Committee of about 154 members had
grown into 200 members, ^  In the new House of Commons the
Indian sympathizers consisted of not only retired Anglo­
'S 6Indians like Sir Henry Cotton and C .J.0 !Donnell, but
1. Sir William Wedderburn - (1838-1918). I.C.S. 1859-87; 
President of the Congress, 1889,1910. M.P.Liberal, 1893-
1900. Chairman of the Indian Parliamentary Committee,
Author of Allan Octavian Hume C.B.
2. William Sproston Caine 11842-1903). Politician and 
temperance advocate. Pirst fought election as Liberal in 
1873» but failed, returned as radical member for Scarborougl 
in 1880. Visited India as the Congress delegate in 1890. 
Member of the Royal Commission on Indian Expenditure in 
1895.
3. John Edward Ellis (1841-1910), M.P,Liberal 1885-1910. 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for India, 1905-6.
4. For a detailed account of the activities of early Indian 
nationalists in England see Dr. Mary Cumpston,,"Some 
Early Indian Nationalists and Their Allies in the British 
Parliament, 1851-1906", English Historical Review, Vol. /j 
LXXVI, No.299. April 1961. pp.279-297.  ^
Sir Henry Cotton (1845-1915;. Entered Bengal Civil 
Service, 1867. After numerous appointments became Chief 
Commissioner of Assam in 1896. Retired in 1902. M.P. - 
Author of New India or India in Transition. President
of 1904 Congress Session,
'S. Charles James O'Donnell (1850-1934). Indian Civil Service, 
1870-1900. M.P.Liberal, 1906-1910. Author of the Ruin of 
an Indian Province^ the Failure of Lord Curzon, tEe 
Causes of Presen€a> Discontent in India. O'Donnell's 
intere st in ant i-partit ion agitat ion can be seen in his 
letter to Bannerjea. He wrote him on 2 March 1906, "Keep 
on agitat in g~and do so effectively. Large mass meetings are 
the most useful ... You have the justest of causes and I 
hope you will make your voice heard. Everything depends on 
you in India and remember a Whig does nothing unless pressed 
... "P.S. Have mass meetings by the dozen in every
district - in door and out of doors, Morley will yet yield.
C. J.0 'D." Baner jea circulated this letter amongst other 
agitators on 20 March 1906. The letter was somehow inter­
cepted and Hare, sent it to Dunlop Smith on 1 Sept. 1906. 
Minto to Morley - 1 Sept. 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
labour members like Keir Hardie^ and Radicals like F.C.
2 ^Mackarness and Dr. V.H.Rutherford. They demanded quick
action to redress Indian grievances and harrassed Morley by
not only asking searching questions regarding Indian
administration, but by taking a spirited and active part in
Indian debates. The members of the Indian parliamentary
Committee kept themselves well informed and in close touch
with the Indian leaders - both the moderates and the
extremists. Their speeches in the House of Commons were
fully reported in the Indian papers. They exerted immense
pressure on Morley and Morley on his part pressed Minto.
Minto never liked this parliamentary interference in Indian
administration. Morley and Minto differed on this point.
In general, the Labour, the radical and most of the Liberal
members supported and presented the Congress views in the
House, while the Conservatives like Ronaldshay ^  and Earl
1. James Keir Hardie (1856-1915)* Editor of Cumnock News, 
1882-86. M.P.Labour, 1892-95, 1900-15. Visited India in 
1907. Chairman of Independent Labour Party; founder of 
Labour Leader, author of India, Impressions and Suggestions
2. Frederic Coleridge Mackarness {18$4-19£0). Called to Bar, 
1879; Advocate of Supreme Court, 1882, Revising Barrister 
for London 1889, Professor of Roman-Dutch Law University 
College, London. 1905-6. M.P.Liberal, 1906-10.
3. Dr. Vickerman Henzeil Rutherford (1860-1934)* Physician, 
M.P, Liberal 1906-10, Contested as Labour candidate in 
1920.
4* Earl of Ronaldshay, Lawrence John Lumley Dundas, 2nd
Marquess of Zetland (1876-1961). Visited India, 1899-1900, 
A.D.C. to the Viceroy, 1900; M.P. Unionist, 1907-16;
Member Royal Commission on the Public Services in India, 
1912-14; Governor of Bengal, 1917-22; Secretary of State 
for India, 1935-40; Secretary of State for Burma, 1937-40, 
etc. Author of numerous books - the Heart of Arya Varta, 
the Life of Lord Curzon etc.
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Percy supported the Muslim demands.
There were certain other influences which hindered 
Minto1s administration at times. Por instance in India 
Anglo-Indian opinion was hostile to change and in England 
the House of Lords and the Conservatives were unwilling to 
allow the Government to adopt a liberal line like the 
appointment of an Indian on the Viceroyfs Executive Council. 
The radicals, on the other hand, demanded much more radical 
changes in Indian administration and bitterly criticised 
strong government action against extremists. Since the 
improvement of means of communication the interference in 
the day to day Indian administration by the India Office had 
increased, Morley, perhaps, was more inclined than any 
previous Secretary of State to interfere in the details of
Indian administration. Then there were visiting M.P.s like
2
Keir Hardie and journalists like H.W.Nevinson who were no 
supporters of the Indian bureaucratic machinery. They 
visited India, attended public meetings and openly criticised 
the Government. They encouraged the nationalists, but did not 
make things easier for the Government, The Indian press had
1. Lord Algernon Malcolm Arthur Percy (1851-1933)* Served in 
the British Army, 1872-1910. M.P.Conservative,
2. Henry Wood Nevinson (1856-1941). Manchester Guardian 
correspondent in India, 1907-8. War Journalist, leader 
writer Daily Chronicle, 1897-1903, on the staff of the 
Nation, 190^23. Manchester Guardianfs special correspond­
ent, 1921-29. Author of the Thirty"Days * War, A Modern 
Slavery, the New Spirit in India, etc. etc.
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also become quite powerful and bitterly criticized some of 
the government's actions.
An attempt has been made in this thesis to discuss and 
analyse Mintofs policy towards Indian aspirations - the 
Congress demand for more representation on the Councils of 
the Government and the Muslim demand for separate 
representation. Minto was the first Governor General who 
emphatically stated that the Congress should be considered 
as "an important factor" in Indian political life and thus 
was responsible for changing the government policy, which, 
at least under Curzon, was to ignore the Congress. Minto 
also recognised the Muslim demand for separate representation. 
This was not a new policy, as the Government had always 
believed that the only suitable system of representation in 
India was the representation of various interests. He simply 
confirmed it and brought it t-j its logical conclusion by 
incorporating it in the reform scheme.
Three most valuable books, which deal with Minto's 
Indian administration and throw some light on his policy 
towards the Indian nationalist movement, have been published. 
John Morley1s Recollections was published in 1917> three 
years after Mintofs death. This book is based entirely on 
his letters to Minto,lacks certain important details and 
fails to give an adequate idea of Minto's reactions to
2b
some of Morley's suggestions. It suggests that in many 
matters Morley*s will prevailed. It gives us an impression 
that many important decisions were taken by Morley, while 
Minto meekly submitted. It credits Morley, in the most modest 
way, with originating and initiating a number of reforms. 
Though it gives an idea of Morley's strong likes and dislikes 
particularly in the case of deportees, it fails to convey 
Minto's feelings towards this problem. Thus in many ways it 
is insufficient and gives a one sided picture, Morley himself 
took shelter behind the thought that it was his autobiography, 
and so must necessarily concern him. Its publication 
hastened Lady Minto!s endeavours to have her husband1s 
biography published. Harcourt Butler, the Educational member 
of the Viceroy's Council and after him Harold Stuart, another 
Civil Servant, and a Secretary of the Government of India in 
Minto's time, were approached. But both declined to comply 
due to their preoccupations and their official positions."^ 
Ultimately John Buchan wrote and published Earl Minto in 
1924, a year after Morley!s death. This is a well written 
biography of Minto, but in it his Indian administration 
forms a very small part. Buchan based his chapters on India 
on Minto's private papers and tried to present the whole 
case from Minto's point of view. But he had very little
1. Correspondence between Lady Minto, Harcourt Butler and 
Harold Stuart is preserved in a loose packet of letters 
in the Minto Collection in the National Library of 
Scotland.
space at his disposal, and so could not go in greater 
detail.
Realizing that the part that Minto had played in 
moulding the destinies of the Indian people was too 
important to he described in this biography, Lady Minto 
published India Minto and Morley in 1934. She took great 
pains in presenting the events of 1905-1910 in greater 
deatil, and endeavoured to depict the story with quotations 
from the letters of Morley and Minto and from her own Indian 
Journal. Her Indian Journal is preserved in the Indian 
Institute, Oxford and is very interesting and illuminating. 
It contains many beautiful photographs and descriptions of 
Indian scenes. Lady Minto tried to describe some Indian 
personalities and it gives us an idea of the warmth and 
sympathy that the Mintos felt towards India and the Indians. 
Both her book and her J ournal are understandably partial to 
Minto and she presents him in the brightest possible colour.
Hence there was the need of a more analytical and 
dispassionate study of Minto's attitude towards Indian 
nationalism. With the opening of the private papers of Lord 
Morley at the India Office Library and the aoquisition of 
Minto's papers by the National Library of Scotland, it 
became possible to find the missing links and to go more
27
deeply into certain problems. In preparing this thesis, 
besides the private papers of Minto and Morley, the official 
records of the Government of India and the India Office, 
parliamentary papers and debates, newspapers and other 
contemporary and secondary sources have been consulted.
Appendix I,
Congress Place Total Muslims
Session Delegates
1885 Bombay 72 2 (Both Bombay attorneys)
1886 Calcutta 440 33 ( 27 from Bengal)
1887 Madras 607 79 ( 59 from Madras)
1888 Allahabad 1248 219 (152 from N.W.P.and Oudh)
1889 Bombay 1889 248 ( 80 from Bombay)
1890 Calcutta 677 116 ( 82 from N.W.P. and
29 from Bengal)
1891 Nagpur list not available
1892 Allahabad 625 91 ( 81 from N.W.P.and Oudh)
1893 Lahore 867 65 51 from the punjah)
1894 Madras 1163 23 ( 17 from Madras)
1895 Poona 1584 25 ( 21 from Bombay)
1896 Calcutta 784 54 ( 42 from Bengal)
1897 Amraoti 692 57 53 from Berar)
1898 Madras 614 10 ( 1 0 from Madras)
1899 Lucknow 789 313 (308 from N.W.P. and Oudh) 
from^unjab)1900 Lahore 567 56 52
1901 Calcutta 896 74 54 from Bengal)
1902 Ahmedabad 417 20 ( 19 from Bombay)
1903 Madras 538 9 5 from Madras)
1904 Bombay 1010 35 ( 25 from Bombay
1 from Bengal)
1905 Benares 756 20 ( 9 from U.P.)
1906 Calcutta 1663 45 ( 24 from Bengal out of 
686 delegates)
1907 Surat Adjourned Sine die
1908 Madras 626 10 ( 3 from Madras)
1909 Lahore 243 5 ( 3 Bengal, 2 Punjab)
1910 Allahabad 636 19 ( 8 from U.P.)
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Minto and the Indian National Congress.
1905-1907.
By 1905 the Congress had Become a formidable 
organization. Though it remained mainly a Hindu organization, 
its membership had grown considerably. Curzon's illdisguised 
contempt for the Congress ^  and his emphasis on an efficient 
rather than a representative system of government gave a 
greater impetus to this movement to grow from an association 
of moderate, constitutionally inclined members to a bitterly 
critical one. The return to power of the Liberals after the 
Conservative defeat at the general elections of 1905 and the 
appointment of John Morley as the Secretary of State for 
India was claimed by the moderate Congress leaders to be "the 
return of hope and joy" for India and they hoped that now the
Government would consider their claims patiently, wisely and
2
sympathetically. Surendranath Banerjea and others went to 
the extent of flattering Morley by calling him their
s 1. Curzon'thought the "Congress was tottering to its fall" 
and he would "assist it to a peaceful demise". Curzon to 
Hamilton, 18 November 1900, Hamilton Papers. Vol.XV'III. 
I.O.L.
2. Report of the I.N.C. 1905. Introduction, pp.3-4. Such a 
change was expected and the Congress leaders were 
preparing to place their demands before the new Government. 
In its twentieth Session, 1904, Wedderburn introduced a 
resolution in favour of sending a Congress deputation to 
England. See also S.K.Ratcliffe, Sir William Wedderburn 
and the Indian Reform Movement, Lonchm, 1925. P.13V.
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"political Guru".'*’
Through presidential addresses and resolutions the
Congress had been pressing for the extension of
representation in the Executive and legislative Councils of
the Government of India since 1892, the year when the
2
Indian Councils Act was passed. It was in 1905, that the 
demand for "further extension and reform of the supreme and 
provincial Councils" became intensive.
The Congress demanded "a real voice in the Government 
of the Country" and recommended an increase in the number 
of elected members and the right to divide the councils on 
financial matters, Gokhale in his presidential address 
went even further. While admitting that "our destinies are 
now linked with those of England", he demanded the same 
"form of Government which exists in the self-governing 
Colonies of the British Empire".^
1* Repopt of the I.N.C, p.65. Gokhale in his presidential 
adaress said, "Large numbers of educated men in this 
country feel towards Mr, Morley as towards a master, and 
the heart hopes and yet trembles as it had never hoped 
or trembled before. He, the reverent student of Burke, 
the disciple of Mill, the friend and biographer of 
Gladstone, - will he courageously apply their principles 
and his own to the government of this country, or will 
he too succumb to the influences of the India Office 
around him and thus cast a cruel blight on hopes which 
his own writings have done so much to foster?" Ibid.p,17.
2. a) Presidential address, 1895, p.14, Report of ihe I.N.C,
1895.
b) Resolution XIV,- 1898, p.108. Ibid, 1898.
c) Resolution XII, 1899, p.33. Ibid, 1899.
d) Presidential address, 1899, pp.21-22. Ibid. 1899.
3. Resolution II, p,23. Ibid. 1905.
4. Ibid. 1905. Presidential address, p.13.
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Yet Morley was cautious and despite his liberal ideas 
he was reluctant to move quickly. Immediately on his arrival 
Minto gathered all the information he needed to form his 
opinion of the Congress and wrote to Morley that "I think 
myself it is a mistake to attempt to ignore the existence of 
the Congress. The section of the population it represents 
will never, I am convinced, possess the grit to play a 
leading part in the Government as a whole, but it does 
represent Indian advanced thought on many subjects which 
must affect the future administration of the country, and 
it will be the greatest mistake to attempt to set the 
Congress aside and to refuse to have anything to do with it 
as a factor in the present history of India". He also 
expressed his inclination to receive a Congress deputation, 
(Curzon refused to receive any such deputation from the 
Congress), "provided of course that the deputation is a welli
selected one representing influential members". Minto 
thought that Gokhale "represents the best elements in the 
Congress" and that "one can do a good deal by keeping in
2
touch with such leaders as S.N.Banerji and Moti Lai Ghose". 
Minto*s view, thus, was that the Congress was an important 
factor in the Indian political life and it would do immense 
good to make friends with the moderate leaders of the 
Congress. ^
1. Minto to Morley - 3 April 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - 9 May 1906. See also Minto to Morley -
28 May 1906 and 27 June 1906. Ibid.
3. Minto to Morley - 2 May 1906 - "it would be best not to
ignore it [the Congress]." Ibid.
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Morley was, on the other hand, sceptical* He had "no
i»
particular liking for that school [the Congress] yet he 
wanted to look deeper into "their notions". His suggestion 
to Minto was "to consider rather slowly whether it would be 
well to accede to their request for an interview. It is not
to be settled off hand, I think, either way"."^ After his
interviews with the Prince of Wales, who had returned from
2
India, and G-okhale, who had gone to see him, Morley came 
to this conclusion that "there it [the Congress] is, whether 
we like it or not (and personally I don't like it)". The 
Prince of Wales told him that the Congress was "becoming a 
great power for evil", but Morley thought "that it will 
mainly depend upon ourselves whether the Congress is a 
power for good or evil", and he comforted Minto by saying
that "all depends on you and me keeping step",-’
1. Morley to Minto - 19 April 1906, Ibid,
2. During his stay in England, Gokhale, besides his many 
meetings with Morley, met H.Campbell-Bannerman, the 
Prime Minister. This interview was without Morley*s 
knowledge which upset him very much. He wrote to the 
Prime Minister pointing out that it would have been 
better had the Secretary of State been informed about 
this interview beforehand, as there was every likelihood 
of Gokhale*s making capital out of it. The Prime Minister, 
however, assured him that it was "innocent" and 
"unimportant". See Morley to Campbell-Bannerman,
2, 4 August 1906. Campbell-Bannerman Papers, Vol.XVIII 
(ff,288). (41223. S.M.) See also P.A.Hirtzel1s Diary,
9, 23 May; 12, 26 June and 1 August 1906. Home Misc.
864, I.O.L. ---------
3. Morley to Minto - 11 May 1906. Morley Papers. See 
Morley - Recollections, V ol,11. Bond on 1$ 17 # p.171#
Morley omitted those words which he thought would 
betray his dislike of the Congress.
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j Commenting on Gokhale1s speech at the Benares Congress
meeting (1905) Minto had earlier expressed his views about 
popular representation."His [Gokhale1s] ideas and his
I
j ambitions certainly appear to me high spirited and patriotic,
ii
| but one can not disguise from oneself the risk that would
| surround popular representation on any large scale in the
government of this country," He explained that the Indian 
Empire was composed of many races, some of them far behind 
the Bengali standard of intellectual development, but more 
war like and it was very doubtful whether these races would 
"put up with Bengali ascendancy in the administration ofi
India", Minto was thus of the opinion that it would be
dangerous "to import into India English political
institutions". He admired the British constitution, but
"our constitution is the result of a long course of
historical experience unknown to India." He would never
2
encourage its blind imitation by the Bengali,
Morley agreed, "Fundamental difference between us, I 
really believe there is none. Not one whit more than you, 
do I think it desirable, or possible, or even conceivable, 
to adopt English political institutions to the Nations who 
inhabit India. Assuredly not in your day or mine. But the 
Spirit of English institutions is a different thing, and
1. Minto to Morley - 3 January 1906. Morley Papers.
2. Minto to Morley -16 May 1906. Ibid.
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it is a thing that we cannot escape even if we wished, which 
I hope we don't”. ^
Both of them had become aware of the growth of a new
2
spirit in India - Morley from what he had been told, and 
Minto from what he saw. That is why Minto was more emphatic 
in his desire to consider the Congress as one of the chief 
factors in the situation. He surprised Morley when he 
expressed his willingness to receive a Congress deputation, 
if it came to him.*^ His admiration for "perfectly loyal 
and moderate" Indians belonging to the educated class was 
great and he thought that this loyalty entitled the members 
of this class "to a greater share in the Government of 
India", Moreover, there was another fear "if we do not 
[conciliate this class], we shall drive it into the arms of 
the Congress leaders;" and by the Congress leaders he meant 
the leaders of the Extremist group.^ In another letter 
Minto informed Morley that Gokhale was also very anxious 
that if nothing was done, "the whole younger generation of 
India is going over to the extremists' side" and they were 
attracted by the extremist doctrines of "getting rid of 
British rule".^ c
As early as March 1906 Minto discussed with some
1. Morley to Minto - 6 June 1906, Morley Papers.
2. Morley to Minto - 6 June 1906. Ibid.
3. (Minto to Morley- 3 April 1906.Ibid.
(Morley to Minto-25 April 1906,TEi3.
4. Minto to Morley - 27 February 1907. Ibid.
5. Minto to Morley - 5 March 1907* Ibid.
6. John Buchan, Lord Minto, London-, T924. p.231,
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members of his Executive Council possible changes like the 
appointment of an Indian to his Executive Council, but the 
members of his Council were not favourably inclined to such 
an idea, so he dropped it. In a letter on 28 May 1906, Minto 
stated that he had been thinking of "a possible counterpoise 
to Congress aims" and suggested that "we may find a solution 
in the Council of Princes".'1' Morley was sceptical. "What 
would the Council discuss? What power of directing or 
influencing the executive? How far could they be allowed to 
look into the secrets of Government?", he asked. But he 
admitted, "it is with the liveliest satisfaction that I 
perceive in your letter of the 28 May how much cool,
equitable and penetrating reflection you are giving to all
2
our puzzles".
Morley knew that he had no practical knowledge of 
Indian affairs,  ^ that India was not England; and that one 
cannot transplant British institutions wholesale into that 
country, whatever the Congress or others might think. He 
was of the opinion that India had reached in her political 
evolution a stage between the old strictly bureaucratic 
regime, and government by representative and constitutional 
institutions. And it was after becoming sure that Minto was 
thinking in the same direction of administrative reform that
1. Minto to Morley - 28 May 1906. Morley Papers.
2. Morley to Minto - 22 June 1906. Ibid.
3. Morley to Minto - 21 June 1907. Tbid. "I do not know
the Indian ground ...".
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Morley suggested, "Either do you write me a despatch, or
I'll write you one - by way of opening the ball" before "the
demands will widen and extend into 'National' reasons, where
I at least look with a very doubting and suspicious eye.1'"1"
Minto readily fell in line with Morley but expressed
the desire that the initiative should come from the
Government of India, being the Government on the spot and
to avoid any misgiving in the minds of the people that the
2
Government of India had been forced. It was a statesmanlike 
suggestion and Morley acquiesced, Minto accordingly 
appointed a Committee of his Executive Council with Sir. A. 
Arundel as its chairman on 16 August 1906.^ The Committee 
was to give its opinion on four points; a Council of Princes 
or their representation on the Viceroy's legislative 
Council; a Native Member for the Viceroy's Executive Council; 
increased representation on the Viceroy's Legislative 
Council and that of Local Governments; and prolongation of 
the debate on Budget and powers to move amendments.^
Besides the consideration of changes in administration 
Minto diverted his attention to find out the immediate 
causes of political stir in India and in Bengal particularly 
the partition of Bengal was one of the most ticklish 
questions. The partition of Bengal announced on 3 December
1. Morley to Minto - 15 June 1906. Morley Papers,
2. Minto to Morley - 5 July 1906, Ibid.
3# Minto to Morley - 15 August 1906. Ibid,
4. Secret Minute circulated for Hon'ble Members of 
Committee's information - 15 August 1906. Ibid.
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1903 and carried out on 16 October 1905 had given a great
shock to the Congress leaders and stirred up a violent
nationalism in Bengal. The Congress considered it a
calculated move against the national unity and solidarity.
It was thought "a most arbitrary and unsympathetic evidence
2
of irresponsible and autocratic statesmanship".
In his very first letter Minto informed Morley of the 
situation in Bengal. He was not content with the official 
interpretation of the happenings in Bengal. Official opinion 
was unanimous in its approval of Partition. He was told 
that the agitation was really not due to any genuine national 
feeling in India, but due to the "loss of a certain amount 
of business, especially legal business, which now migrates 
from Calcutta to the large cities of Eastern Bengal, and 
that this feeling had been fanned into blaze by wire-pullers 
at Calcutta under the influence of other wire-pullers at 
home connected with the National Congress". The Indian 
Press had been violent, asserting that Partition had been 
carried out regardless of Bengal national sentiment and 
local feeling, and that it had been aimed to a great extent 
at the Swadeshi movement in support of the local industries
1. For a detailed account of events leading to Partition 
see P.C.Ghosh - Development of the Indian National 
Congress, 1892-lWS, Calcutta, 1950. pp.95-128. For 
Bengali Muslim attitude towards Partition see Sufia 
Ahmed - Some Aspects of the History of the Muslim 
Community in Bengal. (1884-1912). London tJniversity Ph.D. 
Thesls7T55T);" -------
2. Beport of the I.N.C. 1904. Presidential address, p.46.
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which the Government was accused of hoping to destroy.
Minto*s opinion was that "there is no douht a great deal of
truth in the assertion that the agitation has been
unscrupulously fostered, and that influence has been brought
to bear upon the student class and the universities to join
the movement. But at the same time I can-not but think there
is much more genuine feeling in the movement than the
official mind is prepared to admit .... I cannot help
suspecting that local feeling has been treated with some
want of sympathy in aiming at what in the official mind is
considered necessary for administrative machinery". Minto
thought that if the East Biding of Yorkshire were for the
best possible administrative reasons handed over to
Lincolnshire, one would hear a good deal about it and "I
believe it is incorrect to deny the existence of a somewhat
similar feeling here,"1 though the Muslims who largely-
preponderated in Eastern Bengal appeared to be generally
satisfied with what had ^jcurred,^ He, however, firmly
believed that Partition was "very necessary" and that "the
•j
agitation was settling down".
As the Prince and Princess of Wales were touring India 
at that time Minto thought it advisable to call Gokhale for 
an interview and asked him to stop the agitation pending re­
appraisal of the whole situation by his government. This
1. Minto to Morley - 13 December 1905. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - 20 December 1905. TFid.
3. Minto to Morley - Memorandum - 5 February 1906. Ibid.
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interview had a marked effect on both. Gokhale told Dunlop
Smith that "His Excellency shows sympathy and understanding"
and Minto gained "through him a real insight into the
1
aspirations of the Hindus. "
The Bengali Hindu leaders, headed by Surendranath 
Banerjea had started this agitation for the revocation of 
the partition. They held protest meetings which were 
attended by other Congress leaders as well. Their
p
processions and chanting of Bande Mataram, a song not liked 
by the Muslims of Eastern Bengal particularly, were 
considered a danger to the peace of the new province. This 
agitation unwittingly united the leaders of extreme views 
with the moderate thinking ones against the Government. It 
further gave birth to the Boycott movement - the Indians 
were to boycott British goods with a view to compel' the 
British Government to listen to their demands, This method
1. Mary, Countess of Minto - India, Minto andJVTorlev,
London 1934. p.20. T.V.Parvate, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, 
Ahmedabad, 1959, pp.310-311, does not agree with Lady 
Minto's account of this interview. According to him, 
"Gokhale could not be the theatrical courtier that he is 
made out to be by the Countess of Minto, as turning 
round to the Viceroy's Private Secretary and indulging 
in fulsome flattery". Parvate seems to have missed the 
point Lady Minto was trying to make. What she wanted to 
convey was that Gokhale was impressed by the Viceroy's 
sympathetic attitude.
2. H.W.Nevinson - The New Spirit in India, London 1908.p.15. 
This song "Hail Motherland" was not liked by the Muslims, 
Because "Motherland" was identified with the Hindu goddess 
Kali and the song was full of Hindu imagery. It was taken 
from Bankim Chandra's novel Ananda Math (The Abbey of 
Bliss). The Pioneer, 27 September 1906 suggested that it 
would be betier if the agitators invent some cry with 
"less disagreeable associations" than the pure Hindu cry 
"Bande Mataram", which is so unpalatable to the Muslims.
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had worked in Ireland and it was hoped that it would work in 
India as well. The boycott was supplemented by increased 
emphasis on the Swadeshi movement which sought to correct 
the industrial helplessness of the country.^ With these 
political and economic weapons, the Bengali Hindus sought 
the redress of their grievances. But it placed Congress in 
a difficult position, for it brought Muslim and Hindu 
interests into sharp conflict.
The Muslims, except a few, did not join these protests
and demonstrations and remained aloof. They opposed the
Congress demand for the revocation of the Partition and did
not join the Swadeshi movement, as besides being an economic
2
movement, to which probably they would not have objected, 
it had a strong religious colouring which attracted the 
Hindu masses. Swadeshi meetings opened and closed with 
Hindu songs, Bande Mataram, being one of them. Besides in 
order to symbolize continued unity of the Bengali race the
1. S.N.Banerjea - A Nation in Making, London, 1925. p.191. 
"the Swadeshi movement"had already come into existence.
At any rate the Swadeshi spirit was abroad. It was in 
the air. There was a growing party among the educated 
community who espoused it. Our industrial helplessness 
was attracting attention in an increasing measure; and 
it was readily perceived that the boycott would be a 
double-edged weapon, industrial and political, in its 
scope and character."
2. The Muslims were not opposed to Swade shi as such. The 
weavers in Bengal were mostly Muslims and it was in 
their interest. This is further borne out in a letter 
from Adamji Peerbhoy, President Muslim League Session 
1907, to Dunlop Smith dated 25 March 1908, which he sent 
with "a small true Swade shi article" as a wedding present 
to Lady Ruby Elliot. Lady Minto, My Indian Journal, 1908, 
p.77. Indian Institute, Oxford.
.rakhis (thread wristlets) were distributed. The Muslims did 
not like all these manifestations of a movement which was 
supposed to be economic. They abstained from its meetings. 
Even some of the Hindus were coerced to attend these meetings
and use Swadeshi goods. The Hitavarta, Calcutta gives a
story of a representative of the Bhattacharya family in the 
village Mahespur, District Jessore,who visited various 
families urging them to use Swadeshi goods. The defaulters 
were told that they would be ex-communicated."1'
Besides these Swadeshi meetings a new festival was 
celebrated in Calcutta, It was Shivaji festival and Tilak
p
himself spoke at one of the meetings. This festival was
first celebrated in 1896 at the Port of Raigarh in honour of
the birthday of ShLvaji, a Maratha Chieftain, who had fought 
against the Mughal army. He had assassinated Afzal Khan, a
1. The Hitavarta, Calcutta, 24 December 1905. B.N.N.R. 1905. 
Fortnightly report from the Government of Eastern Bengal 
and Assam, 8 October 1906. Chief Sect. of E.B.& A, 
Government to Government of India, 6, 8, 23, 26 
October 1906, 5 November 1906. Home Progs. August- 
December 1906. 7313* S.N.Banerjea, op.cit. pp.202-203 
shows how Pundit Kali Prosanna Kabyavisard, editor of 
the Hitabadi introduced a new element in Swadeshi 
meetings by beginning them with patriotic songs.
For a comprehensive account of the Swade shi leaders* 
tactics to make the movement popular see also J.R.
McLane - The Development of Nationalist Ideas and 
Tactics anci the Policies of the floveriimen~b of India. 
lb97-1905. London University th.D. Thesis 19b1. Ch.VI,
2. D.V.Thamankar - Lokmanya Tilak, London, 1956. pp.65-66 
says that the festival was being celebrated in Calcutta 
before Tilak was invited in 1906.
See also Ram Gopal - Lokmanya Tilak, Bombay, 1956, 
pp. 234-236.
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I general of the Mughal Army treacherously, Tilak had\i
| exonerated Shivaji from the charge of murdering Afzal Khan
[
I "by suggesting that for national reasons he was justified in
I
doing so. The revival of the Marat ha glory in the shape of 
' the Shivaji festival had undoubtedly stirred the Maratha
imagination, but it was intensely disliked by the Muslims, 
Its celebration in Bengal naturally affected the Muslim 
public opinion towards any movement with which those Hindus 
were associated who were celebrating Shivaji festival. While 
the Sandhya, the Bharat Mitra and the Yugantar praised 
Tilak and Shivaji,^ the Soltan, in most conciliatory terms 
suggested to the Hindus that if they must celebrate such 
festivals, why not find some hero who would not be as 
obnoxious and unpalatable to the Muslims, as Shivaji was.
It asked the Hindus, "How can our Hindu bretheren wipe away 
from the page of history the record of Shivaji's inhuman 
conduct towards Afzal Khan and his army? Cannot the annals 
of the Hindu race point to a single hero whom even the
tongue of slander will not dare call a chief of dacoits or
2
a treacherous man?". Such were the questions which 
remained unanswered and the cleavage between the two 
communities widened.
1. The Sandhya, Calcutta, 7 June 1906; the Bharat Mitra,
Calcutta, 9 June 1906, the Yugantar, Calcutia^, T O  June 
1906. B.N.N.R. 1906.
^ 2. The Soltan, Calcutta, 8 June 1906. Ibid.
The Boycott movement placed the Muslims in an awkward 
position and the refusal of some Muslim traders and vendors 
to agree to boycott British goods led to rioting. One such 
instance occurred in Mymensingh in Eastern Bengal in 1906. 
Thus the tactics adopted by the Hindu leaders to mobilize 
public opinion against the Partition led to strong 
differences between Hindus and Muslims. That is why this 
anti-partition agitation of the Congress Hindus, originally 
directed against the British Government, had the appearance 
of being aimed at the Muslims who had supported Partition.
Minto's first important public utterance in India was 
his reply to an address from the Indian Association on 12 
January 1906. The address dealt mostly with the situation 
in Bengal. Minto fs reply was careful but firm. He made it 
clear that he would be misleading the bearers of the address 
if he in any way appeared to encourage in them a hope of the 
reversal of the policy already agreed upon.1 He was an 
administrator and his duty was to carry out the policy 
already approved by the Secretary of State. He told them 
unhesitatingly that the reasons they had given for the 
revocation of the partition were not shared universally, so
1. In his letters to Morley, Minto explained that first he 
thought of telling the deputation that like all other 
British subjects they had a right to approach the House 
of Commons for the redress of their grievances if any.
But that meant more trouble, so he changed his mind and 
gave them no such hope, Minto to Morley - 3, 17 January 
1906. Morley Papers, I.O.L.
far as he knew. He explained that he was no opponent of 
Swadeshi, "it is only the abuse of the word to which I
object".'1' His reply naturally pleased neither the
2 1 deputationists nor the Bengali Press. The Indian Mirror
thought that Minto1s reply "has disillusioned the people"
and would not restore public confidence and that he was ill-
advised in accepting the official version of the facts as
gospel truth. It suggested to Minto that he should not
allow himself to be too much under the influence of
bureaucracy.^ The Amrita Bazar Patrika was of the opinion
that instead of giving the reply in a purely "official way",
Minto might have said that he could not commit himself to
an expression of opinion on the difficult points raised.
Such a reply would not have offended the people, where as
the reply he actually had given had wounded their feelings
and created the impression that "he favoured the official
party at the cost of the nation". It, however, advised the
people not to lose heart as their cause was just and if the
Viceroy could not redress the Bengali grievances, the
15
Secretary Of State and Parliament would do it. According 
to the Charu Mihir, Minto’s reply had made the people 
despair of getting any redress of their grievances. The
1. Speeches of the Earl of Minto, Calcutta, 1911. p.28.
2. lady Minto - iMy Indian Journal, Vol.I. 1905-6. p.45.
3. B.N.N.R. 1906. To keep himself informed of the day to 
day position, Minto asked for fortnightly reports from 
the Lt,Governors of the two provinces besides these 
newspaper reports.
4. The Indian Mirror, 14,18 January 1906. B.N.N.R.1906.
5. The. Amrita ~Bazar Patrika, 15,16 January 19o6. Ihid.
6. The faharu Mihir, liymen Singh, 16 January 1906."*TEad.
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Sri Sri Vishnu Priya-o-Ananda Bazar Patrika thought that it
"has disappointed the Bengali people
But there were still hopes that the question of the
Partition would he raised in Parliament and that the new
Ministry would undo the unjust act. In the House of Commons
some Liberal members, H.Roberts, Denbighshire W; Sir Henry
Cotton, Nottingham E; C.J.01Donne11, Newington, Walworth;
T.Hart-Davies, Hackney N: and D.M.Smeaton, Stirlingshire, *
2
pressed Morley for a reconsideration of the Partition. Sir 
Henry Cotton explained that the Bengali race, with all their 
faults, were the principal section of the Indian Community 
who had inspired the new national patriotism in which was 
centred the hope and destiny of their country. This partition 
was designed to weaken the Bengalee ascendency. The object of 
the partition was to strike a blow at an intelligence and 
enterprise which had taken a form which the officials did not 
approve of. The wish of the people of Bengal was that the old 
state of things should be restored and that they might still 
be placed under one government. He admitted the practical 
difficulties of undoing the partition but suggested that 
"it was possible to meet the feeling in India by some 
modification of the existing arrangement". With regard to 
the Hindu-Muslim differences he admitted that it was
1* The Sri Sri Vishnu Priya-o-Ananda Bazar Patrika,
Calcutta. 18 January 1906. B.N.N.R. I9O6.
2. Hansard. House of Commons. 4.S. Vol.152. (February - 
March I9O6 ). 26 February 1906. Cols. 811-15; 822-30; 
835-36; 837; 838-42.
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partially true that the Muslims had not joined the protest
meetings, but they were absolutely at one with the Hindus in
this demand for revocation of Partition, On what evidence he
based his statement he did not clarifyT.Hart-Davies was
not sure whether it was a "Machiavellian policyn framed by
the late Government, but he was of opinion that it was part
of "the wild policy" followed by the late Government in
China, South Africa and the Somaliland, He, therefore,
suggested that considering the new spirit prevalent in India,
the new government should respond to the aspirations of the 
2
people, C. J .0 fI)onnell informed Morley that it was possible 
•'to do away with what had been done",^ Earl Percy, on the 
other hand, stated that there was no doubt that the Partition 
had given rise to a great deal of discontent. But, in his 
opinion, it not only subserved the interests of 
administration, but it actually secured far better grouping 
than had hitherto existed both of language and nationality 
by recognizing the preponderance of the Muslim element in 
the North and amalgamating the Uriyah-speaking populations 
of the West.^ Morley !s reply was a definite no to any 
suggestion of reconsideration of the partition. In his 
opinion the partition was a "settled fact",
t
-**• Hansard. House of Commons. 4.S. Vol. 152. (February - March 
19o6) .  26 February 1906. Cols, 822-830.
2. Ibid. Col.837.
3. TbiH. Col.836.
4. Tbid. Col.847.
5. TbTcT, Col.844.
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The Bengali Press, which had pinned down their hopes > 
on the new government for revocation of the partition, was 
shocked at Morleyfs statement. The Hitavadi thought that 
"elevation to power has a levelling effect in the field of 
politics. The charm of office makes men belonging to widely 
different political creeds express the same views about 
political incidents". 'John Morley was the classic example
i
of this, because he supported the partition on the same
grounds on which his predecessor in the India Office
supported it. It, therefore, urged the people to do
something that should make Morley repent one day for having
supported the partition. Let him not say that the agitation
was subsiding. The authorities must be brought to senses by
a thorough boycott of English goods. Bande Mataram should
henceforth be "our only instrument instead of prayers and
petitions".^ The Sandhya sarcastically stated that it was
happy that Morley had rejected their plea of revoking
partition, because it had served "to open our eyes to the
2
true nature of feringis and indicate to us the true means 
of getting divided Bengal re-united." In its opinion "the
1. The Daily Hitavadi; Calcutta, 28 February 1906. B.N.N.R. 
On 2 March 1906, it stated that Morley*s statement "has 
created the greatest suspioion in the public mind as 
regards British justice . The national crisis has become 
all the more acute. But it will not do to remain inactive 
.... A stirring agitation must be got up again and the 
entire British public informed of the actual state of 
things ".
2. A Persian word, meaning foreigner, originally used for 
Europeans, but later on acquired a contemptuous meaning.
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harsher Sir B. Fuller!s strokes will become, the more Lord 
Minto and Mr. Morley will spurn at us, and the fiercer the 
course of official oppression on students will grow, and the 
more the feringi will exhibit his true nature, the closer 
will the divided parts of Bengal be drawn together in bonds 
of unity. Life comes through death. Life will not come to us 
so long as death does not overcome our false political 
agitation, unnatural love for feringis, our despicable want 
of self-reliance and the ideas and superstition which an 
alien education has generated in us,,.'L The Bengalee urged 
Morley to think again as "Liberalism becomes a very 
meaningless creed if it is to tolerate or perpetuate evils 
simply because they are settled things". It advocated a
vigorous agitation to show that they were not slackening in
2
their demand. The Amrita Bazar Patrika and the Indian 
Mirror also urged for a stifring to inform the entire British 
public opinion of the actual state of things.^ The Amrita 
Bazar Patrika thought that Morley's statement resembled the 
decision of King Habu Chander (a legendary King), who once 
ordered a person to be hanged on charges of murdering 
another. But the King could not take back his order when the 
alleged murdered person appeared in his court.^ It wondered 
what had happened to Morley. He was silent and acquiesing in
1. The Sandhya, Calcutta, 28 February 1906. B.N.N.K. 1906.
2. The Bengalee, 28 February, 2 March 1906. Ibid.
3* The Amrita Bazar Patrika, 28 February 1905; the Indian 
Mirror, 28 Fe bruary 1906. Ibid.
4. The Amrita Bazar Patrika, 2 March 1906. Ibid.
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the perpetuation of the wrongs. It decided to pin no hopes
either on Liberals or Tories but appeal to the Labour - the
working classes of England.^ With regard to Morleyfs
statement that the agitation was subsiding, the Indian
Mirror stated that he had been misinformed. It was true that
the first paroxysm of grief had passed, "but the grief is
2
still there - silent, settled and unabated". The Dacca 
Gazette simply said, "so, after all, the fate of Bengal is 
sealed!
While this controversy was going on in the Press with 
regard to Minto and Morley's policy towards the partition of 
Bengal, Puller1s administration of the Eastern Bengal and 
Assam had also taken a very controversial turn which 
ultimately resulted in his resignation. The most important 
decision Minto had to take early in his administration was 
the acceptance of Sir J. Bampfylde Fuller's resignation. 
Puller had become the object of Congress attacks because of 
some of his tactless expressions and attempts to fight the 
agitation. His attitude had annoyed the Congress leaders and 
the Bengalee, the Congress's most vociferous organ, wrote 
strongly against him. ^  The Bengali Press opposed Puller for
1. The Amrita Bazar Patrika, 25, 27 May 1906, B.N.N.R. 1906.
2. The Indian Mirror, 3 March 1906. Ibid.
3. The Dacca Gazette, Dacca, 5 March 1906. Ibid.
4. The Bengalee, 24 June 1906. The extracts from the Press
in the B.NlN.R. 1906 show the intense dislike the Bengali 
Hindu Press had for Puller, He was called ^Muhammad 
Tughlak of East Bengal" (the Sanjivani, 26 April 1906); 
"Shaista Khan II" (the Bengalee, 1 May 1906; the Amrita 
Bazar iatrika, T  May 1906; etc. The period of his Lt.
Governorship was called a period of great "Zulum"
(terror).
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three reasons. He was appointed to a province the creation 
of which the Bengali Hindu Press did not like. Secondly, he 
tried to suppress the Bengali Hindu agitation sternly by 
banning its meetings and the cry of Bande Mataram because a 
large section of the Muslim population in Eastern Bengal did 
not approve of these and there was danger of disorder in the 
province. Thirdly in an attempt to redress the Muslim 
grievance of meagre representation in the provincial 
administration he exposed himself to the charge of partiality. 
The Bengali press was owned by Hindus. The Muslims had no 
papers of their own except one or two weeklies which had a 
very poor circulation.
The Swadeshi and Boycott movements had attracted 
students from schools and colleges and they were taking 
active part. The Government did not like their participation. 
So on 10 October 1905, even before the new Province 
came into existence, the Government of Bengal issued a 
circular with regard to the participation of school and 
college students in political agitation. The magistrates 
and collectors in each district were instructed to take 
notice of students taking part in political activities. They 
were directed to inform the heads of schools and colleges 
that in the event of the students of any particular 
institution taking part in such a movement, its grants-in- 
aid and other privileges would be withdrawn. Its students 
would not be permitted to compete for scholarships and
scholarship holders would not he admitted there. The 
institution would, however, not he punished, if it was found 
to he taking sincere efforts to prevent such disorders, hut 
then it was obliged to give the names of the offenders to 
the authorities. The magistrates and collectors were given 
powers to take either disciplinary action themselves or ask
1
the educational authorities to punish the students concerned.
Puller issued a similar circular on 16 October 1905. 
According to this circular the district authorities were to 
furnish the names of prominent residents of their districts 
who had been taking a leading part in the agitation. It also 
stated that the Government would take a lenient view except 
in one particular case, "the scandalous vernacular broad 
sheets which have been in circulation," and the authorities
were asked to spare "no pains" to discover any persons who
2
have been disseminating them. These "broad sheets" were 
various circulars that the Bengali leaders issued 
encouraging people to maintain boycott of foreign goods and 
agitate. Most of these were issued anonymously, but where 
ever the authors were brought to government's notice, they 
were warned, made to withdraw or punished. In Government's
1. Circular from Government of Bengal to Magistrates and 
Collectors, 10 October 1905. Parly.Papers. Cd.3242.
J.R. McLane, op.cit. gives a number of instances where
students took active part in Swadeshi and Boycott movements.
2. Demi-official circular from Government of Eastern Bengal 
and Assam to the Commissioners of Rajshahi, Dacca, 
Chittagong and heads of all other districts, 16 October 
1905. Parly.Papers,Cd.3242.
view these circulars tended to excite people and were thus
a danger to the maintenance of law and order in the province.
For instance, in Barisal Aswini Kumar Butt 1 and some other
leaders had issued one such circular. Fuller called them for
an interview and asked them to withdraw their circular,
which they did. They agreed to withdraw it because in their
own words, it ’’contains certain expressions that may tend to
plead people to commit breaches of the peace”. The Bengali 
Press alleged that in this meeting Fuller's behaviour was 
rude and he did not even ask the leaders to sit down. The 
San.jivani, therefore, asked/’should Lord Minto not think of 
removing such a man who was so much deprived of the sense of 
gentlemanliness?
Nevertheless the Boycott leaders took no notice of 
Fuller's circulars and the students were encouraged to take 
an active part in political affairs,^ A volunteer corps of 
the teachers and students of the Banwari Lai High School and
1. Aswini Kumar Butt - A prominent leader of Barisal, very 
active during the Swadeshi and Boycott movement. Founder 
of Brajo Mohan College, was later deported for 'seditious 
activities',
2. Baily Hitavadi, 24 November 1905. B.N.N.R. 1905.
3- The San3ivani," 28 Becember 1905. Ibid.
4. S.N.Banerjea - op.cit. p.196. See also - Home Progs. 
Public/Political, January-March 1906 (73ll); April - 
July 1906 (7312)j August-Becember 1906 (7313)$ January- 
April 1907 (7587); May-August 1907 (7588); September- 
Becember 1907 (7589)$ July-Becember 1907 (7590). 
Fortnightly reports on Partition, agitation and the 
Boycott movement in Bengal from the Governments of Bengal 
and Eastern Bengal and Assam,
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the Victoria High School at Siraj ganj in the Pahna district 
was formed with a view to guard against the sale of foreign 
goods in the town.’*" The activities of this corps led to 
difficulties. Their first conflict was with the Marwaris, 
who traded in foreign cloth. On 15 November 1906, they tried 
to stop them from loading their carts with this cloth and in
the afternoon, they even went to the extent of assaulting a
2certain Carberry, an officer of the Bengal Bank.
The Government took serious notice of the whole 
affair. The inquiries of M.P.Chatterji, Inspector of Schools, 
Rajshahi Division, showed that the boys of the two schools 
had violated the rules laid down by the Government, and he 
recommended that they be punished. The Education 
Department, after considering the report, recommended to the 
Lieutenant-Governor that the Banwari Lai High School and the 
Victoria High School Sirajganj be brought to task. Puller, 
accordingly, asked the Syndicate of the Calcutta University 
to withdraw "the recognition extended to these two 
inst itutions".^
The Government of India wanted to take a lenient
1. Inspector of Schools to D.P.I., Eastern Bengal and Assam. 
2 January 1906. Para.3; Parly. Papers. Cd.3242.
2. Government of East Bengal and Assam to the Registrar, 
Calcutta University 10 February 1906. Para.2. Parly 
Papers, Cd.3242. The Times, 14 November 1906.
3. Inspector of Schools io the D.P.I., Government of East 
Bengal and Assam, 2 January 1906, Para.8. Parly Papers. 
Cd. 3242.
4. Government of East Bengal and Assam to the Registrar, 
Calcutta University 10 February 1906. Parly.Papers. 
Cd.3242. ---
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view, and thought the action of the Lieutenant-Governor 
rather tactless* He was, therefore, requested to withdraw 
his recommendations.'*’ The school authorities attempted to 
come to an amicable settlement as well* Fuller was willing 
to withdraw his recommendations, if the boys concerned paid 
a small fine. But the negotiations broke down* The Congress 
leaders from Calcutta, who had become interested in this 
affair, did not want to let this opportunity go. So they 
influenced the local people and the school authorities not 
to come to any terms with Fuller. Fuller, in the meanwhile, 
arranged for a new Government School to replace the other 
two and was even willing to re-affiliate the two schools if 
they acknowledged their past errors. But all attempts at 
negotiation failed. Fuller thought that his stooping down 
would weaken his authority and he would not be able to 
maintain public order in the province. In an attempt to 
carry the Government of India with him, and knowing little 
that things could take a different shape, he wrote to Minto
that "these orders [for the withdrawal of Fuller1s 
recommendations to the Syndicate] may be re-considered, or
that, if I am to give effect to them, my resignation may be
2 3accepted". Minto promptly accepted his resignation.
1. Government of India to Fuller, 5 July 1906. Parly Papers.
Cd. 3242.
Minto to Morley. 5 July 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Fuller to Minto - 15 July 1906'." Minxo Collection, N.L. S.
3. Telegram - Viceroy to Lt.-Governor of East Bengal and
Assam. 3 August 1906. Parly.Papers. Cd. 3242.
This was, however, the immediate cause of hisi
resignation. When the papers regarding Fuller's resignation
were presented to Parliament every effort was made to explain
that the agitation had nothing to do whatsoever with his
resignation, but the Viceroy's reference to the "present 
2
situation" when suggesting withdrawal of Fuller's 
recommendations regarding schools betray the fact that the 
political agitation did play a part in it. Minto has since 
been blamed for bowing before the agitation, much to the 
agitators' pleasure.^ It has been suggested that this showed 
weakness and that he betrayed the Civil Service by not 
upholding one of its members, and the Muslims who had come 
to look upon Fuller as the champion of their cause. It has 
also been alleged that Minto agreed to revert to even 
harsher measures later on, than those for which Fuller was 
compelled to resign in August 1906.^
1. The same immediate cause is given in the Summary of the 
Administration of the Earl Minto. in the Home department, 
November 1905 to November 1$10. Simla - l9lQ. p.b. MiirE"o 
Collection. N.L.S.
2. Grovernment of India to lyiler, 5 July 1906 
Parly Papers, Cd. 3242.
3# Ihe Bengalee, 7 August 1906. "This [Fuller's resignation] 
would point to the potency of the Bengali Press." Also 
see the Amrita Bazar Patrika, 6,7,8 August 1906, New 
India, 4 August 1906. The Indian Mirror, 7 August 1906, 
thought it "a welcome relief"; the Hindoo Patriot,
7 August 1906, it "should prove a lesson and a warning 
to officials of his class." Only the S qLtan, 10 August 
1906, and the Mihir-o-Sudhakar, Calcutta, 10 August 1906, 
both Muslim papers, praised Fuller and thought it a loss 
to Muslims.
4. V. Chirol - Indian Unrest, London 1910. p,88.
J Despite the fact that Puller wrote to Minto "we have
to be careful not to commit ourselves entirely to Musalman
interests,""*" some of his actions, during the nine month
period of his Lieutenant-Governorship, positively antagonised
the Hindu leaders. His aircular, curtailing the right of
public meeting and preventing the cry of Bande Mataram, and
the prosecutions in this connection; his attempts to
redress the genuine under-representation of the Muslims in
2
the public services, and his casual remark that out of two 
of his wives, the Hindu and Muslim, the latter was his 
favourite,^ were enough to make the Hindus angry. The 
Government of India did not approve of his handling of the 
case concerning an indecent assault on a Mehtar (sweeper) 
woman. On 21 March, 1906, Gokhale brought this to the notice 
of the Government of India by asking questions in the 
Legislative Council. He enquired the reason as to why the
1. Puller to Minto - 26 November 1905# Minto Collections 
N.L.S.
2. Puller to Minto - 26 November 1905# Ibid. The Amrita 
Bazar Patrika, 12, 15 and 16 June 1906/ The Bengalee,
14 June 1906; The Hindoo Patriot 14 June 1906; Power and 
Guardian, 17 June 1906/ The Indian Mirror, 24 June I9O6 ; 
The Indian Nation fiercely criticised the policy of the 
Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam to provide larger 
employment to the Muslims and considered the Government's 
circular which was issued to invite suggestions in this 
matter "a humiliating document". The Bengalee blamed 
the Muslims for apathy towards English education which 
caused meagerness of their numbers in Government jobs.
It considered the Government's policy a sinister move to 
curry favour with the Muslims and create a rift between 
Hindus and Muslims.
3. Morley to Minto - 5 October 1906. Morley Papers. See
H.W.Nevinson, op.cit. p.192.
Weekly Chronicle of Sylhet had been boycotted by the 
Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam. If it had committed 
some crime why criminal proceedings were not instituted 
against it. Arundel, on the information supplied by the 
local Government, told him that the paper had published a 
false report of an indecent assault on a sweeper woman named 
Mangli by a Gurkha policeman at Barisal and produced 
statements of Mangli and her husband Gunpati. As to criminal 
proceedings he explained that the local Government 
considered that no useful purpose would be fulfilled by 
instituting a criminal proceedings and therefore decided to 
withdraw from the newspaper certain facilities. On making 
further enquiries, the Government of India came to know 
that J.E.Dickinson, Assistant Superintendent of Police, in 
his enquiry, (14 December, 1905) had stated that "I have no 
hesitation in believing that an assault was actually 
committed on the woman, probably with the intent to outrage 
her modesty, but there are many suspicious circumstances 
and discrepancies which prevent my crediting the story, or 
rather imputation that her assailant was a Gurkha sepoy ...1 
The assault was committed, on the night of 10 December 1905* 
On 11 December, Babu Rajani Kanta Das, Chairman of the 
Barisal Municipality, came to T. Emerson, Magistrate with 
papers explaining that a Municipal overseer was deputed to 
make enquiries when a complaint of the assault was made to 
him. Since the woman did not wish to proceed further, he
58
suggested that the matter he dropped. But the Magistrate 
deputed Dickinson to make the enquiry. On 13 December 1905, 
the Weekly Chronicle of Sylhet published the report of the 
crime under MGurkha oppression at Barisal", On 19 December 
the report came to the notice of Fuller while on tour 
at Barisal. He sent for the papers of the enquiry and 
consulted the Legal Remembrancer as to the propriety of 
prosecuting the newspaper for libel, but was advised that 
such a prosecution would probably fail on technical grounds,. 
Fuller demanded an apology from the paper. Since it was 
not done, government advertisements and other special 
facilities from this paper were withdrawn. The Government 
of India took a serious view of the whole case, and 
blamed the local Government for not supplying them with 
full details."1" Thus compelling them to make unsatisfactory 
answers to Gokhale's questions. The Government of India 
was satisfied and agreed with Dickinson^ enquiry that 
an assault had been made and that the action of the local 
Government with regard to the newspaper was wrong. As the 
Editor was not guilty of specific misconduct in the sense 
in which he was accused, the local Government was asked to
withdraw the disabilities imposed by them on the Weekly
2
Chronicle.
1. Government of India to Government of Eastern Bengal and 
Assam, 31 May 1906. Home Progs. (Public). April-July 
1906. 7312.
2. Ibid.
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Fuller's action in connection with the Bengal 
Provincial Conference held at Barisal on 14 April 1906 
was not approved by the G-overnment of India, The Conference 
was to be held at Barisal and the delegates came from 
various parts of Bengal, The cry of Bande Mataram was 
forbidden throughout Eastern Bengal and Assam.1 Rajani 
Kanta Das, Secretary of Reception Committee was almost 
in daily contact with T. Emerson, the District Magistrate, 
Aswini Kumar Dutt was the President of the Reception 
Committee, A few days before the arrival of the 
delegates, both of them called on Emerson, who told them 
that he would not allow any procession or shouts of Bande 
Mataram in the streets of Barisal during the Conference.
p
They agreed to abide by his orders. On 13 April the 
delegates arrived in two steamers which reached 'Barisal 
ghats ^  at about 7 p.m. Surendranath Banerjea was in the 
steamer that came from Narainganj. Abdul Rasul, the 
President of the Conference and other delegates from 
Calcutta came in the steamer from Khulna, When the steamers 
reached the ghats, the delegates on them began to shout 
Bande Mataram. But about 3>500 people, who had assembled on 
the shore to receive them, did not respond. The Calcutta
1, Fuller's circular to the Commissioners of Dacca, 
Chittagong, and Rajshahi Division, 8 November 1905.
Home Progs. April -July 1906. 7312.
2, Emerson1s report, no date. The orders were verbal. Ibid,
3, Pier.
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delegates felt very sad at the apathy of Barisal people and 
some even refused to eat until the ory of Bande Mataram was 
heard publicly in the streets. F.E.Kemp, District 
Superintendent of Police, was also present there. He went on 
board the Naraingauj steamer and explained to Banerjea the 
government orders and asked him to stop those who were 
shouting. Banerjea questioned the legality of the order, but 
Kemp told him that he had not come to discuss government 
orders with him. Wiser counsels, however, prevailed and the 
delegates stopped shouting and silently went to Raja 
Bahadur's haveli.1
Next day the police came to know that the delegates 
were intending to take out a procession and shout Bande 
Mataram in the streets with a view to testf the legality of 
the government orders. Kemp thought it a great risk to the 
maintenance of law and order in the town, so he secured an 
order from Emerson, "to prevent the holding of this
procession and, if any attempt was made to carry it out to
2
disperse it and arrest the ring leaders". The delegates
1. Residence, literally a palace, S.N.Banerjea1a account of 
the arrival of the delegates differs with this only in 
one respect. He does not mention the presence of Kemp and 
says that the delegates decided to stop shouting, because 
they did not want to compromise the position of their 
hosts who had made an agreement with the authorities. He 
also states that they had decided not to shout Bande 
Mataram, only for that time, but otherwise they iiad 
agreed that the cry would be uttered throughout the 
Conference proceedings and that the local leaders 
concurred with this decision. S.N.Banerjea, op.cit.
pp.220-221.
2. Emerson's note, no date. Home Progs.Apr11-July 1906.7312.
began to collect at Raja Bahadur's haveli and the procession
left for the Pandal, an assembly place outside Bra jo Mohan
College, at 2.p.m. Abdul Rasul and his wife left in a
carriage and other leaders including Banerjea, Moti Lai
Chose, editor of the Amrita Bazar Patrika and Bhupendra Nath
Basu,1 were in the first row. According to Banerjea they had
already decided to take out a procession and shout Bande
Mataram with "full concurrence" of the Barisal leaders, and
also apprehended that the police would interfere and might
even use force. The delegates had, therefore, been warned
2
by their leaders not to carry any sticks or lathis and the 
instructions were "loyally carried out".^
The Police, armed with regulation lathis under Kemp, 
was present outside the haveli. As the first rows of the
procession were not orderly, they let them pass by. But when
the a
about 40 members oy Anti-Circular Party led by K.K.Mittra,
editor of the Sanjivani came out of the haveli, they were in
rows of two and four and had badges of Bande Mataram pinned
on their chests. The Police tried to disperse them, but
they refused and forced their way in an attempt to carry out
1. Bhupendra nath Basu - (1859*1924). A Calcutta leader. 
Congress President in 1914. Member of Bengal Legislative 
Council and Viceroy's Legislative Council.
2. Long bamboo sticks.
3. S.N.Banerjea, op.cit. p.221.
4. Anti-circular Party was founded in Calcutta to protest 
against the various circulars about schools, Bande 
Mataram and boycott issued by Fuller. Mittra was later
on deported for'seditious activities'. He was a prominent 
member of the Brahmo Samaj.
their march. At this the police started heating them, Kemp’s
report suggests that the delegates were shouting Bande
Mataram and when they were asked to stop, they resisted and
1
this resulted in a scuffle with the police. Banerjea states
that the delegates started shouting after they had heen 
2
heaten. Newspaper reports are also very confusing. It is 
not easy to determine responsibility for the start of the 
actual happening, hut it is very clear that the police did 
show grave high handedness. The sight of so many 
processionists might have unnerved the police officer and he 
ordered the police to use force. The procession was illegal 
because the authorities had not heen approached for 
permission beforehand. The Police action too, seems 
unjustified, because the reports of H. Le Meseurier, 
officiating Commissioner of Dacca, Emerson and Kemp, had not 
been able to provide any evidence that this show of force 
was necessary.
A great pandemonium ensued and the people began to 
shout Bande Mataram. Banerjea and other leaders turned back 
and Banerjea accepted the responsibility for breaking the 
law and was accordingly arrested. Banerjea was brought 
before Emerson and was fined for breaking the law as well as
1. Kemp’s report. 16 April 1906. Home Progs, 7312.
2. S.N.Banerjea, op.cit. p.222.
contempt of court.^ Here too, the nervousness of the 
officers in-charge was apparent. Banerjea was summarily tried 
and Emerson seemed to have shown his ill-temper while 
conducting the trial. Emerson maintained that the fact that 
the procession through the town had heen forbidden was known 
to Banerjea. He could have secured permission from the 
District Superintendent of Police, but he did not. This does 
not seem very convincing. Because the Government of Eastern 
Bengal admitted that section 30(i) of the Police Act (Act V 
of 1861) gave power to the police to control such processions 
but did not extend to the total prohibition of such 
processions. If the Magistrate or the Police wanted to
prohibit the procession, they could have issued orders under
2
the Criminal Procedure Code. No such orders had been issued 
as far as the first day's proceedings were concerned. Kemp's 
action, even if it was intended to stop the processionists 
shouting Bande Mataram, seemed high handed, because the 
Government had not been able to produce any evidence that 
there was any immediate danger of a Hindu-Muslim clash.
1. Banerjea presents the whole incident of his arrest in a 
most dramatic style and suggests that his arrest was 
pre-arranged. The fact was that Kemp had already the 
orders to arrest the ringleaders and Banerjea was 
extremely anxious to court arrest and assume 
responsibility in order to gain popularity.
2. Emerson's report; P.C.Lyon, Chief Secretary to Government 
of E.B. and A. to Secretary, Government of India, Home 
Deptt. no.45, dated 25 April 1906. Home Progs. 7312.
Local officers took a faulty decision and acted outrageously. 
Even the Officiating Chief Commissioner of Dacca did not 
know about it till quite late. Puller pleaded, that it was a 
difficult situation and the officer concerned was under 
great pressure."*-
Another interesting feature of all these proceedings 
is the absence of local leaders. Throughout these incidents, 
it seems, the local leaders had been pushed aside and the 
Calcutta leaders took the responsibility of testing the 
legality of the Government order against the cry of Bande 
Mataram. Newspaper reports clearly show that the Calcutta 
delegates, particularly the members of the Anti-Circular 
Society under K.K.Mittra were determined to have their own 
way. There is more evidence to suggest this. On 15 April,
Kemp received reports from Inspector Kali Kishore Chaudhuri 
and Girija Kanta Bal that the delegates intended to take a 
procession. He asked Emerson to pass an order under Section 
144, Criminal Procedure Code, for stopping the Conference, 
because it would not otherwise be possible to stop the 
procession. Emerson issued the orders. Before carrying out 
the orders, Kemp approached Rajani Kanta Das, who at first
1.Report of H. Le Mesurier, offg. Commissioner of Dacca 
Division, 18 April 1906. Government of E.B. and A. to 
Government of India. 25 April 1906. Home Progs.7312. The 
newspaper reports, no doubt suggest 'that the Mus 1 ims did 
become uneasy after the Barisal events.
denied any knowledge of the procession, hut after
aonsultation with other leaders he confirmed it. He, however,
1
gave no assurance that Bande Mataram would not he shouted.
The Conference was ultimately stopped under Emersonfs 
orders. Kemp's reason in securing prohibition of the 
Conference was that it was not possible to control such a 
huge procession.
The whole incident has a melo-dramatic touch. The 
main characters are three - Banerjea leading the Calcutta 
delegates, Kemp, the Superintendent of Police and Emerson 
the Magistrate, Between them a situation was created which 
undoubtedly stirred the political atmosphere and brought 
Banerjea into the limelight, but discredited Puller's 
Government. Determination of the Calcutta leaders to test 
Puller's circular against Bande Mataram cannot be 
denied. In this they received loyal but unenthusiastic 
support from Barisal leaders. Kemp's nervousness gave the 
whole affair a colour which ordinarily it would not have 
acquired. Emerson's conduct at Banerjea's trial was also 
not blameless.
The Government of India was immediately
p
approached and ^ enquiry was demanded. Dr. V.H.
Rutherford, J. Ward, and Sir Henry Cotton
1. Rajani Kanto Das to Kemp - 15 April 1906. Home Progs. 
7312.
2. A.Chaudhuri to Dunlop Smith, telegram, 15 April 1906. 
Abdul Rasul, President of the Conference to Dunlop 
Smith, telegram, 16 April 1906. Ibid.
asked questions in the House of Commons."1" But the Bengali 
Press was most indignant. The Bengalee wrote violently about 
the whole incident and called the events at Barisal the 
"climax of brutality" and thought that Surendranath 
Banerjea1s arrest was the "brilliant coup d fetat of the
p
Jungly lat". The Daily Hitavadi questioned - "Is this 
British rule or the regime of Nadir Shah?" It was not sure 
whether "such anarchy prevailed even in the time of Shaista 
Khan". It further informed the English officials that they 
were bound by law, and that a repetition of the Zulum of the 
Badshahi and Nawabi regime was an impossibility in these 
days of civilisation. In its opinion Emerson was "a dog 
unfit even to touch the shoes of Babu Surendranath".^ The 
Indian Mirror and the Sri Sri Vishnu Priya-o-Ananda Bazar 
Patrika requested Minto to set things right in Eastern 
Bengal by recalling Fuller.^ The Amrita Bazar Patrika; the 
San.iivani, and the Sandhya were all violently hostile. The 
Indian Empire could not "help crying out that the glory of
1. Hansard, House of Commons. 4S. Vol. 156 (26 April - 10 
MayT'9"06 ), 1 May 1906. Col. 402.
2. The Bengalee, 15, 17 April and ff,1906. "Jungly Lat" - 
Wild- Master, uncivilised ruler meaning Puller.
3. Daily Hitavadi, Calcutta. 15, 17, 20 April 1906. B. N.N.R.
1906. Reference to Nadirshah and Shaista Khan - Badshahi 
(Muslim Kingship) and Nawabi must be noted. While under­
rating the British regime, ^he aim of the Congress 
papers was to solicit Muslim support. It is doubtful 
whether such comparisons would have brought Muslims 
nearer to the Hindus,
4. The Indian Mirror, 17, 18 April 1906. The Sri Sri Vishnu 
Priya-o-Ananda Bazar Patrika, 19 April 1906. B.N.N.
1906.
5. 17, 18, 26 April 1906. Ibid,
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the British Government in India has departed...nlIn the
opinion of the Hindoo Patriot, the Government of Eastern
Bengal and Assam had acted "outrageously, senselessly and
illegaily", hut suggested that passion and prejudice had
done enough harm and hoth the Government and the people
should learn to he more tolerant and more solicitous for the
2
welfare of the country. But the Englishman put all the 
hlame on the Calcutta leaders as they deliberately chose 
Barisal with Mthe mischievous idea of making trouble."^
Fuller withdrew the circular banning the cry of Bande 
Mataram after this great stalemate and as a face saving 
device, the Government of India suggested that he might base 
its withdrawal on the good behaviour of the Barisal people 
in standing aloof during recent agitation.^ Morley 
announced this withdrawal in the House of Commons.
Minto had not liked Fuller's handling of the 
situation. He wrote to Morley, "In Fuller's case one cannot 
put one's finger upon any particular act of his for which
1. The Indian Empire, 24 April 1906. Ibid.
2. The Hindoo Patriot, 18, 19* 20 April 1906. Ibid.
3. The Englishman, 16 April 1906.
4. Government of India to Government of E.B. and A. - 
telegram 4 May 1906. Home Progs. 7312. B.C.Pal addressing 
a meeting of about 4000 people at Barisal on 1 March 1907 
said that lathis were shown to the people to stop their 
agitation tut when they had made the Government 
understand that they also had lathis, and bamboo groves 
behind their homes , the Bande Mataram circular was 
withdrawn, not as a favour but through fear. C.I.D.
Report of B.C.Pal's speech. Public Letters from India.
1907. Vol.35. :
5. Hansard. House of Commons. 4S Vol.157 (11 May to 25 May 
1906), 14 May 1906. Col.177.
he could he justly recalled. His proclamations, his dealings
with the schools, the story of the Mehtar woman, and lastly
this unfortunate murder appeal case,1 have heen rather
illustrations of want of tact and of good judgment than
2
anything more serious.” But Minto explained more fully in 
a letter to Sir V. Chirol, written quite some time after 
the incident. "The question I had to deal with was, not 
whether his action towards the school was right or wrong, 
hut how in the world to get a dangerous man away from a 
position, his retention of which would quite certainly have 
produced a conflagration in Eastern Bengal. He was hysterical
1. Udoy Patani was sentenced to death for murder and was 
accordingly hanged. His execution became a cause of great 
resentment, because he was hanged before his appeal could 
reach the Viceroy. A number of questions were asked in 
the House of Commons and Morley admitted that a mistake 
had been committed in the sense that Udoy Patani was 
hanged before the decision of the Government of India with 
regard to his sentence. Since the Government of India was 
convinced of the crime committed by Udoy Patani it was 
doubtful that his appeal would have been accepted, yet
the fact that he was hanged before the Government of 
India*s decision does refleot a grave mistake on the part 
of the Local Government. The Local Government was 
negligent in the sense that it did not give much time for 
Udoy Patani*s appeal to reach the Government of India and 
the execution of the sentence. The date of his execution 
was fixed by the Sessions Judge for 21 May 1906. The 
prisoner*s appeal was turned down by the Lt. Governor on 
"12 May. On Sunday 13 May the Prisoner orally appealed 
through the Superintendent to the Government of India, On 
15 May the Local Government sent the papers under 
registered cover marked "immediate" to the Government of 
India, but these did not come into the hands of the 
Government of India until 10 o*clock on the morning of 
Monday 21 May. He was executed at 7 o'clock the same 
morning, Morley*s statement in the House of Commons.
12 July 1906. Hansard. House of Commons. 4S Vol.160.
(4 July to 16 July 1906,) Col.1047.
2. Minto to Morley - 5 July 1906, Morley Papers. I.O.L.
and absolutely unsuited for a position full of risk and
1
requiring infinite tact."
Both Minto and Morley agreed that Puller was not the 
right man to tackle the delicate situation in Eastern Bengal 
and Assam. "Puller, the Lieutenant-Governor, though a 
pleasant man to talk to, does not at all impress me as 
likely to take a level-headed course of action, and there
has been very stupid mismanagement there lately", wrote
2
Minto to Morley. A few days after the Barisal incident, 
Minto wrote that he was "somewhat doubtful of the good 
judgment of the local Government, and I cannot but suspect 
that things might have been better managed the other day at 
Barisal."^ In spite of all his dislike of Puller's 
tactlessness, Minto did not want him to be made a "scape­
goat" on "public grounds".^" He further thought that 
Puller's removal from the Lieutenant-Governorship would be 
looked upon as a victory gained by the Bengali leaders and 
would have a mischievous effect throughout India.
1. Minto to Chirol - 18 May 1910. Minto Collection N.L.S. 
In reply Chirol wrote that all that had been told him 
about Puller "takes me, I confess, by surprise, I am 
inclined to think that to the present day he ascribed 
his dismissal merely to the difference of opinion between 
the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam and the Home 
Department with regard to matters of school discipline", 
Chirol to Minto - 23 May 1910. Minto Collection N.L.S.
2. Minto to Morley - 29 March 1906 - Morley Papers. I.O.L.
3* Minto to Morley - 25 April 1906. Ibid.
4, Minto to Morley - 16 May 1906. Ibid.
5# Minto to Morley - 27 June 1906. Ibid.
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Morley on the other hand, did not have that cool and 
unperturbed mind. His continuous harrassment in the House of 
Commons regarding Puller's actions made him extremely 
impatient. He wrote to Minto, "Granted that Curzon's choice 
of Puller for a difficult post was not happy 5 granted that 
it may he wise to "save his face"; I still cherish a lively 
hope that bye-and-bye some means may be found of removing 
him to a post more sympathetic to him. If the agitation 
subsides, so be it. If not, I must say frankly that it will 
be impossible for me to carry both Partition and Puller on 
my back,
Puller himself provided an opportunity. Minto and
2
Morley thought it a "stroke of luck", and both heaved a 
sigh of relief. Puller was, on the other hand, stunned 
with this decision to accept his resignation, as he had not 
expected it. His only objection, when he placed his case 
before Morley, was that he was not given an opportunity to 
explain and he received no clear indication of the line of 
policy to follow.4 Minto defended his action, which he
1. Morley to Minto - 3 May 1906, Morley Papers. I.0.1. See 
T.V.Parvate, op.cit. pp,209-21in G-okhale's letters to 
Krishna Swami, 8 June 1906 and N.A.Dravid, 6 July 1906 - 
Since his arrival in England G-okhale had been pressing 
Morley for Puller's transfer and Morley had virtually 
promised him to make an announcement in this regard. See 
also P.A.Hirtzel1s Diary - 14 May, 2,10,11,23 July 1906. 
Home Misc. 864* I.O.L.
2. (Minto to Morley - 25 Jyly 1906 ) Morlev Paners I O L
(Morley to Minto - 20 September 1906) • -Gy ^aPer3-i»0»^»
3. Minto to Chirol - 18 May 1910 - Minto Collection ■ N.L.S.
"I never was so relieved in my life as when he resigned".
4. Morley to Minto - 9 October 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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himself was so reluctant to take, with the thought that if
he had asked Fuller to come to Simla and discuss matters
with him, it would not have heen possible to get rid of him.
The officials in Simla would have exerted all their influence
in favour of Fuller."*" Moreover, "there was no policy,
entailing a change in the nature of his administration,
advocated by the Government of India. We assumed that he
would administer his province and enforce law and order in a
reasonable manner with the machinery at his command, but he
2
did not act reasonably or judiciously ..."
Fuller was himself responsible for his undoing.^ He 
was rash, tactless and impulsive, though "shrewd, eager, - 
quite well-fitted for Government work of ordinary scope.
1. Lady Minto - op.cit. Vol.II. 1905-6. p.179 and pp.241-3. 
"The Members of Council, whom Roily [Minto] consulted, 
feared that, if his resignation was accepted, the 
impression throughout India would be that the agitation 
had brought about the desired result, and that they would 
howl all the louder, in order to obtain further conces­
sions. Roily decided that this danger was preferable to 
the risk of keeping on Sir Bampfylde, with the probability 
of having to recall him at some future date, so accepted 
his resignation." Lady Minto thought that Fuller was a 
rash, "hot-headed and impetuous Irishman." See also 
Dunlop Smith’s note on Fuller’s resignation in the same 
Journal - 1908. pp.227-237.
2. Minto to Morley, 28 October 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
3. "People ask me," he [Sir Andrew Fraserj said, "was it 
Lord Minto fs doing or Mr. Morley's doing; I say it was 
Fuller’s doing." Morley to Minto. 14 September 1906.
Ibid.
4. Morley to Minto. 5 October 1906. Fuller missed another 
chance, when it was suggested that he should be appointed 
to the Secretary of State’s Council and Morley had almost 
made up his mind to do so He published a letter in 
the Times, 6 June 1908, criticising the Government policy. 
This made Morley change his mind immediately. Morley to 
Minto - 8 June 1908. Ibid.
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The agitators were jubilant at Puller's fall, but the 
Muslims started an agitation condemning the Government of 
India's action* Minto, Morley and Sir Arthur Godley, all 
thought it a good sign* "As long as it does not get out of 
control it will be useful to us," Minto thought,"*" "I cannot 
help being rather pleased at the demonstrations which are 
being made in his favour. They will be a most useful reminder 
to people in this country - some of them in high positions - 
that the Bengali is not everybody in India," wrote Godley 
to Minto.^
But Puller's fall did not solve the problem of 
Partition. There was still hope of discussion in Parliament 
and a possible reversal of the action taken* The agitation 
against the Partition was kept alive. Minto did not think 
it desirable that in India "a change of Government at home 
should be looked to as likely to bring about the reversal of 
decisions arrived at here". The Government of India had a 
strong point - not to surrender to agitation by unsettling 
the settled fact. This would also mean betraying the Muslims 
in Eastern Bengal who "appear to be generally satisfied with 
what has occurred".^ In a later letter Minto informed Morley 
that even Gokhale said that he "was not opposed to partition, 
that he recognised Mohammedan claims and so on; that he knew
1. Minto to Morley, 22 August 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Godley to Minto - 20 September 196b, Minto Collections. 
N.L.S.
3. Minto to Morley - 20 December 1905* Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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the anti-partition feeling in Bengal was really nothing hut
1
sentimental”. Dr* A. Mukerji, Vice Chancellor of Calcutta 
University, had earlier informed Minto that the anti-
2
partition agitation was the work of disappointed agitators.
All these opinions of leading Indians had helped Minto to
form his opinion ahout this complex problem. And the
"settled fact" remained settled during Mintofs Viceroyalty,
despite Morley!s dictatorial assertion that "I had only to
lift my finger, and the H. of C, would instantly have passed
a resolution that would have overthrown the "settled fact"
•3
in a trice".
While Minto and Morley were shaping their policy 
towards Indian aspirations, the Congress leaders were busy 
in making their voice more effective, A section of them 
becoming tired of the "mendicant policy" of the moderate 
Congress leaders, tried to divert the line of action. 
Earliest symptoms of this extremism appeared at the Benares 
Congress of 1905, but the first open rupture manifested 
itself in the Calcutta Congress of 1906.
By a clever move, the extremists were hoodwinked and 
Dadabhai Naoroji was invited to preside over the
1. Minto to Morley - 5 November 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - 16 May 1906. Ibid.
3. Morley to Minto - 24 January 1907. Ibid. See also
S.N.Banerjea, op.cit, p.283. “ "it was clear that Lord
Minto would do-'nothing to modify the Partition. "
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deliberations of 1906 session of the Congress at Calcutta."*"
The extremists were not willing to take it lying down. Tilak,
in a speech on 7 June, had already said that the days of
protests and prayers had gone and nothing would be achieved
unless the demand was backed by ,fsolid force". His
conclusion was that nothing much should be expected "from a
2
change m  government".
The Congress session of 1906, thus heard the speeches 
of Tilak, B.C.Pal and Aurabindo Ghose, along with the 
moderately worded speech of the President and other moderate 
leaders.^ Dadabhai Naoroji declared that the goal of the 
Congress was to attain "Swaraj" or "self-government", ^  and a 
resolution was also passed which said that "the system of 
Government obtaining in the self-governing British Colonies 
should be extended to India". Minto thought Naoroji!s
1. The extremists wanted Tilak to be the Congress President, 
but the moderates did not, so Surendranath Banerjea wrote 
to Naoroji, who agreed to come. R.P.Maaani, - Dadabhai 
Naoroji, London. 1939. p.497. Minto also thought it a 
good thing, but doubted whether Naoroji would be able "to 
control some of the firebrands he has to deal with" - 
Minto to Morley. 18 November 1906. Morley Papers, I.O.L.
2. Speeches and Writings of Tilak - Madras l91b. pp.24-25.
3. Minto realized that the time had come when the moderates 
should be given "a pat on the back". He, not only opened 
the Industrial Exhibition, but tried to repair the damage 
done by Curzon's policy towards the Congress by even 
permitting the high officials, viz; Lieutenant-Governor, 
Lord Kitchener, and Dunlop Smith, to attend the garden 
party given by the Maharaja of Darbhanga to receive the 
Congress delegates. Minto to Morley - 26 December 1906. 
Morley Papers. I.O.L.
4. Report of the I.N.C. 1906. Presidential Speech, p#21.
5. Ibid. Resolution.
address "very long and impractical" and the type of 
administration he had foreshadowed as "impossible".^ Morley, 
however, thought that "this gives me plenty to think about,
and sows the seeds of plenty of difficulties, great or small,
2
for me in the next session of the House of Commons". Minto 
was keenly interested in Dadabhai*s views, but was surprised 
when he went away without seeking an interview, "which", he 
wrote, "I would gladly have given him". Minto suspected "his 
[Naoroji's] not doing so was out of regard to Extremist* 
susceptibilities".^
It is interesting to note that this session of the 
Congress did not take any notice of either the Muslim 
Deputation that had met the Viceroy, or the contents of 
their Address to him and the Viceroy fs reply. Nor did any 
speaker try to discuss or mention the various demands of the 
Muslims and the fear that they had expressed of being 
subjected to a Hindu majority if a representative form of 
government was introduced. The Viceroy*s reply must have 
startled the Congress leaders. The number of Muslims 
attending this session was not very encouraging, for out of 
1663 delegates 45 were Muslims, of whom 24 were from Bengal. 
Moreover, the Nawab of Dacca*s scheme of an All-India Muslim
1. Minto to Morley - 2 January 1907. Morley Papers. Minto 
also informed Morley that "There has been a siiff fight 
in Congress between the Extremists and Moderates, 
resulting, as far as one can see at present, in the 
complete success of the latter."
2. Morley to Minto - 27 December 1906. Ibid.
3. Minto to Morley - 16 January 1907* Ibid.
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Confederacy was already in circulation and the Congress 
papers had not only discussed and criticised this scheme, 
hut had also laughed at the idea of any independent Muslim 
organisation. The All-India Muslim League was meeting for 
the first time in those very days in Dacca,
Perhaps the Congress leaders were too much occupied 
with their own difficulties to think very seriously about 
the nascent Muslim movement, except for a slight reference 
in Surendranath Banerjea's speech, Dadabhai Naoroji, however, 
in his presidential address, did try to enlist the support 
of the Muslims by quoting Sir Syed Ahmed and saying that he 
was "a nationalist to the backbone". He hoped that Mthe wise 
and patriotic counsel of that great man" his Muslim friends 
"will take to heart". He emphasised "that our emancipation 
depends upon the thorough union of all the people of India 
without any obstruction".1 Surendranath Banerjea, speaking
i
as a member of the Hindu Community", desired "to tell my 
Mahomedan fellow-countrymen that we notice with satisfaction 
the political ferment which we witness in the great Islamic 
oommunity in India, We rejoice at the growing aspirations of 
theMahommedan Community, Prom us Hindus, you will receive 
nothing but sympathy and co-operation, for, we recognise 
that you are brothers linked to us by an inseparable destiny.
j
Hindus and Mahommedans let us stand on a common platform
2
...." The remarks of the chairman of the Reception
1. Report of the I. N.C. 1906. Presidential Address, p.32.
2, ^fbid. 1906. Speech - S.N.Banerjea. p.77*
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Committee, Dr, Rash Behari Ghose, on the other hand, might 
have antagonised those Muslims who were urged to join the 
Congress, In an attempt to emphasise that the Muslims were 
well represented he said, "with the exception of some 
Nawabs and Khan Bahadurs in the Eastern province who are 
now weeping like the poor Queen of Carthage for Sir Joseph 
Fuller, you will find on the Reception Committee almost all 
the most prominent men of Bengal, Behar and Orissa , "  And 
it was those very Nawabs and Khan Bahadurs who were laying 
the foundations of the All-India Muslim League,
The Congress, despite its growing strength, showed 
grave weakness. Its leadership was hopelessly divided and 
it worked, under conflicting principles. Gokhale was liked 
by Morley and Minto and he was the foremost leader, but he 
was weak and lacked unifying magnetism. Morley thought "he
[Gokhale] had a politicians head, but "as a party
2
manager," he "is a baby". Gokhale had a difficult task.
Morley had clearly told him that to implant English
political institutions in India was a dream but "for 
reasonable reforms in your direction, there is now an 
unexampled chance". Morley frankly told Gokhale that the 
chance of such reforms might be spoilt by the perversity 
and unreasonableness of some members of the Congress, Though 
Gokhale assured Morley that he would see that nothing
1. Morley to Minto - 2 August 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2, Morley to Minto - 31 October l906TYhia.
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unpleasant happened and that he had taken steps in that 
direction,'*' he knew that the Congress was in danger,
The moderates succeeded in averting a show down at 
1906 session at Calcutta, but they could not save a split in 
the Congress, when it met on 26 December 1907 at Surat. The 
1906 Congress session had disclosed the existence within the 
Congress of a body of extreme opinion opposed to the 
severely constitutional methods of the older generation. 
There the two parties wrangled fiercely, amongst other 
things, over the propriety of the boycott as a political 
weapoh of universal application. The older men looked upon 
the boycott movement and its connected activities as a 
temporary expedient, the adoption of which had been forced 
upon them; not as a normal method of political agitation. 
There was also the question whether the boycott should be 
economic or extend to other aspects of the west; i.e. law 
courts etc. However, embarrassed as they were by the 
Secretary of State's declaration that the partition must be 
accepted as a settled fact, the moderates retained control
1. Morley to Minto - 2 August 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L. 
See also T.V.Parvate, - op.cit. pp.2l2-*3* Gokhale 1 s 
letter to Dravid, 3 August 1906 - ,f ... I want you to 
do what you can to prevent any ungenerous criticism of 
Mr. Morley in the press. See Mr. Kelkar and with him 
see Mr, Tilak if necessary and beg them in my name to 
exert their influence for the sake of our common 
country to discourage any declaration on the part of the 
Indian Press just at present of want of faith in 
Mr. Morley Natesh Appaji Dravid was one of the
first members of Gokhale!s Servants of India Society and 
one of his closest friends.
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of the situation, though they allowed the resolutions on 
self-government, national education, and the Swadeshi and 
boycott movements and tolerated the heated tone of the 
speeches.
The next session of the Congress was to have been 
held at Nagpur, but due to some local differences, the venue 
was changed to Surat. Humours started spreading from early 
November 1907, that the 23rd session of the Congress would 
have nothing to do with the four resolutions of the 
preceding session, i.e. resolutions on $elf-government, 
national education, Swadeshi and boycott of foreign goods.
At Calcutta the Congress passed these resolutions, but for 
the Surat Session "slight verbal alterations had been made 
in one or two of them to remove ambiguity". For instance, 
the resolution on Self-Government was changed from "the 
system of government obtaining in the self-governing 
colonies" to "the self government enjoyed by other members 
of the British Empire"; later on Gokhale even inserted 
"self governing" before "members of the British Empire". The 
Swadeshi resolution was changed from "to stimulate the 
production of indigenous articles by giving them preference 
over imported commodities even at some sacrifice" to "to 
stimulate the consumption of indigenous articles by giving 
them preference where possible over imported commodities". 
Nevinson suggests that the "omission of the words 'even at 
some sacrifice' was due to the inaccuracy of the newspaper
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copy, from which the resolution was taken’1. Similarly a 
clause in the resolution about national education was 
modified from Mto organize a system of education - literary 
scientific, and technical - suited to the requirements of 
the country on national lines and under national control” 
to "to organize an independent system of education - 
literary, scientific, and technical - suited to the 
requirements of the country". Gokhale again defended the 
alteration on the ground that it was more restrained in 
form and "more in accord with what was being actually 
attempted in different parts of India". The change in the 
resolution on boycott was criticised most. Previously it 
was that the Congress was "of opinion that the Boycott 
movement inaugurated by Bengal by way of protest against the 
Partition of that province was and is legitimate." The 
wording of the new resolution was, "This Congress is of 
opinion that the Boycott of foreign goods resorted to in 
Bengal by way of protest against the Partition of that 
province was and is legitimate." Earlier this could have 
been interpreted as suggesting the boycott of foreign goods, 
education, foreign authority, foreign appointments, foreign 
justice etc., but now it was specifically restricted to 
"foreign goods".'*' On the eve of the session, the extremists 
under the leadership of Tilak encamped themselves at a
1. H.W.Nevinson - op.cit. pp.250-253* See also Reports of
the I.N.C. 1906, 1908, The Surat Congress. 1,0.tract.
F57LTT4Tr------------ ------------ ----
place three miles distant from the Congress camps. Despite 
numerous refutations and denials, rumours continued to 
spread. Then arose the difficulty over the election of the 
President. The Moderates wanted Dr. Rash Behari Ghose and 
the extremists, lala Lajpat Rai, on whose refusal, they put 
up another man. The real clash came on 26 December 1907, 
when Dr. Ghose's name was proposed and Surendranath Baner j e a 
rose to address the assembly. The audience did not want to 
listen to him and cried for Lajpat Rai and Tilak. The 
session ended in pandemonium and it was adjourned sine die.
People were expecting it. Gokhale expected it, Minto 
and Morley expected it. Gokhale thought that this split 
would encourage bureaucracy to put down both sections 
without much difficulty. They would brush Gokhale and his 
friends aside on the ground that they had no large following 
in the country and would put down the new party for sedition. 
Minto thought this whole line of argument "trash". He knew 
that the reforms would not be welcomed by the extremists,
1. Report of the I.N.O. 1908. Home Progs. (Public). Vol.7872, 
January—March _L9Ob. For a more detailed account of the 
Surat Split, see also P.O.Ghosh - op.cit. pp.163-183.
2. Minto to Morley - 9 October 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L. 
Morley "to Min "bo 26 December 1907 • Morley feared that 
this split might not result in the defeat of moderates,
who were to he hacked.
3. On 11 October 1907 Gokhale wrote to V/edderburn, ’’The 
outlook at this moment is as dark as could he «••. If a 
split does come, it means a disaster ....1 Morley to 
Minto, 31 October 1907. Minto Collection. N.L.S.
Minto to Morley, 5 November 1907, "He [Gokhale] was very 
disappointing as to the future”.
but he expected that "he [Gokhale] could have played a great 
game if whilst asserting his own political honesty he had 
recognised our good intentions and done his best to assisti
the Government of India”. Minto construed ’’Gokhale's
letters to Wedderburn simply as indicating that for the
present he has lost the game and feels that our recognition
of political interests other than those of the party he
represents has for the present scotched his wheel”. This
2
disappointed Minto.
Events at Surat did not prove to be so disastrous. 
Minto thought it ”a great triumph for us”, because the 
extremists had disappeared from the Congress and he hoped 
for ”a reasonable recognition by the Moderates of our 
intentions”. Gokhale and other moderates also heaved a 
sigh of relief.J
1. Minto to Morley - 23 November 1907. Minto Collections. 
N.I. S. '
2. Minto to Morley - 30 November 1907. Ibid.
3. Minto to Morley - 2 and 15 January l908. Ibid.
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CHAPTER II
The Origin and Growth of the All-India Muslim League
1906 - 1910
It was not until 1900 that the seeds of an independent 
Muslim political party on an All-India basis were sown. 
Talking about the origin of the Muslim League, Syed Ali 
Imam1 said in 1908, "It is nearly a decade since Nawab 
Viqar-ul-Mulk Bahadur called an informal meeting of leading 
Mahommedans of India at the house of my esteemed friend 
Mr, Hamid Ali Khan of Lucknow. I was present in that 
meeting. After the necessary deliberations, the gathering 
broke up and all of us who had taken part in it felt the
2
absolute necessity of a political organisation of our own.” 
In other words, some prominent Muslims, who were destined 
to play an important part in Muslim politics later on, had 
decided to organise a political party long before the 
supposed "British imperial policy” which helped the birth of 
the Muslim League.1
1. Syed Ali Imam (1869-1932), went to England in 1887, 
called to Bar, 18905 Trustee Aligarh College 1903, Bellow 
of the Calcutta University 1909; President of the first 
session of the Behar Provincial Conference, 1908, 
President, All-India Muslim League, Amritsar, 19085 
Member Viceroy's Executive Council, October 1910 - March 
1915; Judge of the Patna High Court, 1917? President 
Nizam's Executive Council, June 1919 - Sept.1922.
2. Syed Ali Imam - Presidential Address. Amritsar Session, 
All-India Muslim League, I9O8.
3. See W.C.Smith - Modern Islam in India, London 1946.p.246.
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Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk, ^  who had settled at Amroha, (U.P.),
after his retirement from Hyderabad and who had not taken an
active part in public affairs, became active during the 
%v
Hind^-Urdu controversy in 1900. Articles were published m  
the Aligarh Institute Gazette. The revival of the Muhammedan
f *v - •--—  —  —  ~
Anglo-Oriental Defence Association was advocated. He toured
the country and a meeting was also held at Lucknow in
October 1901, where it was decided to form a political
association to safeguard Muslim interests. The support was
not very encouraging as the Muslims were still very
reluctant to deviate from the path which had been laid down
by Sir Syed, though in July 1903* the Muhammadan Political
Association was formed at a public meeting of the Muslims
2
held at Sahranpur, U.P.
The agitation over the Partition of Bengal which took 
the shape of an anti-Muslim agitation, especially when the 
Bengaleet an influential Congress organ, began to criticise 
the Muslim leaders particularly Nawab Salimullah of Dacca . 
for their support of partition, further antagonised the 
Muslims.^ They started to think in terms of finding the
1. Nawab Mushtaq Husain Viqar-ul-Mulk (1841-1917) - started 
his career as a school teacher; went to Hyderabad in 1875, 
presided at Dacca League Meeting 1906; Secretary M.A.O. 
College after Mohsin-ul-Mulk.
2. The Pioneer, 31 July 1903.
3. In Bengal, at least, the agitation over the Partition and 
the Muslim reaction to that widened the gulf between the 
two communities. See N.C. Chaudhuri - Autobiography 
of an Unknown Indian, 1951* pp.233-237* He describes how 
Ma cold dislike for the Muslims settled down in our hearts, 
putting an end to all real intimacy of relationship11. The 
Hindus nicknamed Nawab Salim ullah "the one-eyed", p.234.
best ways of counteracting the Congress agitation. But as
the leadership was still in the hands of landholders or
members of the upper middle class, they were very slow to
react because of their vested interests. Moreover, they had
great hopes in the Government. Sir Syed had done much to
explain to the Government the loyalty of the Indian Muslims
and it was hoped that the Government would not betray them
in the face of an anti-Government agitation. Curzon's
announcement that the new province would give them extra
opportunities of emerging from their backward state had
given them further confidence. But there were no signs of
any decrease in the fervour of the agitation, despite the
fact that Morley had declared Partition a "settled fact"
The Barisal events and the acceptance of the resignation of
Puller, who was considered to be a champion of the Muslim
2
cause, made them extremely uneasy. A wave of resentment 
ran across the whole sub-continent. Hundreds of telegrams 
poured into the Governor-General's office and largely 
attended meetings were held at almost every important town 
of India and even at some lesser known places, which had no 
connection with the movement whatsoever.*^ The resignation
1. Hansard. House of Commons. 4 S. Vol. 152 (February-Maroh 
1906. (Jol.844* Morley fs Speech - 26 February 1906.
2. See Chapter I. Fuller was given an extremely touching send 
off by the Muslims. Newspaper reports of the period 
contain many statements of the Muslim leaders and 
organizations throughout the country condemning the 
Government action and praising Fuller, The Englishman 
7,8,9,11,13,15,18, 25 August 5 3,5,7,11,13 etc7 September 
1906. See also Bengal Native Newspaper Reports 1906,
3. For instance Multan in the Punjab. The Englishman,
5 September 1906. See also B.N.N.H, 19t)6.
of Fuller stirred up the Muslims ^  just as the Partition and 
Swadeshi movement had popularised the Congress* These 
largely-attended meetings of the Muslims at places that had 
not "been affected in any way hy the partition or the 
resignation of Fuller indicated their keenness to join in 
some organization to press for the safeguard of their 
interests. It further showed that the Muslims had realized 
that the time had come when something should he done to 
hring to the notice of the Government the existence of a 
community which was intensely loyal and which had not 
resorted to the methods of the agitators to safeguard their 
interests. And the documents show that the Government, too,
p
was beginning to realise the Muslim uneasiness.
But before resorting to the methods adopted by the 
Congress, they wanted to approach the Government in the most 
constitutional and peaceful way and the opportunity was 
provided when Morley in his Budget speech expressed his 
desire to consider the proposals for reforming the 
Legislative Councils^ and Minto appointed a Committee to
1. Lady Minto also admits this in her My Indian Journal.
Vol.II, 1905-6, p.201, though she omitted the relevant 
sentence from her book - India.Minto Morley, p.45.' The 
complete sentence is - "The Younger generation were 
wavering, inclined to throw in their lot with the 
advanced agitators of the Congress, then came Fuller's 
resignation. A howl went up that the loyal Mahommedans 
were not to be supported, and that the agitators were to 
obtain their demands through agitation".
2. Hare to Minto. 1 September 1906. Minto Collection. N.L.S.
3. Hansard. House of Commons. 4*S. Vo 1.151. "Col.588.
2U duly 1906.
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look into the matter and suggest some reforms. The Muslim 
leaders decided to act promptly,
1
Nawah Mehdi Ali Khan better known as Mohsin-ul-Mulk,
who had succeeded Sir Syed to the secretaryship of the
Aligarh College, wrote a letter from Bombay on 4 August 1906
2
to the Principal of his College, W.A,J• Archbold, who was 
staying in Simla during summer vacations, "You must have 
read and thought over Mr, John Morley*s speech on the Indian 
Budget, It is very much talked of among the Mohammedans of 
India, and is commonly believed to be a great success 
achieved by the "National Congress",
"You are aware that the Mohammedans already feel a 
little disappointed, and young educated Mohammedans seem to
1, Nawab Medhi Ali Khan, Mohsin-ul-Mulk (1837-1907)5 joined 
the East India Co, as a clerk on only Rs.10/- P.M., 
made Ahalmad in 1857, did not take part in the Mutiny? 
became Tehsilder of Etawah in 1861; A.0,Hume, Collector 
of Etawah was very pleased with his work; selected to
be the Deputy Collector of Mirzapur in 1867; transferred 
to Hyderabad in 1874 and stayed there till 1893 
occupying various positions. Settled down in Aligarh in 
1893* First opposed Sir Syed in 1863, later on became 
a great f\g^nd and devoted wholeheartedly to the Aligarh 
movement. Hon,Sect of the M,A.0,College, since 1898.
See also - Mary, Countess of Minto - India Minto and 
Morley, London 1934, pp.55-56, quoting from her Journal 
3 October 1906, states "Rather a touching story was 
told me to-day of the great Mahommedan leader, Nawab 
Mahsin-ul-Mulk, who has just died in Simla". This is 
incorrect, Mohsin-ul-Mulk died on 16 October 1907 in 
Simla.
2, William Arthur Johnson Archbold (1865-1929). Secretary 
Board of Indian Civil Service Studies, Principal M.A.O. 
College, Aligarh, Government College, Dacca and Muir 
Central College, Allahabad. Author of Recent Essays, 
Outlines of Indian Constitutional History, and Bengal 
Haggis.
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have a sympathy for the "Congress"; and this speech will 
produce a greater tendency in them to join the "Congress", 
Although there is little reason to believe that any 
Mohammedans, except the young educated ones, will join that 
body, there is still a general complaint on their part that 
we (Aligarh people) take no part in politics, and do not 
safeguard the political rights of Mohammedans, they say that 
we do not suggest any plans for preserving their rights, and 
particularly do nothing and care nothing for the Mohammedans 
beyond asking for funds to help the college, I have got 
several letters drawing attention particularly to the new 
proposal of "elected representatives" in the Legislative 
Councils, They say that the existing rules confer no rights 
on Mohammedans; and no Mohammedans get into the Councils 
by election; every now and then Government nominates a 
stray Mohammedan or two by kindness, not however on the 
ground of his ability, but of his position, who is neither 
fit to discharge his duties in Council nor is he considered 
a true representative of his community. If the new rules 
now to be drawn up introduce "election" on a more extended 
scale, the Mohammedans will hardly get a seat, while Hindus 
will carry off the palm by dint of their majority, and no 
Mohammedan will get into the Councils by election,"
"It has also been proposed that a memorial be 
submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy to draw the attention 
of Government to a consideration of the rights of Mohammedans"
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"I feel it is a very important matter, and, if we 
remain silent, I am afraid, people will leave us to go their 
own way and act up to their own personal opinions.”
"Will you therefore inform me if it would be advisable 
to submit a memorial from the Mohammedans to the Viceroy, 
and to request His Excellency's permission for deputation 
to wait on His Excellency to submit the views of 
Mohammedans on the matter?”'1'
It was in reply to this letter that Archbold wrote 
his famous letter of 10 August 1906, which many have since 
made a point to quote without referring to what Mohsin-ul- 
Mulk had written, Syed Tufail Ahmed Mangalori first 
published the "gist” ( ) 0f Archbold's letter without
p
mentioning the source. This gist was translated verbatim 
by Achyut Patvardham and As oka Mehta in The Communal 
Triangle, ^  Prom there it was copied by Gr.No Singh,
Landmarks in Indian Constitutional and National Development;^
s 1. Mohsin-ul-Mulk to Archbold, 4 August 1906 enclosed with 
Minto to Morley, 8 August 1906, Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Tufail Ahmed Mangalori - Musalmanon Ka koshan Mustaqbil, 
(Urdu). 1938, pp.348-349,
3. Published at Allahabad in 1942, p.62, Dr. W. Cantwe11- 
Smith -perhaps, based his views on this letter in 
Patvardhan's book when he says, "this group of Muslims 
and the government together decided on an imperial policy 
of special British favour for communalist and loyal 
Muslims.” p.286, W.C.Smith, - Modern Islam in India.1943.
4. Published at Delhi in 1950, There is no mention of 
Archbold's letter in the first edition of this book 
published at Benares city in 1933*
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B.M.Chaudhuri, Muslim Politics,^ and Ram G-opal, Indian
2
Muslims. Mohammed Noman accepted the letter without 
contesting its authority or verifying the date or contents 
or trying to trace the letter in whose reply it was written. 
Lai Bahadur, however, does not mention it, though his 
conclusions do not differ from those other writers, that 
Archbold was the prime mover and originator of the idea of a
A
Muslim deputation to the Viceroy, thus supporting the 
thesis that the British aroused the Muslims as a counterpoise 
to Congress aims.
Archboldfs letter to Mohsin-ul-Mulk could not be 
traced, except for what is printed in various books. But 
the correspondence between Archbold, Dunlop Smith and 
Mohsin-ul-Mulk suggests that Archbold was acting on behalf 
of and under instructions from Mohsin-ul-Mulk and not vice 
versa. Mohsin-ul-Mulk soon established contact with Dunlop 
Smith and corresponded with him directly. Moreover some of 
Archbold*s suggestions appear to have been turned down. He 
was in favour of the deputation supporting the system of 
nomination, while the deputation suggested election of their
1. Published at Calcutta in 1946, p.15.
2. Published at London in 1959, p.97.
3* M.Noman - Muslim India. 1942, p.72.
4. Lai Bahadur - The Muslim League. 1954,
9 1
representatives. ^
Mohsin-ul-Mulkfs letter was put "before Minto through 
Col. Dunlop Smith, his private Secretary. This letter 
reached Minto at a time when he was seriously thinking about 
political reforms. Being aware of the trends of the new 
Liberal Government, he was preparing himself to chalk out 
a policy which should meet with the Indian aspirations.
Until then the Congress's voice was the only voice that had 
reached him. Mohsin-ul-Mulk's letter explained to him the 
feelings of a loyal but politically important Indian 
community. Realising the importance of this letter he
p
immediately forwarded it to Morley. After telling him that 
the telegraphic accounts of his speech "have excited a 
good deal of interest," Minto wrote, "I think it is
1. Archbold to Dunlop Smith, 9*20,22 August 19065 Dunlop 
Smith to Archbold, 10,21 August 1906; Mohsin-ul-Mulk to 
Archbold, 18 August 1906, - This letter suggests that
Archbold did send a draft of the formal application 
and Mohsin-ul-Mulk circulated it amongst his friends.
But it was not liked. Mohsin-ul-Mulk wrote, "I am sure 
nobody will like the opening phrases which give an 
assurance of deliberate aloofness from political 
agitation in the future. Probably also they will not like me 
to represent their cause to Government without the means 
of a political association." Minto Collection. N.L.S.
2. Morley was informed about each and everything and Minto 
had Morley's complete support and confidence. G.N. Singh 
is wrong in suggesting that "It is certainly most 
surprising but nonetheless it is an important fact that 
Lord Morley was not only not consulted but appears to 
have been deliberately kept in the dark about the 
mischievous move until Lord Minto had committed the 
Government to the policy of granting to the Muslim 
community both weightage and separate political 
representation." Landmarks in Indian Constitutional and 
National Development, 1930V p.194*
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worthwhile to enclose you a copy of a letter to Mr. Archbold, 
Principal of the Aligarh College, from Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the 
manager of the College. It was only put before me to-day and 
is important in illustrating the trend of Mohammedan thought, 
and this apprehension that Mohammedan interests may be 
neglected in dealing with any increase of representation on 
the Legislative Councils. I have not had time to think over 
the advisability of receiving the proposed deputation, but 
am inclined to do so. There have been other signs besides 
the letter to Mr. Archbold pointing the same direction, and 
there is no doubt a natural fear in many quarters lest 
perpetual Bengalee demands should lead to the neglect of 
other claims to representation throughout India; so that we 
must be very careful in taking up these questions to give 
full value to the importance of other interests besides 
those so largely represented by the Congress". Minto was not 
unaware of the presence of various interests besides the 
Congress and knew that their claims could not be overlooked, 
but he was very cautious and not very enthusiastic about 
Mohsin-ul-Mulk1 s suggestion. He feared that the Congress 
would not look favourably at any attempt to recognize other 
claims than those put forward by it.^
p
Nevertheless he was willing to receive any deputation.
1. Minto to Morley, 8 August 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Besides the Muslim deputation, Minto received many 
important deputations, (a) Rajput Deputation at Agra,
10 January 1907; Report in the Bengalee, 11 January 1907. 
(b) the Orthodox Hindu Deputation, etc.etc.
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Writing from Agra on 3 April 1906, Minto says, "In a 
Reuter which had just reached me I see it is stated that you 
have "been asked to advise me to receive deputations from the 
"Congress" and that you replied that you saw no reason for 
taking the initiative♦ Curzon refused to receive any 
deputations of the sort, but my own inclination is certainly 
to do so, provided of course that the deputation is a well 
selected one representing influential members* I think 
myself it is a mistake to attempt to ignore the existence of 
the Congress. The section of the population it represents 
will never, I am convinced, possess the grit to play a 
leading part in the G-overnment of India as a whole, but it 
does represent Indian advanced thought on many subjects 
which must affect the future administration of the country, 
and it will be the greatest mistake to attempt to set the 
Congress aside and to refuse to have anything to do with it 
as a factor in the present history of India." On 2 May 
1906, some six months before he actually received the Muslim 
deputation he wrote to Morley "I see that the other day you 
were asked a question in the House as to my willingness to 
grant an interview to representatives of the Congress,^ and
1. C.E.Price, Edinburgh, Central, asked Morley this question. 
Morley replied, "I am confident that the Governor-Generai 
of India will be inclined to give a sympathetic hearing 
to any person or collection of persons having a fair and 
reasonable claim to be heard." He stated that the 
Viceroy would use his discretion as to the recognition of 
such persons and that he saw no reason for taking any 
initiative in the matter. Hansard.House of Commons.4*S. 
Vol. 155 (30 March - 25 April' 1906). 2 April 1906, Col. 148.
you allude to such a possibility in your last letter to me.
My inclination would certainly be to grant such an interview* 
although one would have to be careful about it, I think we 
are bound to look upon the Indian National Congress as a 
factor in Indian politics, and that it would be best not to 
ignore it,
Morley was rather cautious, nwith no particular liking 
for that school, I wish that I could see a little deeper 
into what may be good and useful in their notions, The Times 
is going, I believe, to write in the sense of giving them 
a reasonable hearing. You will no doubt consider rather 
slowly whether it would be well to accede to their request
for an interview. It is not to be settled off-hand, I think,
2
either way." A few days later he writes, "As I showed in
my letter that crossed yours, I am a very cautious person
(caution being sometimes disguised) .... Your language about
receiving a deputation from the Congress is quite a surprise
■5
to me, - but a highly agreeable surprise,
Thus, Minto was willing to receive even the Congress 
deputation, though the suggestion never materialised 
presumably due to lack of enthusiasm on the part of the 
Congress leaders themselves.
Minto1s aim was to acquaint himself with the views of 
all those groups of the Indian population who were to be
1. Minto to Morley, 2 May 1906, Morley Papers, I.O.L,
2. Morley to Minto, 19 April 1906. Ibid.
3. Morley to Minto - 25 April 1906.“TEId.
affected by the contemplated changes in the structure of the 
Indian Government, and the Muslim deputation was not the 
only deputation he received during his Viceroyalty? he 
received many more, some equally prominent,
Morley, on the other hand, thought it "an excellent 
occasion for vindicating our entire and resolute 
impartiality between races and creeds, and deprecating any 
other construction of either language used by Government or 
action taken. We view all these questions in genuine good 
faith." Enoouraged by Morley1s enthusiasm Minto replied, 
"I have not yet got a copy of the Aligarh Address, It will 
be a capital opportunity for making clear our position, and 
the line I shall try to take will be exactly as you say in 
the direction of indicating our entire and resolute 
impartiality between races and creeds, I shall say this 
clearly and strongly, but the position is a ticklish one, 
and one will have to think over very carefully all that must 
and must not be said. Arundel1s Committee is dealing with
the very points you mention - the representation of races,
2
creeds and interests,"
Normally the Viceroy was given beforehand a copy of 
any address to be presented to him, so that he could 
prepare his reply in time? but a copy of the Muslim address
1, Morley to Minto - Telegram, 27 August 1906. Morley Papers,
I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - Telegram, 31 August 1906, letter,
29 August 1906, Ibid.
had not reached Minto even "by 19 September 1906,"^ though he 
was in the meanwhile, considering the pros and cons of the 
coming event. Minto had already decided to receive the 
deputation but he was not quite sure about their demands.
The Muslims in Eastern Bengal were very agitated over 
Fuller’s resignation. Minto naturally suspected that the 
situation in Bengal would loom large in the deputation’s 
address. Moreover the Congress Press was trying to establish 
that the contemplated Muslim deputation was not a 
representative one and it was the work of the frustrated 
Bengali Muslim leaders who had been disappointed at Puller's 
resignation. So with a view to acquainting himself with 
the situation in Eastern Bengal and the Muslim feelings 
there, he wrote to Sir Lancelot Hare, the new Lieutenant- 
Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam, who was quite popular
1. It was at a meeting of the Muslim representatives at 
Lucknow on 15 and 16 September that the text of the 
address was finalised. The Englishman, 17 September
1906. Minto to Morley - 19 September 1906. Morley Papers,
I.O.L.
Dunlop Smith to Mohsin-ul-Mulk - 13 September 1906, in 
reply to Mohsin-ul-Mulk*s letter of 7 September 1906 - 
’I am to request you that a copy of the proposed 
address may be furnished to me for His Excellency’s 
information as early as p o s s i b l e M i n t o  Collection. 
N.L.S. -----------------
2. Bengal Hat ive He wspaper Rep orts. 1906. The Hitavadi, 
Calcutta, 21 September l90b 5 the Amrita Bazar Patrika,
7, 14 September 1906; the Bengalee, 9 September 1906 -
To mention only a few.
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amongst the Hindus as well then.
Hare's letters did not add much to Mintofs knowledge.
He already knew through Mohsin-ul-Mulk's letters and
newspaper reports about dissatisfaction amongst the Bengali
Muslim leaders. Hare's information was significant only in
one respect that it was an official opinion. After telling
Minto that the Muslims were capable of staging a more
effective agitation under the leadership of Moulvis
(Religious leaders), than the Hindus, Hare suggested that
the Government of India should give them an assurance that
the Government were in sympathy with their hopes and
aspirations and would help them, as far as possible,
"without undue favour or detriment to other classes". He,
however, added that great uneasiness would prevail among
them in case the members of the deputation were not
2considered representatives or were not heeded.
Minto was still completely unaware of the contents 
of the Address. In his letter to Morley on 10 September 
1906, he states, "I am to receive the Mohammedan deputation 
on the 1st of October, and if I can succeed in saying the 
right thing it may have a great effect on the present 
position. My answer must of course depend aonsiderably on
1. Ibid.The Congress Press in Bengal approved and applauded 
Hare's appointment as Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern 
Bengal and Assam. He had officiated in this capacity in 
Bengal as well during Sir A,Eraser's absence.
2. Hare to Minto - 1 September 19065 Hare to Dunlop Smith-
1, 18 September 1906. Minto Collection. N.L.S,
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the points they put forward, but, from what I hear, the
Address is likely to be moderate in tone, I should like, if
possible, to avoid direct allusion to Fuller and to go
generally on the lines that our rule is based on an
administration which aims at recognising and safeguarding
the welfare of all interests and creeds, I would gladly not
touch on "Partition", though no doubt Mohammedan feeling and
Mohammedan interests would be very adversely affected by
any idea that reconsideration was possible, and it would
have a great effect on the future to assure the deputation
that our decision is definitely taken and that they need
have no fear as to the stability of the new province."^
Morley was equally anxious about the outcome of the 
2
deputation*
While this correspondence was going on between the 
Viceroy and the Secretary of State and they were thinking 
of possible answers to an address about the contents of 
which they had no knowledge as yet, Mohsin-ul-Mulk busied 
in arranging the signatures and ascertaining the views of 
various prominent Muslims. Muslim Associations and Anjumans 
were consulted. The draft memorial which was prepared by 
Nawab Imad-ul-Mulk S,H.Bilgrami in collaboration with
1. Minto to Morley, 10 September 1906. Morley Papers, I.O.L,
2. "Your talk to the Mahometans next Monday will become 
the centre of Indian interest. I am looking forward to 
it pretty keenly, as you may guess - with perfect 
assurance that you will hold sound and straight forward 
language." Morley to Minto, 26 September 1906. Morley 
Papers. I.O.L.
Mohsin-ul-Mulk was discussed and finalised at a meeting at 
Lucknow on 16 September 1906.^
Minto received the Muslim Deputation on 1 October 1906 
Thirty-five prominent Muslim leaders from all over India 
gathered in the Ball Hoorn of the Viceregal Lodge at Simla.
Their leader was a young man of 29 years, H.H.Aga Sir
2
Sultan Mohamed Shah Aga Khan from Bombay, who besides 
being the head of the rich Ismaili sect of the Muslims had
1. i. A.H.Albiruni - The Makers of Pakistan, Lahore, 1950,
p,92.
ii. M.Noman - Muslim India, Allahabad* 1942, p.71. On 
page 74, Noman wrongly considers Nawab Imad-ul-Mulk 
and S. H. Bilgrami as two persons, Nawab Imad-
ul-Mulk was S.H.Bilgrami's title. Syed Husain 
Bilgrami (1842-1926) Born in Sahibganj, Gaya, 
Started his career as Professor of Arabic at Canning 
College, Lucknow in 1868; joined the Nizam of 
Hyderabadfs service in 1873; occupied various office 
and held many titles; member of the Legislative 
Council; C.S.I.; member S. of S.fs Council, 1907, 
resigned due to ill health and returned to the 
Nizami service, 
iii. S,H.Bilgrami - Addresses, Poems and other Writings, 
Hyderabad. Deccan. 1925. pp.139-144. 
iv. See Note by Dunlop Smith on Mohsin-ul-Mulk dated
11.11.1907, Lady Minto - My Indian Journal, Vol.II 
1907, pp.286-287.
2, Aga Sultan Muhammad Shah Aga Khan (1875-1958). Ancestors 
originally came from Persia and settled down in Bombay, 
Head of Ismaili sect of Muslims, A great horse racer and 
popular social figure in Western countries. K.C.I.E., 
1898, G.C.I.E., 1902. Member of the Governor General's 
Council, led the Indian delegation to the League of 
Nations Assembly in 1937. Permanent President of the 
Muslim League till 1913. Worked for the Muslim cause 
particularly for the Aligarh University,
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close and friendly relations with prominent British peopled
Mohsin-ul-Mulk and other sponsors of the deputation had had
a hand in his selection, and he had been hastily summoned
2
from his tour abroad. Other members of the deputation were
not elected representatives of the Muslims, but they did
command respect, popularity and considerable influence in
their respective areas and represented many professions and
various shades of opinion. This galaxy of men presented such
an impressive and delightful scene in the afternoon's
Garden Party at Viceregal Lodge ^  as to make even Morley
4
wish that he could "have moved about" among them.
The address that they presented was extremely 
moderate in tone. It conveyed the impression that the 
deputationists were politicians by compulsion rather than by 
choice, and were forced by contemporary developments to
1. Incorrect date and place are given ins-
a. H.J# Greenwallf - His Highness the Aga Khan,
London, 1952 - "Early in 1896 ... went to Delhi to 
call on the Viceroy," - p.16, on p.126, the date 
was corrected.
b. Stanley Jackson - The Aga Khan, London, 1952 - 
"Meanwhile, in Delhi, the Aga Khan headed a Moslem 
deputation ..." p.49.
c. Sir George Dunbar - India and the Passing of Empire, 
London, 1951 - "a deputation of the All-India Moslem 
League, and backed by the Government of India which 
in this matter had Gokhale's support." p.171. The 
All-India Muslim League was not in existence at that 
t ime. ■ -
2. This selection did not please Nawab Syed Muhammad, a 
member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, who himself 
aspired to lead this deputation, Minto to Morley, 4 
November 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
3. Mary, Countess of Minto - India, Minto and Morley. 
(1905-1910), London, 1934.""p.'4’7.
4. Morley to Minto - 26 October 1906, Morley Papers. I.O.L.
lOi
speak out concerning the fears of their community regarding 
its future position and status under the contemplated 
changes in the administrative set-up.
After complimenting British rule which brought 
"peace, security, personal freedom, and liberty of worship" 
to the peoples of India, the address criticised the 
existing system of representation in Municipalities, District 
Boards and Legislative Councils, and dwelt on the political 
importance of the Muslims as a community of over sixty-two 
millions. Morley's Budget speech had hinted at the possible 
increase in the Legislative Councils, Hence it was submitted 
that they might be given "adequate recognition as an 
important factor in the state" and it was urged that "the 
position accorded to the Mohammedan community in any kind 
of representation, direct or indirect, and in all other 
ways, affecting their status and influence, should be 
commensurate not merely with their numerical strength, but 
also with their political importance, and the value of the 
aontribution which they make to the defence of the Empire",
It was hoped that "due consideration" would be given "to the 
position which they occupied in India a little more than a 
hundred years ago". It was emphasised that the system of 
election or nomination to the Legislative Councils prevail­
ing hitherto had failed to give them proper representation, 
and it was hoped that this discrepancy would be removed by 
granting them the right to send their own representatives
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through separate electorates. The insufficient Muslim 
representation on the Bench, Municipalities, District Boards 
and on the Senate and Syndicates of the Indian Universities 
was also brought to the notice of the Viceroy.
In the address a specific system of representation 
was suggested!
1. "That, in the cadre of the Council, the proportion 
of Mohammedan representation should not be determined on the 
basis of the numerical strength of the community, and that, 
in any case, the Mohammedan representatives should never be 
an ineffective minority.
2. "That, as far as possible, appointment by election 
should be given preference over nomination,
3. "That, for purposes of choosing Mohammedan members, 
Mohammedan landowners, lawyers, merchants, and 
representatives of other important interests of a status 
to be subsequently determined by Your Excellency's 
Government, Mohammedan members of the Provincial Councils 
and Mohammedan Fellows of Universities should be invested 
with electoral powers to be exercised in accordance with 
such procedure as may be prescribed by Your Excellency's 
Government in that behalf.
They also sought protection of their interests in 
the event of the appointment of an Indian to the Viceroy's
1. The Muslim Address, Para.14. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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Executive Council and solicited help in the foundation of a 
Muslim University. The address ended on a note of loyalty to 
the British Raj.1
The points raised in this address were discussed 
at length by the Viceroy, the Secretary of State for India 
and others in their private and official correspondence. 
Minto's reply though non-committal, was extremely 
sympathetic. He said that he realized that the Muslim claim 
was not merely that they should be represented "as a 
community;" but that their position should be estimated 
not merely on their numerical strength but in respect to 
their political importance and their service to the Empire. 
He agreed with the deputationists that "any electoral 
representation in India would be doomed to mischievous 
failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement 
regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities 
composing the population of this continent," and assured 
them "that their political rights and interests will be
safeguarded in any administration with which I am
2
concerned." It is worth while noting that none of the 
critics of government policy or the supporters of the 
Congress views asked any questions at that time in 
Parliament with regard to Mintofs reply.
Morley telegraphed his approval and appreciated
1. The Muslim Address, Paras. 15* 16, 17. Morley Papers.
I.O.L.
2. Minto's reply. Ibid.I.O.L.
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"its high qualities,and he read the account of the 
proceedings in the Times, not "with anxiety", but "with 
lively interest", as he thought the address "was admirable
alike in spirit, in the choice of topics, and in the
2
handling", and he maintained the same tone of appreciation 
in his other letters^ till the controversy arose over his 
electoral college scheme, "Among other good effects" of 
this "Mahometan deliverance", he wrote, "was that it had 
completely deranged the plans and tactics of our 
Cottonianss^ that is to say, it has prevented them from any 
longer presenting the Indian Government as the ordinary 
case of the bureaucracy versus the people, I hope that even 
my stoutest radical friends will see that problem is not 
quite as simple as this", Minto's brother, Hugh Elliot, 
also congratulated him on his address, "I don't think the 
answer & tone of it would have been improved, & there seems 
to be only one opinion in the papers here as to its wisdom 
& fittingness, I am glad to see that the Indian papers 
appear to be as well pleased as the English ones*" John
7
Buchan considers Minto's reply "most sagacious and tactful"*' 
But the Congress Press commented differently. While
1. Morley to Minto, telegram, 4 October 1906,Morley Papers,
I.O.L.
2. Morley to Minto, 5 October 1906. Ibid. I.O.L.
3* Morley to Minto, 11 and 19 October T906. Ibid.I.O.L.
4. A group of M.P.s in the House of Commons, extremely 
sympathetic towards the Congress, whose chief spokesman 
was Sir Henry Cotton.
5. Morley to Minto - 19 October 1906. Ibid. I.O.L.
6. Hugh Elliot to Minto - 8 October 1906. Minto Collection. 
N.L.S.
7« John Buchan - Lord M into, London 1924* p.243*
most of them praised its prudence, the Congress Papers
sensed the beginning of a never-ending imperial policy
which would result in the perpetuation of British mile, by
exploiting rivalries between the various communities of 
1
India. The Congress leaders were naturally very worried 
and suspected that the Muslims were being put up as 
opponents of political reforms., The Amrita Bazar Patrika 
tried to minimise the importance of the deputation by 
suggesting that it was not an "all-India" deputation and
that it was a "got up affair fully engineered by interested
2
officials". The Bengalee published various editorials. On 
13 September, 1906, it appealed to the Muslims to co-operate 
with the Hindus in presenting a united front to the 
Government and promised to meet the Muslim "brethern half­
way". But the appeal did not evoke any response. It first 
denounced the whole idea of a Muslim deputation,*^ and when 
it realized that it could not be stopped, admitted that the 
deputation was "as thoroughly representative and influential 
as could be desired."^ It expressed its happiness that 
"among the deputation there are several Mahomedan leaders 
who are as level-headed as they are loyal and patriotic.
1. The Hindu Patriot, 5 October 1906; Sanjivani, 11 October 
1906; the Hitavadi, 12, 14 October 1906; The Weekly 
Chronicle, 24» 3l October 1906; B.N.N.R., 19061
2. T h e Amrlta Bazar Patrika, 2, 3 October 1906.
3. The Bengalee^ 9 September 1906.
4. The Bengalee?, 29 September 1906.
5. The Bengalee, 30 September 1906.
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But it soon changed its tone after publishing a full account 
of the proceedings.^- In the course of five editorials it 
asserted that the deputation "was composed most exclusively 
of Mahomedan leaders of the old school, that some of the 
important Mahomedan Provinces" and "the educated section" 
were accorded a lamentably inadequate representation; that 
"the reply of the Viceroy must have been rather disappointing 
to the deputation"; that the deputation was "the first fruit 
of educational movement" among the Muslims; that the address 
was "moderate and sober"; that they also detested 
"nomination" like the Hindus and wanted "election". It 
strongly opposed the Muslim demand for separate 
representation as it considered it "not only indefensible 
in theory", but it would create "serious political 
difficulties".2
The Anglo-Indian Press, like the Pioneer, and the 
Englishman, heartily expressed its approval of the 
proceedings and shared the opinion of the Times that the 
memorial was the "only piece of original political thought 
which has emanated from modern times.
Minto himself was very anxious to "avoid appearing 
to take sides^ but he could not help "heartily 
acknowledging the soundness of Mohammedan arguments", and 
was pleased that "the members of the Deputation were more
1. The Bengalee, 2 October 1906.
2. The Bengalee*, 3*4,5,6,9 October 1906.
3. The Times, 5 October 1906.
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than satisfied"1 with his answer. He was, however, pained 
when Hare told him of the "attempts of the Amrita Bazar 
Paprika and the Bengalee to belittle the Mohammedan 
deputation, and the lying assertions that this and the
recent 16th October meetings to celebrate the Partition have
pbeen got up by the Government officials", and when one
"Madras English Paper" stated that he had"missed a
magnificent opportunity of pitching into Surendra Nath
Banerjee and his friends I apparently with the idea that I
should have made an onslaught on Congress ideas"# "Whatever
one may think of them", he explained, "it is really
extraordinary that there should be anyone so narrow and
short-sighted as to imagine that the Mahommedan Deputation
gave me an opportunity of attacking Bengali sentiment."^
Mohsin-ul-Mulk told Dunlop Smith that the Muslims
were genuinely pleased and satisfied, as this "clear and
sympathetic recognition of the rights of the Mohammedans"
and "historic declaration of the policy of the Indian
Government" had "put a new heart" into them. ^
It will have become apparent that the Muslim
Deputation which waited on the Viceroy on the morning of
1 October, 1906 at Simla, was not "engineered" by the
Government to offer "a staunch resistance to all nationalist
1# Minto to Morley, 4 October 1906, Morley Papers, I.O.L.
2# Hare to Minto, 20 October 1906. ibid.
3. Minto to Morley, 9 October 1906."TBId.
4. Mohsin-ul-Mulk to Dunlop Smith, 7~ October 1906# Ibid.
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ambition and activity. There is no evidence that Mohsin- 
ul-Mulk was "at the heck and call of the Government of
p
India", or that Archhold was its originator, or that the
"inspiration came from Simla", or that it was a "Command 
4
performance"; or that it was "a counterpoise to the 
Congress aims."^
To subscribe to such opinions is to distort history 
and to under-rate both Muslim political aspirations and the 
integrity and intellectual capability of Muslim leadership. 
Archbold's close contact with high Government officials
1. Lai Bahadur - The Muslim League, Agra, 1954. p.33*
2. Ram Gopal - Indian Muslims, (1558-1947). London, 1959. 
p.97.
3. C.Y.Chintamani - Indian Politics Since the Mutiny,
London, 1940. p.91. Though some years later C.Y.Chintamani 
himself favoured separate electorates, as they reduced 
the tension between the Hindus and the Muslims - Evidence 
before Reforms Enquiry Committee, on 18 August 1924 - 
Shafaat Ahmad Khan - What are the Rights of the Muslim 
Minority in India. Allahabad, 192b. p.9^. C.H.Philips- 
India. London tn.d.) "... the charge has often been
made that the British deliberately applied such a 
"divide and rule" policy. Morley and Minto, indeed, were 
not unaware of the possible advantages of this course, 
but there is no evidence to suggest that they consciously 
sought it. Had they set themselves to introduce 
parliamentary government of the English kind into India, 
then their recognition of separate electorates would 
have been a mischievous act, but they clearly had no such 
intention in mind." p.108. Evidence, moreover, is now 
available that at least in this particular case they 
were not the prime movers.
4. Maulana Mohammad Ali's expression in 1923 quoted in 
various books, (i.e. G.N.Singh - Landmarks in Indian 
Constitutional and National Development - Delhi. 1950.
p .205). See also the Cambridge history of India, Vol.VI, 
Delhi, 1958. p.618, which contains certain inaccuracies,
5. B.M.Chaudhuri - Muslim Politics in India, Calcutta, 1946. 
p. 15.
might have facilitated the work of the Muslim leaders in 
approaching the Viceroy and presenting him the memorial, hut 
it did not in any way seem to have inspired them. The 
inspiration came from within rather than from without. In 
fact, when Muslims roused themselves from their lethargy 
and began to learn English, they naturally looked for 
responsible offices as Hindus had previously done, but found 
the doors to the public services practically closed upon 
them. Lord Ripon's Government had introduced Local Self 
Government in India, and mixed electorates had been made the 
vehicle of entry to the elective seats in the local bodies. 
The Muslims found it almost impossible to enter these bodies 
through mixed electorates. Mixed electorates had also been 
instituted in the universities under Lord Curzon's Indian 
Universities Act, but no Muslim could enter the Senates 
under this system. By the beginning of the 20th century the 
struggle between the Haves and the Have-nots was becoming 
very acute. The announcement of the consideration of 
further constitutional reforms led to the Muslim leaders to 
take prompt action in order to safeguard their community's 
interests.
The Muslim leaders, who had gathered in Simla to 
present an address to Minto, joined heads and informally 
discussed the question of forming an association with a view 
to safeguarding the interests of their community in India.^
1. The Times, 6 October, 1906. Report from its Correspondent.
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It was at that time that, the Aga Khan writes, "Mohsin-ul- 
Mulk and I, in common with other Muslim leaders, had come to 
the conclusion that our only hope lay along the lines of 
independent organisation and action, and that we must secure 
independent political recognition from the British Government 
as a nation within a nation.""^ Moreover Syed Ameer Ali, who 
founded the Central National Muhammadan Association in 1877, 
and had since then been urging the Muslims to organize into
a distinct political group, again emphasised the need of a
2
political party in an article in the Nineteenth Century.
But Nawab Salimullah Khan of Dacca, who could not 
Join the deputation because of an eye operation,"^ took the 
first concrete step. He circulated a letter which contained 
a scheme for "the Muslim All-India Confederacy".^ The aims 
and objects of this "Confederacy" were to support the 
Government "whenever possible" and to protect the interests 
of the Muslims. It also aimed at contraverting the growing 
influence of the Congress and to win back those Muslims who 
had joined the Congress by providing them with a scope for 
public life. In other words the Nawab was suggesting a 
political party with the sole aim of protecting and 
propagating the Muslim cause. The scheme definitely had a
1. The Aga Khan - Memoirs, London, 1954- p.76.
2. Syed Ameer Ali, hIndia and the New Parliament", Nineteenth 
Century, August 1906. pp.257-258.
3. The Englishman. 27 September 1906.
4. Pull text wifH editorial comments. The Bengalee,
14 December 1906.
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limited scope and was defective, but the scheme was the
embryo from which the League emerged. *
The Bengalee strongly criticised the scheme and hoped
that the Muslims would not agree to this. It did not even
like the name - "the Moslem All India Confederacy, reminds
us of the Mahratha Confederacy of old and the Khalsa
Confederacy of more recent times. Why should the Nawab
c.
assume a bellicose name when sycophai^y is to be the 
watchword of the Association?"^" The Times of India 
considered his circular "ill -advised and indiscreet", though 
it appreciated the need of an association to unify the
2
activities of the numerous Muslim associations in existence. 
The Beharee characterised the scheme as "hopelessly pre­
posterous" and calculated to embitter the relations between 
Hindus and Muslims, It hoped that none of the Muslims would 
associate with "the Salimullah tomfoolery".^ The Pioneer 
thought that "the Mohammedan community do need an 
authoritarian medium for the expression of their views.
Pailing it, the legitimate influence they should exercise is 
often lost".^ The Englishman expressed similar views. It 
published a letter by one rJ.B.!, who liked the Nawab!s 
scheme and suggested that such a formation of Muslim
5
political association was essential in the country's interests.
1. The Bengalee, 14 December 1906.
2. The Times of India, 18 December 1906.
3. The Seharee, 21 December 1906. B.N.N.R. 1906, Comments 
of the Congress Press were not at all favourable.
4. The Pioneer, 14 December 1906.
5* The Englishman, 27 September 1906.
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Thus while the Congress Press criticised and disliked the 
scheme, the Anglo-Indian Press appreciated and admitted the 
need of an all-India Muslim organisation*
The Nawab*s scheme became the basis of discussion 
at Dacca on 30 December 1906* Those delegates, who had 
assembled there from all parts of India to attend the All- 
India Muhammadan Educational Conference, met in a session 
after the Conference, under the presidentship of Viqar-ul- 
Mulk and decided to form the All-India Muslim League.
The meeting of these delegates began two hours 
later than the advertised time, but it was "most 
enthusiastic". Mohsin-ul-Mulk thanked the Nawab of Dacca 
for his hospitality and "expressed satisfaction at the 
spirit and enthusiasm shown by the people of the new 
province". Viqar-ul-Mulk took the chair and in his 
introductory speech in Urdu he said, "Time and circumstances 
made it necessary for Mohammedans to unite in an association 
so as to make their voice heard above the din of other 
vociferous parties in India and across the wide seas to 
England. Unless united in support of one another and working 
in loyal unison with the Government of India the Moslem 
majority who, through misfortunes and errors, had fallen 
from their once high estate, were in danger of being 
submerged by the enormous Hindu flood". He further said that 
there was a need for maturer guidance for the younger 
generation who were "too hot, too frothy" and for showing
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complete loyalty to the Government, The Viceroy's reply to 
the Simla Deputation was cited as a great encouragement for 
the Muslims."1"
The Nawab of Dacca introducing the Scheme explained 
that under normal circumstances "The movement might perhaps 
not have been heard of" hut now the times were such that 
"only those who cried loudest had a chance of heing heard". 
The Muslims had decided to abandon their traditional policy 
and come into the political field because now the Government 
was convinced of their loyalty and they themselves had 
acquired sufficient knowledge of the tricky hazard of 
politics. "The resolution he was moving was framed to secure 
the protection and advancement of political rights and 
interests without prejudice to loyalty to the rulers or 
goodwill to their Hindu neighbours."^
The resolution was seconded by Hakim Ajmal Khan of 
Delhi and supported by a dozen speakers. Copies of this and 
other resolutions were sent to the Government of India and 
the Secretary of State for India.^ The resolution was:- 
"Resolved that this meeting composed of Musalmans from all 
parts of India, assembled at Dacca, decided that a Political 
Association be formed styled All-India Moslem League, for
1. The Englishman, 31 December 1906 and the Pioneer,
2 J a m a J f T W .  -------
2. The Englishman, 31 December 1906. The Pioneer, 2 January
1907.
3. Public Letter, Calcutta - 10 January 1907. Proceedings of 
the Home Department (Public), February 1907, Vol./boY. 
January to April 1907.
114
the furtherance of the following objectss-
a) To promote, among the Musalmans of India, feelings of 
loyalty to the British Government, and to remove any 
misconception that may arise as to the intention of 
Government with regard to any of its measures.
b) To protect and advance the political rights and interests 
of the Musalmans of India, and to respectfully represent 
their needs and aspirations to the Government.
c) To prevent the rise, among the Musalmans of India, of any 
feeling of hostility towards other communities, without 
prejudice to the other aforementioned objects of the 
League. "
A provisional Committee, with power to add to its 
members was formed with Nawabs Viqar-ul-Mulk and Mohsin-ul- 
Mulk as Joint Secretaries, with a view to framfc°a 
constitution for the League within four months, and was 
authorised to convene a representative meeting of Indian 
Muslims at a suitable time and place to place the 
constitution before that body for final approval and 
adoption. A resolution condemning the anti-partition 
agitation was also passed.
Thus on 30 December 1906, the All-India Muslim League
was founded, ^
1. The following writers give wrong dates for the 
establishment of the All-India Muslim leagues-
J.Ramsay Macdonald - The Government of India, London, 
1919* "In 1912 the Moslem League was founded" - p. 13. 
See p. 18 as well,
2) V.Chirol - India Old and New, London, 1921* p.136 - 
states that the League was founded 1 in 1905".
3) A.E.Dodd - A Short History of the British Empire, 1925. 
p,207, (Year 1910).
4) Gr. T. G-arratt - An Indian Commentary, 1928, p. 139 ~
fives 1907 as the year and calls Ali Imam its founder. .Tflurray Titus - Indian Islam, A religious History of 
Islam in India, London, 1930, states that the Aga Khan 
was its President,
6) W.H.Moreland and A.C.Chatterjee - A Short History of 
India, London, 1936. p. 451, mentions year 1908.
7) Mohammad Homan - Muslim India, 1942, p.64, mentions 
that the name "Muslim League" was first given to an 
association in the Punjab, which held its first 
meeting in 1906, and Azim Husain, in his fatherfs 
biography, Fazl-i-Husain, p.96, gives credit to his 
father for coining the name.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Frederick Sykes - Prom Many Angles, an Autobiography, 
1942, p. 482, mentions I9O7.
Eric A.Walker - The British Empire, Its Structure and 
Spirit, 1943, p.ll2, (Year I90&J.
BiPlaskett and P.Jordan - Government of Britain. The 
Commonwealth Countries and the Dependencies, 1950, 
p.287, (Year 1908).
David Thompson - World History from 1914 to 1950,
1954, pp.25, 28 (Year 1907]
J.C.Powell-Price - A History of India, London, 1955, 
p.599, states that "ihe Muslim league had been founded 
in 1905 with a view to representing Muslims* special 
claims ...."
A.Gledhill - Pakistan, the Development of its Laws and 
Constitution, 1957» P. 27. (Year I908)~.
T.GoP. Spear - India, Pakistan and the West, 1958, 
p.207. (Year 19'0'8
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The formation of the League was received by the Indian 
Press with mixed feelings. The Englishman thought that it 
"will provide an effective answer to the Congress as well as 
affording an avenue for the publication of Mahommedan 
aspirations", and admitted that "it was high time that the 
Mahommedans of India found a v o i c e A s s u r i n g  the Times,
which had expressed its doubts whether the League would make
2for peace, the Englishman in a lengthy editorial said that 
its fears were uncalled for, as "the new body is a thing not 
only to be welcomed with cordiality, but to be fostered, for 
it is in its essence sane, not hysterical, solid not
3
frothy, sensible not absurd, representative, not artificial"* 
It published a number of letters explaining the policy of 
the League and replying to the criticisms of the Congress 
Press. The Times of India and the Daily Telegraph of Lucknow 
also welcomed its formation, as it was "founded on the safe
A
and sure rock of loyalty to the British raj". The Pioneer, 
Allahabad, and the Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 
remained almost neutral. The former stated earlier that 
"the Mahomedan Community do need an authoritative medium for 
the expression of their views. Bailing it, the legitimate
5
influence they should exercise is often lost." But it did
1. The Englishman, 1 January 1907.
2. The Times, 2 January 1907.
3. The Englishman, 5 January 1907.
4. Quoted in the Englishman, 10 January 1907.
5. The Pioneer, 14 December 1906.
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not "bother to welcome or denounce the formation of such a 
"body except for opening its columns for the League's news 
and Muslim correspondents. The latter merely printed 
Reuter's report of the Times' editorial,
While most of the Anglo-Indian Press was supporting 
the Muslim cause in the absence of any effective Muslim 
organ, it was the Congress papers, and the Bengalee 
especially, that opened an attack on its organizers and on
the League itself. The Bengalee often called it "Salimullah
2 ^League" and "Nawab Salimullah1 s latest fad". After
commenting on the Times' s editorial, saying that "the Times
does not evidently feel happy over the establishment of the
Mahommedan League", it predicted that, "it will, if it seeks
to fulfil its mission, fraternize with the Congress, and
eventually coalesce with it. If not, it will go the way of
4
the Patriotic Association of the late Sir Syed Ahmed." The 
Bengalee also alleged that "the League and its branches are 
engineered mostly by Government pensioners or ex-officials, 
of gentlemen who are compelled to solicit Government
5
assistance in their family or pecuniary difficulties," M.
6
Haque, Barrister-at-Law and a prominent member from Behar, 
tried to repudiate some of the charges levelled by the
1. The Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 4 January 1907.
2. The Bengalee, Id January 1907.
3. IbidT 10, lb January 1907.
4* ^foid, 6 January 1907.
5. Ibid. 6, 8, 9 January 1907.
6. Later President of All-India Muslim League in 1915.
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Bengalee in a letter to the Englishman, He denied that the 
League was the work of Nawab Salimullah of Dacca or that it 
was engineered by old pensioners and needy persons, and 
strongly condemned the effortsjthe "Bengali Press" which was 
trying to misrepresent the aims and objects of the League 
and to sow dissension amongst the Muslims, Maulvi Rafiuddin 
Ahmed, Barrister-at-Law, a prominent member of the Simla 
Deputation and a leader from Bombay also gave a long
interview to the Press and explained the genesis, scope and
2
aims of the League. The Bengalee, however* showed its 
dislike of the League by not giving a detailed report of 
its formation, but instead publishing a lengthy account of a 
rival meeting of the "Bengal Mahommedan Association", which 
was to have been presided over by Nawab Syed Mahomed, 
a member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council and a Congress 
leader from Madras. The Bengalee opened its columns for the 
j correspondents of that Association. The Hindustan Review 
was not very critical of the League, It welcomed the stir 
amongst the Muslims and refrained from commenting on 
separatist tendencies amongst them, because in its opinion 
"the choice of methods is a question of detail, what is of 
more consequence is the principle,"^
1. Letter dated 22 January 1907, published in the Englishman, 
25 January 1907*
2. The Englishman, 4 January 1907.
3. The Bengalee, 6,8,9» January 1907.
U  The Hindustan Review, Vol.XV, No,89, January 1907. p.110.
The formation of the League was not favourably 
received in Britain and to a great extent went unnoticed.
The Times thought it an inevitable outcome of the Congress 
movement and an exposure of the hollowness of the Congress 
pretensions to speak for India, and expressed doubts whether 
it would make for peace, despite the pacific language of 
its founders.^ The Spectator, while admitting that the 
objects of the League were excellent, did not like the
"feeling amongst Muslims that they must organise in a camp
2
by themselves". The Morning Post warned the League to
remain "entirely defensive and protective," and any deviation
from its path "will call at once for the most drastic
3
intervention of the British rulers".
The birth of this new party, which was to split India 
into two parts also went unnoticed by the Government. Neither 
in their private letters nor in any of the official 
despatches did Minto or Morley mention it - not, at least, 
until the League started the campaign against Morleyfs 
proposal of electoral colleges - although the Congress, its 
programme and its sessions were discussed profusely.
The new party was well received by the Muslims of
4
India. Very soon branches were set up at various places.
1. The Times, 2 January 1907.
2. The Spectator, 5 January 1907.
3. The Morning Host, 19 January 1907.
4. The Englishman, 5 December 1907, the Pioneer, 5 December 
1907. etc. One branch was opened in London,under the 
presidentship of Syed Ameer Ali. This branch played a very 
important part and will be discussed later.
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Between 1906 and 1910 the League met every year except 1909. 
The first of the annual sessions was held at Karachi on 29 
and 30 December 1907. It was attended by prominent Muslims 
from all over India and presided over by Sir Adamjee 
Peerbhoy, a distinguished merchant from Bombay. He was one 
of the members of the Simla Deputation and was specially 
invited by Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk to preside."*" His address was 
a very moderately worded practical one. It outlined the 
future policy and political attitude of the Muslims. He urged 
the Muslims "to be united, in ourselves, to be of one mind 
and one purpose". In particular he emphasised loyalty to 
Government, friendly and frank relations with the other 
Indian communities, the acquisition of higher education, 
and an interest in industrialisation. In order to allay any 
fears of disloyalty to Government still lurking in the minds 
of some he said, "our loyalty to Government has never yet 
been impeached and I trust it never will", but he warned 
that though "we recognise the difficulties of the Government 
in adjusting conflicting claims, we must be as fearless as 
we are honest in our criticism, whoever and whatever they 
may affect". Moderating his tone he said, "So far as I know,
the Government of India is the last to complain of criticism
2
so long as it is fair, moderate and upright."
The League's Constitution was finally settled in this
1. The Englishman, 23 December 1907. 
2* Ibid. 7 January 1908.
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session. Its fundamental principles were not different from 
those of the resolution passed at the Dacca Session in 1906s- 
"To maintain and promote loyalty towards the British 
Government among the Muslims; to bring before the Government 
their special requirements in moderate and respectful 
language and consistently with these objects, to promote 
friendly relations with other Indian communities.M A maximum 
of 400 members was fixed and the bulk of those who formed 
the Simla Deputation were amongst its first seventy members. 
The Central Executive Committee was to consist of forty 
members♦ Though Viqar-ul-Mulk expressed his inability to 
carry out the responsibilities of the League*s Secretaryship 
along with the Secretaryship of the Aligarh College (which 
had fallen to him after Mohsin-ul-Mulk*s death on 16 October 
1907), he was successfully persuaded to stay on. At its 
special meeting at Aligarh on 18 and 19 March 1908 the Aga 
Khan was elected Permanent President of the League and S,H. 
Bilgrami, Hon* Secretary.
The first session of the Muslim League, like its 
Dacca Session was held after the conclusion of the Muslim 
Educational Conference, as the leaders could not afford the 
luxury of having political meetings separate and at different 
times, nor could they divorce the educational programme from 
their deliberations, A change had come amongst the Muslims, 
but it was a gradual change. Their political party was not 
founded overnight or by one man, but grew slowly and
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steadily.
The League had taken a cue from the Congress right
from the beginning. It had been realized that to achieve
anything substantial, it was essential to mobilise public
opinion in England and the League devoted considerable
attention to making its views and activities known to the
public there, Fortunately Syed Ameer Ali was in London and
tu
S.H.Bilgrami had also come to London as a Member ofj[ Council 
of India, so a branch of the League was founded there. The 
inaugural meeting of the London branch of the All-India 
Muslim League was held at the Caxton Hall on Wednesday 6 
May 1908. It was presided over by Syed Ameer Ali. Ibni 
Ahmad was elected Honorary Secretary, and .it had its offices 
at 42, Queen Anne's Chambers, Westminster. These offices and 
these office bearers were to play an important part in 
converting Morley back to the original scheme of separate 
electorates from his own scheme of electoral colleges.
On 30 December 1908, the League met at Amritsar. Khan 
Bahadur Yusuf Shah was the chairman of the Reception 
aommittee and Syed (later Sir) Ali Imam presided.^- This
session was important as it was then that the Constitution
2
of the League was formally adopted. By now the Government 
of India's reform proposals and the Secretary of State's
1. P.C.Ghosh - The Development of the Indian National 
Congress, CaTcuTta l^To, p. 2^17 wrongly mentione& Yusuf 
Shah, as President of this Session.
2. The Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 1 January 1909.
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reply had become public and from now on the League was to
embark on an incessant campaign for achieving the system of
separate electorates which had been promised by the Viceroy.
There has arisen a difference of opinion over the
third session of the League, Maulvi Tufail Ahmed says that
it was held in January 1910 and that the Aga Khan presided
over it.^ Mirza Akhtar Hasan contends that it was held in
2
1909 and the Prince of Arcot presided. Lai Bahadur on the
basis of Mazhar Ansarifs Tarikh-i-Musliin League^accepts that
the session was held on 29 .January 1910 at Delhi in Sangram
Theatre, He further strengthens his point by quoting a
notice issued by the Secretary of the All-India Muslim
League which gave the dates for the proposed assemblage of
4
the session on 29-31 January 1910. It was actually held in
1910 on 29-31 January and Sir Ghulam Muhammad Ali Khan,
Prince of Arcot presided over it. The Aga Khan, the Leaguefs
Permanent President was also present. Hakim Ajamal Khan of
5
Delhi was the chairman of the Reception Committee.
Two important changes also took place. Nawab Viqar-ul-
1. Tufail Ahmad - Musalmanon Ka Roshan Mustaqbil (Urdu), 
1938, p.384.
2# Mirza Akhtar Hasan - Tarikh-i-Muslim League (Urdu), 
Bombay p,44.
3* Mazhar Ansari -Tarikh-i-Muslim League (Urdu) pp.61-62. 
quoted by Lai Bahadur.
4. Lai Bahadur - The Muslim League, Agra, 1954, p#8l.
5* The Pioneer, ATlahabacT," 30, 31 January, 2 February 1910, 
the Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 30 January ,
1 February 1910.
1 24
Mulk had been originally asked to work as the Honorary 
Secretary of the League, On his appointment as the Secretary 
of the Aligarh College, he could not carry out the duties of 
both posts, so Major Syed Husain Bilgrami was elected as 
Honorary Secretary in 1908. When Bilgrami went away to 
London to take up his new job, Haji Musa Khan, the Joint 
Secretary performed the functions of the Honorary Secretary, 
but in this third session Maulvi Muhammad Aziz Mirza was 
appointed the Honorary Secretary, and he took charge of his 
office on 14 February 1910.^ At this very session it was 
decided to shift the League's office from Aligarh to Lucknow, 
a more central place. But that was not the only reason for 
this change of headquarters. Sir J.P.Hewett, Lieutenant 
Governor of U.P. did not like "everything connected with
Mohammedan advancement in every form concentrated at
2
Aligarh," So he asked the Aga Khan to arrange to shift 
the headquarters of the League from Aligarh. The Aga Khan ■ 
obliged him by agreeing to do so.^ Hence the change of 
central office from Aligarh to Lucknow, The new Honorary 
Secretary opened the League's office in Lucknow on 1 March 
1910. The Aga Khan wanted the Government to recognize the
1. Proceedings of the All-India Muslim League, 1910,
i i i a h a h a d f  r 9Tr;- pvs'tr;------------------------
2. Sir J.P.Hewett to Dunlop Smith, 25 September 1908. Minto 
Collection. N.L.S.
3. Hewett to Minto - 3 February 1910 - "The Aga Khan had 
managed to carry out a wish of mine that the head-quarters 
of the central body of the League should be removed from 
Aligarh." Ibid.
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League as the only Muslim authorative body to he 
consulted on important matters. Though he did not mention 
it to Minto, he did ask Hewett about it. Hewett was 
not very favourably inclined, Minto agreed with Hewett,
"I quite agree with you that the Government of India 
could not agree that it is the only authority entitled 
to be consulted on Mahommedan matters. At the same time 
we should of course always accept the League as a very 
representative Mahommedan body to which we should 
naturally refer for an opinion on any question of 
importance.
During these early years the League met its
expenses from voluntary contributions. Among its
most generous contributors was the Aga Khan, who announced
an annual contribution of Rs, 4000 in the third session
at Delhi. The Prince of Arcot also contributed Rs.4000
and Rs. 1000 for the London branch. There were other
2
small contributors as well.
It will have become apparent that the League 
did not receive that sort of Government patronage which 
the Congress had received at its inception. Yet still
1. Minto to Hewett, 15 February 1910. Minto Collection. 
N.L.S.
2. The Pioneer, 31 January 1910,
present day writers call it a British organized party. 
Such statements reflect very poorly on the Muslim 
leadership and intelligentia of the time. It is 
suggested that if the British had not encouraged the 
Muslims, they would have joined the Congress and the 
unity of the country would not have been shattered. 
Granting that the British did encourage the Muslims at 
this time by listening to their demands, with a few 
exceptions Muslims had in fact remained aloof from the 
Congress. They were never attracted to the Congress 
because of its political programme, the attitude of 
some of its leaders and the predominance of the 
Hindus in it. Furthermore they had their own special 
problems and interests.' When in 1906, it became 
necessary to embark upon a political career, they 
decided to have a political organization of their own 
rather than join the Congress. It is interesting to 
note how Humayun Kabir interprets the formation and 
aim of the League. He says, "Founded in 1906 by a 
group of well-to-do and aristocratic Mussulmans, it was 
intended to keep the Moslem intelligentsia and middle 
class from the dangerous politics into which the
127
Indian National Congress was just then embarking" .1 
Nothing could he further from the truth!
During all these early years of its existence the 
League had a difficult job. It had to counteract the 
disruptive activities of some of the Muslims who were backed 
by the Congress papers like the Bengalee. At least an 
attempt to form a rival Muslim organization was made in 1906,
though its nominated President, Syed Muhammad of Madras
2
expressed his ignorance of such an organization. It had 
to convince the Government of its loyalty and papers like 
the Times, who had expressed their suspicions with regard to 
its future policies, though they admitted the justness of 
the Muslim cause. It had to consolidate its forces and 
unify the Muslims by championing their cause and jealously 
guarding their interests. In all these three it succeeded.
The rival Muslim organization was an abortive attempt and it 
y was never called into session again. The Government, after 
some reluctance on Morley's part at least, also agreed to 
concede to the League1s demands, and the support which it
1. Humayun Kabir - Muslim Politics, 1906-1942, Calcutta, 
1943, p •2.
2. The Englishmant 13 Pebruary 1907. Syed Muhammad^s 
statement at a function at Aligarh.
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received from the Times in advocating its cause shows that 
it had also overcome its earlier suspicion. With the aim of 
popularising the League and unifying the Muslims, attempts 
were made to establish its branches in all important places 
in India. Provincial and District Leagues were established 
and its leaders toured the various parts of India explaining 
to the people the League rs aims and objects.1 Small brochures 
in Urdu with translations in other languages were published 
and through the medium of Press and platform the League was 
brought nearer to the people, but it could not yet become a 
popular mass movement.
1. Proceedings of the All-India Muslim League, held at 
Nagpur, 2o, 30 December 1910. Allahabad7 1911.
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Appendix II*
Signatories of the Muslim Address.
1. H.H. Aga Sir Sultan Mohamed Shah Aga Khan. G.C.I.E. 
(Bombay)
2. Shahzadah Bakhtiar Shah, C.I.E., Head of the Mysore 
Family, Calcutta (Bengal).
3. Honourable Malik Omar Hayat Khan, C.I.E., Lieut18th  
Prince of Wales, Tiwana Lancers, Tiwana, Shahpur (Punjab).
4. Honourable Khan Bahadur Mian Mohamed Shah Lin, Bar-at-Law, 
Lahore (Pun j ab).
5. Honourable Maulvi Sharf-ud-din, Bar-at-Law, Patna (Behar).
6. Khan Bahadur Syed Nawab Ali Chowdhry, Mymensingh 
(Eastern Bengal).
7. Nawab Bahadur Syed Amir Husan Khan, C.I.E., Calcutta 
(Bengal).
8. Naseer Husain Khan Khayal, Calcutta (Bengal).
9. Khan Bahadur Mirza Sujaat Ali Beg, Persian Counsel- 
General, Murshidabad, Calcutta (Bengal).
10. Syed Ali Imam, Bar-at-Law, Patna (Behar).
11. Nawab Sarfraz Husain Khan, Patna (Behar).
12. Khan Bahadur Ahmed Mohiuddin Khan, Stipendiary of the 
Carnatic Family (Madras).
13. Maulvi Rafiuddin Ahmed, Bar-at-Law (Bombay).
14. Ebrahimbhoy Adamji Peerbhoy, General Merchant (Bombay)
15. Abdurrahim, Esq., Bar-at-Law, (Calcutta).
16. Syed Alahdad Shah, Special Magistrate and Vice-President 
Zamindarfs Association, Khairpore (Sindh).
17. Maulana H.M. Malak, Head of Medhi Bagh Bohras, Nagpur 
(C.P.)
18. Mushirad Lowla Mumtaz-ul-Mulk Khan Bahadur Khalifa Syed 
Mohamed Husain, Member of the State Council, Patiala 
(Punjab).
19. Khan Bahadur Col Abdul Majid Khan, Foreign Minister, 
Patiala (Punjab).
20. Khan Bahadur Khawaja Yusuf Shah, Honorary Magistrate, 
Amritsar (Punj ab).
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21. Mian Mohamed Shafi, Bar-at-Law, Lahore (Punjab).
22. Shaikh Ghulam Sadik, Amritsar (Punjab).
23. Hakim Mohamed Ajmal Khan, Delhi (Punjab).
24. Munshi Ihtisham Ali, Zamindar and Rais, Kakori (Oudh),
25. Syed Nabi-ullah. Bar-at-Law, Rais, Kara, Distt.
Allahabad (U.P.)
26. Maulvi Syed Karamat Husain, Bar-at-Law, Allahabad (U.P.)
27. Syed Abdur Reoof, Bar-at-Law, Allahabad (U.P.)
28. Munshi Abdur Salam Khan, Retired Sub-Judge, Rampur (U.P.)
29. Khan Bahadur Mohamed Muzammil-ullah Khan, Zamindar, 
Secretary, Zamindar's Association (U.P.) and Joint 
Secretary, M.A.O. College Trustee, Aligarh (U.P.)
30. Haji Mohamed Ismail Khan, Zamindar, Aligarh (U.P. )
31. Sahabzada Aftab Ahmed Khan, Bar-at-Law, Aligarh (U.P.)
32. Maulvi Mushtaq^ Husain, Rais, Amroha (U.P.)
33. Maulvi Habib-ur-Rahman Khan, Zamindar, Bhikanpur (U.P.)
34. Nawab Syed Sirdar Ali Khan, son of the late Nawab Sirdar 
Dilar-ul-Mulk Bahadur, C.I.E., Hyderabad (Deccan)
35* Maulvi Syed Mahdee Ally Khan (Mohsin-ul-Mulk),
Honorary Secretary, M.A.O. College, Aligarh, Etawah 
(U.P.)
Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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Appendix III.
Members of the Provisional Committee of the All-India 
Muslim League appointed at its Dacca Session 1906.
Joint Secretariess-
Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk,
Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk,
Members s-
Eastern Bengal:-
The Honourable Nawab Salimullah of Dacca.
The Honourable Chaudhry Nawab Ali (Mymensingh).
Moulvie Himayatuddin (Barisal).
Assam:-
Moulvie Abdul Majid, B.A., B.L. (Sylhet).
Western Bengals-
Mr. Abdul Rahim, Bar-at-Law (Calcutta).
Nawab Nasiruddin Khayal (Calcutta).
Nawab Amir Hossein Khan (Calcutta).
Mr. Shamsul Huda, Vakil (Calcutta).
Mr. Serajul Islam, Vakil (Calcutta).
Mr. Abdul Hamid, Editor, Moslem Chronicle, (Calcutta). 
Behar:-
Mr. Ali Imam, Bar-at-Law (Patna).
Mr. Mazftar-ul-Haque, Bar-at-Law (Chhapra).
Mr. Hasan Imam, Bar-at-Law (Patna).
Oudh:-
Mr. Nabi-ullah, Bar-at-Law (Lucknow).
Mr. Hamid Ali Khan, Bar-at-Law (Lucknow)
Nawab Imad-ul-Mulk (Bilgram).
Munshi Ihtisham Ali, Rais (Lucknow).
Mr, Zahoor Ahmed, B.A., LLB. (Lucknow).
Mr. Mahomed Nusim, Vakil (Lucknow).
Mr. G-hulamus Saqlain, B.A., LL.B. (Lucknow).
Raja Nowshad Ali Khan (Lucknow).
Agra Provinces-
Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk (Aligarh).
Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk (Amroha).
Sahebzada Aftab Ahmed Khan, Bar-at-Law (Aligarh)
Mr. Mohamed Ishaque, B.A., LL.B. (Allahabad).
Moulvie Kiramet Hussein, Bar-at-Law (Allahabad).
Mr. Abdur Raoof, Bar-at-law, (Allahabad)
Mohammed Raoof, Bar-at-Law, (Allahabad).
Haji Mahomed Moosa Khan (Aligarh).
Khan Bahadur Muhomed Mozammil-ullah Khan (Aligarh).
Mr. Abdullah Jan, Vakil (Sahranpore).
Mr. Abdul Majid, Bar-at-Law (Allahabad).
Haji Ismail Khan (Aligarh).
Sheikh Abdullah, B.A. LL.B. (Aligarh).
Mr. Mahomed Ali, B.A. (Oxon.).
Punj ab s-
Mr, Mahomed Shafi, Bar-at-Law (Lahore),
Mr, Pazle Hussein, Bar-at-Law (Lahore),
Mr. Abdul;Aziz, Editor, Observer (Lahore).
Khaja Yousoff Shah (Ludhiana).
Hakim Ajmal Khan (Delhi).
Sheik Gholam Mohammed Sahib, Editor, Vakil, (Amritsar). 
Mr. Ghulam Sadiq (Amritsar).
Prontier Provinces-
Mufti Pida Mahomed Khan, Bar-at-Law (Peshawar).
Sindhs-
Mr. A.M.Dehlavi (Hyderabad),
Kathiawar s-
Mr, Ghulam Mohammed Munshi, Bar-at-law, (Rajkote). 
Bombay Presidencys-
Nawabzada Nasir-ullah Khan, Bar-at-Law, (Bombay),
Mr, Rafiuddin, Bar-at-Law, (Bombay).
Madras Presidencys-
Khan Bahadur Abdul Hadi Badshah.
Khan Bahadur Ahmed Mahi-uddin (Madras).
Mr. Yakub Hussein, Proprietor of the Moslem Patriot,
(Madras),
Nawab Oholam Ahmed (Coromandal),
Mr. Abdul Hamid Hasan, B.A., LL.B., Editor, the Moslem
Patriot, (Madras)
Orissas-
Mr. Naur-ul-Huq, Secretary, Mahommedan Association,
(Cuttack).
Central Provincess-
Khan Saheb Mahomed Amir Khan, Pleader (Nagpur).
Mr. H.M.Mullick (Nagpur).
Burma i -
Mr. A.S.Rafique (Rangoon).
Proceedings of_the Home Department (Public) 
January-Apr11 190?. Vol.75o7. February 1907.
Appendix IV«
The London Branch of the All-India Muslim League, founded 
on Wednesday, 6 May 1908.
Presidents- S. Ameer Ali.
Hon. Vice Presidentss- 1. Sir Henry Seymour King, K.C.S.I.,M.
2. Sir Raymond West, K.C.S.I.
3. Harold Cox, Esq., M.P.
Ordinary Vice Presidents- C.A.Latif Esq.
Hon. Seoretarys- Ihni Ahmed Esq.
Joint Seoretarys- S. Zahur Ahmad Esq.
Asst. Sect. and Asst. Treasurers- M. Masudul Hasan Esq.
Committees- Dr. Abdul Majid, B.A*, LL.D. Bar-at-Law;
Dr. Mohammed Ikbal, M.A., Ph.D.
Dr. M.A.Ansari, B.A., M.B.
S.A.A. Tabrizi, M.A., B.L.
Latafut Husain Khan.
Mohammed. Shakir Ali, P.S.S.
M.K.Azad.
Mirza Mohammed Rafi.
Mohammed Yakub.
M.A.Hafiz.
Mohammed Sharif.
A.H.Khudadad Khan.
A.M.Khwaja.
Musharraful Hakk.
Major S.H.Bilgrami was elected ex-officio member of the 
Committee.
I.O.L. Tr. 1113(a).
CHAPTER III
Minto and Militant Nationalism.
1907 - 1909*
Minto hoped that when the extremists had walked out of 
the Congress and the moderates were ready to rally round the 
Government, his task would he easier. But his difficulties 
were not over. There existed another group of nationalists - 
the terrorists. They too wanted to achieve Swaraj, hut their 
methods differed from those of the moderates and the 
extremists. The terrorist group, which consisted mostly of 
young Indians, was inspired amongst other things hy the 
writings and speeches of the extremists. With the help of 
ancient religious literature it had heen emphasised that 
political assassination was justified. Whether the extremist 
leaders had any direot hand in the activities of the young 
terrorists is open to question hut provocative writings were 
hound to influence young minds.^ The terrorists agreed with 
the extremist view that constitutional methods were 
ineffective and believed that application of force was 
essential to securing their end. Thus they resorted to 
violent means, such as had heen practised in Russia and other
1. J.R.MacLane - The Development of Nationalist Ideas and 
Tactics and the Policies of the Government of India.
L.U .Thesis, 196I. Ch.II, suggests that there is 
no evidence that the activities of Chapekar brothers were 
inspired hy Tilak*s writings.
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European countries. Some hot-headed young men from Bengal and
Maharashtra organized themselves into militant groups
imitating in their ways the techniques of European
terrorists and anarchists. To help promote the activities of
the terrorist element some potent organisations were set up
even outside India. In December 1907, the Indian Sociologist,
the organ of the revolutionary Home Rule Society started hy
Sbyamaji Krishnavarma, observed "the only methods which can
bring the English Government to its senses are the Russian
methods'*. ^  The terrorists hoped, as the bomb discoveries at
various places suggest, that ultimately they would be able to
create a revolution in India. With that view they tried; to
obtain as much knowledge of military matters as they could.
Various Samitis (societies) of young men were organised
2
where an emphasis on physical culture was made.
Outside India the terrorists had their greatest 
inspiration and support from Shyamaji Krishnavarma and his 
India House at Highgate. A number of Indians were active in 
America as well, but they had not yet acquired great 
prominence. Percy Sanderson, H.M. *s Consul-General at New 
York informed H.M. *s Ambassador at Washington that the
1* The Sedition Committee Report, 1918. Para.7# The Indian 
Sociologist. Vol.ilY.y No.l2 - Political and Secret 
Records (Home Correspondence). Vol. 3£E5-l9o7.
2. N.C. TJEaudhuri - Autobiography of an Unknown Indian, 
London, 1951. pp.222-2527
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Indians living in New York were lousy in revolutionary
activities and were sending revolutionary literature to India
for at least three years. The New York Gaelic American was
backing them up."1" It published a tract entitled "Indians
2
declare openly for Republic", It also published a 
description of the "National Flag of India". "It is a banner 
of three broad horizontal bands, the uppermost green, the 
sacred colour of the Moslems, with a line of eight stars 
emblematic of the eight provinces of India; the centre band 
golden hue, the colour of the Sikhs and Buddists, with the 
words "Bande Mataram" in Sanscrit, the ancient language of 
India; and the lower the red of the Hindus with a radiant 
orb near the staff and the Mohammedan crescent near the 
outer edge."-^ Sanderson's letters and extracts from the 
Gaelic American were sent to Morley by the Foreign Office and 
Morley sent copies of them to Minto. Minto was also informed 
that a person named Camille. F.Saldanha, a Bombay University 
graduate went to Dublin in May 1906 and got in touch with the 
"Sin Fein". It was reported that he was an accredited agent 
of "the Swadeshi Society"^ and had visited America as well. 
The Clan-na-Gael had given him financial and other support.
1. Percy Sanderson to the Ambassador, 16 October, 6 November 
1906. Political and Secret Records (Home Department),
1906. Yols. 318 and 321, See also extracts from the New 
York Gaelic American, 5, 12, 19, 26 May, 2 June and
1 December 1906. Ibid.
2. The Gaelic American, 26 May 1906. Ibid,
3. The Gaelic American, 27 October 1906, Ibid.
4. Nothing is known about this society.
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Irish Independent published a report of the "Sin Fein" 
meeting at which he spoke about India's struggle fori
Independence, While Mintofs Government showed a keen 
interest in Shyamaji Krishnavarma's activities, they did not 
take much notice of these activities of Indians in America, 
But these activities in America and the Irish support for the 
Indian cause must surely have encouraged the Indian 
nationalists even at that early stage.
Born on 4 October 1857, Shyamaji had a successful 
educational and professional career both in India and 
England. In 1897 he finally left India for England,^ G.N. 
Singh suspects that Shyamaji Krishnavarma had some connection 
with the Poona murders of Lt. C.E. Ayerst and W.C. Rand, the 
Plague Commissioner who were shot dead by Damodar Chapekar. 
Indu Lai Yajnik suggests that the Poona atrocities during 
Plague suppression by the Government stunned and shocked 
Shyamaji and after being convinced of the justification of 
Tilak's stand, he, instead of plunging into politics by 
filling the gap after Tilak's arrest decided to go to England 
to carry the fight across the seas, Yajnik thinks that 
Shyamaji took this step because he was "accustomed to a
Irish Independent, 3 December 1906. Political and Secret 
Records (Home Department) Vol.321 1906.
2. Indu Lai Yajnik - Shyama.ji Krishnavarma, Bombay, 1950. 
pp.85-87.
3. G.N. Singh - Landmarks in Indian Constitutional and 
National Development (1660-1919). Benares tiity, 1^33* 
p. 336.
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settled life and safe pursuits", though he had "ceased to 
believe and follow Congress policies which appeared timid and 
futile".^- Yajnik's argument does not seem very convincing.
Shyamaji must surely have had other reasons for leaving
2
India at that particular time. He does not seem to have 
indulged in serious political activities immediately after 
his arrival in England. But on 1 January 1905 he started an 
English monthly, the Indian Sociologist. It was an "Organ of 
Freedom and of Political, Social and Religious Reform". It 
violently criticised Government policies and encouraged the 
Indians to resort to revolutionary methods with a view to 
achieving Swaraj. Shyamaji Krishnavarma offered six lecture­
ships and three travelling scholarships to young Indians to 
enable them to go abroad to acquire the education that would 
help them to struggle for national freedom. On 18 February 
1905 "the Indian Home Rule Society" was formed at Shyamaji's 
house at Highgate, Some 20 Indians attended the meeting. Its 
objectives were: "To secure Home Rule for India; to carry on 
propaganda in the United Kingdom with a view to attain the 
same; and to spread among the people of India a knowledge of 
the advantages of freedom and national unity." A hostel for 
Indian students, known as the "India House" was opened at
1. Indu Lai Yajnik - op.cit. pp.101-102.
2, Yajnik does mention Shyamaji1s tussle with Col.Hunter, the 
British agent at the Junagadh Durbar which led to his 
resignation, but does not suggest this as a reason for 
his leaving India for good. Ibid. pp.84-85.
Highgate. Among one of the first arrivals on the travelling 
fellowships offered by Shyamaji was Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, 
editor of the Vihari, Bombay, who was to play an important 
part at the India House. He translated Mazzini's 
autobiography into Marathi and his brother Ganesh printed it 
in Poona. Next he wrote a history of the Mutiny entitled, 
the Indian War of Independence, 1857, which became a sort of 
textbook for the young revolutionary Indian. Shyamaji moved 
to Paris, when questions were asked in Parliament about his 
activities, but he kept himself in touoh with his 
headquarters in London and India. Minto referred many a time 
to Shyamaji* s activities in his letters to Morley. These ex- 
India revolutionaries were sending inflammatory literature 
to India which the Government made haste to proscribe. The 
editors and printers of such journals as had the temerity to 
print that material were prosecuted and punished. They even 
succeeded in smuggling arms and ammunition into the country.^ 
Thus in an organised manner the revolutionaries aimed to 
achieve Swaraj, and they apparently succeeded in inspiring 
some Indians in India, who turned to physical culture 
societies, to the preparation and accumulation of explosives, 
and to political murders.
1. Pistols and other ammunition were found in the false 
bottom of a trunk brought by one Chatrubhuj Amin. See 
Indula Yajnik - op.cit. pp.285-286. Vinayak Savarkar was 
the organiser of this arms supply to India.
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Both Morley and Minto were of the opinion that this 
movement could he controlled by suppressing 'crime1 sternly, 
and by granting political reforms in the hope that these 
would justify the moderates* standpoint and so prevent young 
men from joining the terrorists. Morley was rather reluctant 
to agree to repression, partly because he did not realise 
the real incidence of crime and partly because of the 
pressure exercised by the radical group in the House of 
Commons. There was another section in England which favoured 
the adoption of a policy of coercion and repression. They 
argued that concessions granted to the moderates would 
provide only new weapons of struggle in the hands of the 
extrem i s t s. T o  this view, Morley replied that so long as 
English public opinion watched the activities of the Indian
Government it would not be possible to enter upon a policy
2of pure repression.
Minto believed that to repress sedition, it was 
essential to curtail to some extent the liberty of the 
person and the press and the holding of political meetings.
1. Sir .Austin Chamberlain's record of a conversation with 
Morley. Politics from Insides An Epistolary Chronicle. 
1906-19lT,-Tondon, 1 9 T 6 p . 59.
2. Morley's speeches. - 21 December 1907; Speech at the 
Civil Service Dinner, July 1908. Indian Speeches, 
(1907-1909). London. 1909. pp.39,”"86-7. 17 December 1908. 
Hansard. House of Commons, 4 S. Vol.198, Cols.1974-1994.
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In reply to Morley's remark that "Reforms may not save the 
Raj, hut if they don't, nothing else will", Minto replied that 
"They certainly will not - though if they are thoughtfully 
introduced they may help to render its administration happy 
.., the Raj will not disappear in India as long as the 
British race remains what it is, because we shall fight for 
the Raj as hard as we have ever fought if it comes to 
fighting, and we shall win as we have always won",'*'
The Punjab was the first province to attract Minto's 
attention and it was there that some strict steps were taken 
with a view to preserving law and order. The situation in 
the Punjab had been quite calm, but early in 1907, there was 
some unrest particularly due to the Punjab Colonisation 
Bill. The Chenab Colony in the Punjab was mostly inhabited 
by ex-soldiers - a majority of them being Jat Sikhs. They 
were given lands in this rainless but irrigated area by the 
Government for their services. As the size of each holding 
was gradually being reduced by partition among the heirs, 
the Government proposed to check their further division by 
passing an Act providing for inheritance by primogeniture. 
This and other regulations in this connection were resented 
by the people as an unjustified interference in their time- 
honoured practices and traditions. Numerous meetings were 
held in which the Government's actions were criticised. Some 
of the meetings were addressed by Lala Lajpat Rai, a
1. Minto to Morley - 27 May 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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prominent Punjab leader and a member of the extremist section 
of the Congress party, Ajit Singh, a young man with 
revolutionary ideas, and other local leaders. The meetings 
were attended mainly by the peasants of the locality. The 
Bill was severely criticised in the Punjab Legislative 
Council and numerous petitions were sent, but the Punjab 
Government wanted to run the Colony as a model farm and 
considered the Bill essential for the better administration 
of the colony. Accordingly the Bill was passed. Later on, 
when the agitation grew stronger, it became a question of 
prestige with the authorities. The Punjab Government 
exaggerated the tension and succeeded in securing from 
Minto*s Government the orders for deporting Lajpat Rai and 
Ajit Singh. They were arrested and deported after riots at 
Lahore and Rawalpindi, in none of which they were directly 
involved.
In Lahore the riot started when on 16 April 1907, 
after the Chief Court of the Punjab had upheld the conviction 
and sentence passed on K.K. Athavale, Editor of the weekly 
(later a bi-weekly), Pun.jabee, who was prosecuted for 
publishing two articles on 11 April 1906 entitled "How 
Misunderstandings Occur" and "A Deliberate Murder". The first 
referred to two cases of "oppression" alleged to have occurred 
at Rawalpindi - the death from exposure of two Indians who 
were employed to carry the luggage of the Deputy Commissioner 
of Rawalpindi when on tour. The second referred to the
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accidental shooting of an Indian Shikari hy a European
vn
District officer which accidentally occured also at 
Rawalpindi. Pindi Das, the editor and proprietor of the 
weekly India, published from Gujranwala, had also been 
sentenced for publishing a letter from America containing a 
seditious appeal to the Indian troops. It was addressed to 
the "Men of the British Army" by "The Natives of India and 
Afghanistan who have emigrated to America". It urged them to 
rise against the British Government with a view to achieving 
Swaraj. Copies of this letter were recovered from the
i
possession of some soldiers at Mardan. The police, who were 
escorting Athavale and Pindi Das from the Court to the Jail 
were attacked by a crowd which stopped the carriage, pelted 
them with mud and garlanded the convicts. In Rawalpindi two 
meetings were held to protest against the Colonisation Bill, 
the second of which was addressed by Ajit Singh. His speech 
was considered seditious. The Deputy Commissioner served a 
notice on the organisers, Lala Gurdas Ram, Lala Hans Raj,
Lala Amlok Ram and others who were prominent local leaders, 
and summoned them to his court on 2 May at 11 a.m. A large 
crowd collected outside his court and when the Deputy 
Commissioner postponed the hearing, those who had gathered 
there rioted and damaged the Deputy Commissioner^ house and
p
other government property. Lajpat Rai was also in Rawalpindi
Home Progs. Political. July-December 1907. 7590.
2. Ibid,
at that time and had consented to address a meeting "before it
was prohibited by the Deputy Commissioner.^"
Minto*s policy was to permit the local governments to
use their discretion in matters where they found any danger
of disorders and to resort to the usual legal methods in
2
prosecuting the offenders. Sir Denzil Ibbetson, the 
Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab knew the Government of 
India*s view regarding the use of Regulation III of 1818, 
under which a man could be sent to prison and kept there 
without trial for any limit of time and without being charged 
with an offence. He had himself written in his note on the 
prosecution of the five lawyers of Rawalpindi on charges of 
arson and riot, that, "the Government of India will be very 
unwilling to employ the Regulation save in the most sparing 
manner and in the face of grave necessity".^
Officially Minto knew nothing of the political 
situation in the Punjab till he received Ibbetsonfs minute earlj 
in May 1907. Ibbetson described the situation in the Punjab 
as very serious and explosive because of the "seditious
1. Lajpat Rai - The Story of My Deportation. Lahore, 1908.
pp.1-20.
2. (a) See correspondence between the Government of U.P. and
the Government of India - May 1907, regarding 
prosecution of Tahal Ram and Haider Raza for seditious 
speeches. Home Progs. Political, July - December 1907. 
7590.
(b) Correspondence between the Government of the Punjab 
and the Government of India regarding the Rawalpindi 
Riot Case and the Prosecution of the lawyers. Ibid.
3. Letter from the Government of the Punjab to the Government 
of India. No; 713 - S.B. dated 18 June 1907. Ibid.
activities" of Lala Lajpat Rai and his agent Ajit Singh, 
Lajpat Rai's private character was described as "above 
reproach", but "he is everywhere recognized as being the 
moving spirit of the whole agitation"* Ajit Singh was "the 
most active and the most virulent of those who have spoken 
against the British Government", Ibbetson,based his minute 
on C.I.L, reports of their speeches before the peasants of 
Iy allpur, Multan and other places. In some of these meetings 
Ajit Singh was supposed to have invited the Government to 
prosecute him and had not hesitated to suggest that it was 
afraid to do so. Between 1 March and 1 May 1907, 28 such 
meetings were held, and in most of these either Lajpat Rai 
or Ajit Singh or both had criticised the Government's 
action, particularly in relation to the Colonisation Bill. 
Ibbetson also referred to another rumour that Lajpat Rai 
was in correspondence with the Amir of Afghanistan and 
attempts had been made to tamper with the loyalty of the 
army,^ Under these circumstances Ibbetson requested Minto 
that the warrants of their confinement under section 2 of
p
Regulation III of 1818 be issued, Minto was of opinion that 
Ibbetson knew the Punjab very well and was not likely to 
exaggerate the situation. So trusting Ibbetson's judgment, 
Minto considered his request in council and the orders were
1. Minute by Sir Denzil Ibbetson. 30 April 1907. Home Progs. 
Political, July - December 1907. 7590.
2. Letter from the Government of the Punjab to the Government 
of India. Nos695. 3 May 1907. Ibid.
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accordingly issued.^ Lajpat Rai was arrested and deported
on 9 May and Ajit Singh on 3 June 1907. Both were sent to
2
Mandalay, Burma.
Minto explained his action to Morley as "imperatively 
necessary" and stated that "the present emergency is so great 
that I may he forced to issue an ordinance under section 23 
of the Act of 1861 to regulate public meetings, chiefly with 
the object of obtaining full and accurate reports of the 
utterances of the speakers and in extreme cases to prohibit 
meetings altogether"* He admitted that in the absence of 
shorthand reporting of vernacular languages it was impossible 
to obtain correct reporting of speeches. Under the 
circumstances it would not have been possible to obtain 
conviction for sedition on the basis of these reports of 
informers in face of the multitude of witnesses who would be 
brought to contradict informers. And accordingly on 11 May 
1907, Minto issued the Regulation of Meetings1 Ordinance, 
limiting stringently the right of holding public meetings, 
and it was applied to the Punjab and Eastern Bengal and Assam 
at once. He wrote to Morley that, "I believe the arrest of 
Lajpat Rai and the proclamation of the Ordinance have done
1. The Viceroy’s Council met on Sunday. Erie Richards and 
Sir H. Adamson were against it, but the Viceroy, trusting 
Ibbetson's judgment, gave him all he had asked for. Dunlop 
Smith’s entry, 5 May 1907 in Lady Minto's My Indian 
Journal. Vol.I. 1907. p*129.
2. lajpat Rai - The Story of My Deportation, p.l.
Mint o ’s te le gram 'to- Morley - 3 June 19^7. Morley Papers.
I.O.L.
3. Minto to Morley - telegram - 8 May 1907. Ibid.
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endless good in restoring public confidence".^*
In Mintofs view the reasons for the Punjab unrest were 
three - the 50th anniversary of the Mutiny (10 May 1907); the 
Punjab Colonisation Bill, and the plague. Lajpat Rai saw the 
whole thing in a different light. He thought this unrest was 
due to the Governmentfs unwise policies. In his view the 
riots in the district of Rawalpindi, at any rate, were 
organised by the police with a view to arresting the popular
p
leaders.
But as later events proved and as Minto and Ibbetson
subsequently admitted, the troubles in the Punjab were
largely agrarian in origin.^ Lady Minto considers the
Colonisation Bill "the pretext for this new c a ^  of t^lible
in the Punjab",^ but it was no "pretext", it was the real
1907
underlying cause. Early in May/Minto disallowed the Act, 
notwithstanding the fact that it had been approved by the 
Home Department and adopted by the Executive Council. Minto 
disallowed the Act because he considered it "a very faulty 
piece of legislation" which would "add fuel to the justifiable
1. Minto to Morley - 21 May 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Lajpat Rai - op.cit.pp.1-20.
3. Minto to Morley $ June 1907? 3 July 1907? 26 September 
1907; Government of India to the Punjab Government - 
27 June 1907. M.Shafifs Memorandum to Dunlop Smith - 
19 June 1907. Rote by Major P.Popham Young, Offg. 
Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, on Administration of the 
Chenab Colony. 11 June 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
4. Mary, Countess of Minto - India, Minto and Morley.
London. 1934. p.129.
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discontent which has already heen caused". Ibhetson himself 
admitted the shortcomings of the Bill, hut pressed Minto not 
to veto it, as it would lower the prestige of the Punjab 
Government and it would mean a concession to the agitators, 
yTo this Minto replied, "I hate the argument that to refuse to 
sanction what we know to he wrong is a surrender to agitation 
and an indication of weakness. It is far weaker to my mind 
to persist in a wrong cause for fear of being thought weak".'*' 
He further emphasised that an appearance of surrender would 
"be far less dangerous than to insist on enforcing the 
unfortunate legislation upon a warlike and loyal section of
p
the Indian Community", Again he wrote to Morley, "I am 
always saying to you the stability of our rule here will, in 
ny opinion, depend largely on our own capability of marching 
with the times in a rapidly changing political atmosphere."^ 
Morley approved of Minto!s action in refusing to assent to 
the Act, and suggested an enquiry to be made. Minto shared 
the same opinion but because of Ibbetson's departure on sick 
leave and the subsiding of agitation the matter was dropped 
and the contemplated enquiry abandoned. Minto's disallowance 
of the Act was a quick and effective step. It saved the 
situation in the Punjab. Minto did not want that seditious 
activities should spread widely in the Punjab. The Chenab
1.Minto to Morley - 16 May 1907. Morley Papers, I.O.L.
2.Mintofs official minute. Home Progs. Political. July - 
December 1907. 7590.
3.Minto to Morley - 21 May 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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Colony was inhabited "by loyal Indian Army pensioners. 
Discontent among them ought to be avoided. Moreover the 
Punjab provided a considerable number of recruits for the 
Indian Army, In short, the Act affected not only past and
1
future members of the army but also present serving soldiers.
Morley supported Mintofs action in deporting Lajpat 
Rai and Ajit Singh in the beginning, but soon afterwards he 
became impatient. He had grave misgivings about the wisdom 
of the policy of deportation. As Lady Minto put it, "the 
practice of deportation had always 'stuck in the throat1 of
2
the Secretary of State, it outraged his Liberal conscience'1. 
Morley understood Minto fs difficulties, but he was conscious 
of the opinions of his Radical supporters .and of the fact 
that his "Tory opponents will scent an inconsistency between 
deporting Lajpat, and uy old fighting of Balfour for locking
1. An incident that Minto mentioned in one of his letters to 
Morley shows that Minto was right in thinking that the. 
matter was of political importance. It further explains 
that the soldiers, though ignorant of the reasons for the 
withdrawal of the Act, were much concerned about the 
episode. Story went round the Sikh regiments that 
Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief was responsible for the 
withdrawal of the Colonisation Bill. This was due to the 
fact that General Barrow, Chief Staff Officer, reported 
to Kitchener that a certain Commanding Officer who was 
informed about the political situation considered that 
the Colonisation Bill was an Act affecting Natal. In 
view of such hopeless ignorance, instructions were issued 
that Commanding Officers,- if possible, be enlightened as 
to the true state of affairs, and it was during the 
course of this enlightenment that the withdrawal of the 
Bill was attributed to the Commander-in-Chief, Minto to 
Morley, 15 July 1907- Morley Papers, I.O.L.
2. Mary, Countess of Minto - op,cit. p ,300*
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up William O'Brien",'1' Minto was, however, able to convince
Morley that India being vastly different from Ireland, there
need not be any inconsistency if the policy pursued in India
2
was not exactly the same as Irish policy, Minto was not 
very fond of the policy of deportation and repression, but 
could see no alternative, as he wrote to Lord Roberts, who 
replied that, "Morley was willing to support you in any 
repressive measures you may think necessary to take", Roberts 
further informed Minto that "I told Morley that we govern 
India by respect based on fear, remove the fear and the
1. Morley to Minto - 31 May 1907* See also Morley to Minto- 
28 June 1907. "... since the deportation of Lajpat, I am 
often wounded in the house of my friends ..." Mary, 
Countess of Minto -op.cit, p.147. Morley was not very 
wrong about the impression such strict measures would 
create in England, W. S.Blunt - in his My Diaries, London, 
1919. Part II, p.177. states -"10 May 1907 - Morley is 
just the weak-kneed administrator to resort to firm 
measures and we shall see him using all 'the resources 
of civilisation', practised in Russia", p,227
20 October 1908r Nevinson "agreed with me all the same 
in my estimate of Morley as a weak-backed politician, 
quite ignorant of India and the East, swayed by the 
permanent officials, and principally anxious for general 
praise and his sooial position".
William O'Brien (1852-1928). Irish nationalist leader. He 
was imprisoned many times, without trial, on suspicions 
of treason. In 1887 he was convicted on a charge of 
conspiracy in order to intimidate tenants to refuse to 
pay their rents, and sent to T llamore jail for six 
months. A.J.Balfour was Chief Secretary for Ireland in 
Lord Salisbury's Government. O'Brien's claim that he 
should be treated as a political prisoner was ignored by 
the Government, He declined to wear prison uniform and 
lay naked on his plank bed for several weeks. Morley put 
up a strong fight for his release. See Hansard. House of 
Commons, 3.S. Vol.322. and ff.
2, Morley's speech in the House of Commons - 6 June 1907. 
Morley's Speeches, p.18. Hansard. House of Commons,
4 S. Vol.175. Cols, 879-8817
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respeat will soon disappear,"
Later Minto wrote to Morley, "I found in India in the
official world a great tendency to assume all political
expressions of an advanced nature to be seditious; in many
cases they were very far from being so, and to judge of such
expressions fairly one must recollect the position of those
who give vent to them, i.e., that they belong to a conquered
race, and however much they may recognise the necessity of
British rule in India, it is only human that they should
occasionally give signs of sympathy with their own 
2
nationality.” It is not easy to say whether Minto had always 
been able to analyse official opinion and distinguish between 
various types. But some of his actions suggest that he tried 
to distinguish between "political expressions of an advanced 
nature" and "seditious" expressions. It seems that he 
considered all those expressions and actions which led to 
violence as ’seditious*. He did not, however, hesitate to 
admit his own mistakes* The courage with which he resisted 
the official pressure to deport B.C.Pal in June 1907 and 
then his release of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh in the teeth 
of official opposition suggest that besides pressure from
1* Lord Roberts to Minto - 17 May 1907. Minto Collection 
N.L.S.
2. Minto to Morley - 23 December 1913* Minto Collection 
N.L.S. A few years before this, the Aga khan had put 
forward the same argument - "That India is a conquered 
country, and, whatever her foreign Government may do, the 
very nature of that rule will make it unpopular ...."
"Some Thoughts on Indian Discontent" - National Review, 
London, Pebruary 1907. pp.951-972.
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Morley, Minto's own inclination and understanding of the 
situation played a great part.
It was in June 1907 that Minto was pressed for B.C.
Pal's deportation by Sir Andrew Fraser, Lieutenant-Governor 
of Bengal, Sir Lancelot Hare, Lieutenant-Governor of 
Eastern Bengal and Assam and Sir Arthur Lawley, Governor of 
Madras. B.C.Pal was acting as a political missionary of 
Shyamaji Krishnavarma and was engaged in delivering speeches 
to students, for which he had received Rs, 500/- in payment 
of the first half of his fee. Early in 1907 he delivered a 
number of speeches on topics of national interest - like 
Swadeshiy Swaraj, boycott and Hindu Muslim Unity - in Madras 
and in Bengal. These speeeches created a big stir among the 
students. Sir Bhashyam Aiyangar, Offg. Advocate General, 
Madras, in his report to the Government of Madras, regarded 
Palfs speeches as of a "most pernicious character” and 
thought they would ”have a peculiarly baneful influence upon 
the audience which consist chiefly of students”. The Madras 
Government suggested deportation, but Minto asked Morley's 
permission with the remarks that he himself liked the policy 
of prosecution better than deportation. Minto considered Pal's 
ideas as expressed in these speeches to be "advanced” but not 
"seditious”. In Morleyfs view there were three ways of 
dealing with Pal - leaving him alone; prosecution, or 
deportation without warning, but the last was thought to be 
fatal to the chances of success of the reform policy. The
Government of India suggested prosecution to the Government
of Madras* When the Madras Government took steps in the
matter, the Secretary of State again interfered and demanded
a detailed account of the reasons to justify the prosecution*
Pal was, however, sentenced to six months imprisonment in
October 1907, for refusing to give evidence in a sedition
1
case against Aurabindo Ghose.
In the meanwhile the Government both at Simla and
Whitehall was strongly pressed for the release of Lajpat
Rai and A jit Singh, The Indian Press strongly condemned the
Governments action in deporting Lajpat Rai. The Congress
organs were particularly vociferous and exhorted Morley "to
be himself" and show his true liberalism by undoing these
acts of repression. The daily Sandhya of Calcutta, with a
circulation of 7000, even went to the extent of suggesting
that the departure of Sir. L.Ibbetson on sick leave was a
2
curse on him of the Indian people. The Congress 
condemnation of these deportations was equally strong. Dr. 
Rash Behari Ghose in his presidential addresses of 1907 and 
1908, denounced the Regulation III of 1818. In 1908 the 
Congress demanded the repeal of this Regulation and urged 
that the deported persons be brought to trial. Tej Bahadur
1. Minto to Morley - 3, 10 July 1907. Morley Papers.
I.O.L. Home Progs. Public/Political - July - December 
1907. 7590. Secretary of State to Government of India - 
1 July 1907.
2. Native Newspaper Reports, Bengal, Punjab and U.P. - 1907.
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Sapru and Syed Husain Imam, two prominent lawyers and 
moderate leaders, spoke against this Regulation and declared 
that its spirit was against the very first principles of 
English jurisprudence and that it was opposed to all the 
traditions of the English Constitution.^ Such denunciation of 
the Governments policy from the Congress platform hy these 
loyal and moderate leaders, whose support Minto*s Government 
intended to enlist, must have presented the Government with 
a moment of worry. Gokhale personally approached Minto for 
the release of Lajpat Rai, In a letter to Dunlop Smith 
Gokhale stated that flto bracket A jit Singh with Lajpat Rai 
is monstrous injustice to the latter. When I was in Lahore 
in February last Ajit Singh had already begun to denounce 
Lajpat Rai as a coward and a pro-Government man, because 
Lajpat Rai would have nothing to do with Ajit Singhfs 
propaganda”. Gokhale had a talk with Dunlop Smith as well.
The gist of this talk was that Gokhale virtually "begged 
for the early release of Lajpat Rai - as for Ajit Singh he 
might rot in •Jehannum' [hell],” Gokhale had again insisted 
that Lajpat Rai should not have been bracketed with "that 
miscreant Ajit Singh who should have got transportation to 
the Andamans". Gokhale also published a letter in the Times 
of India regarding Lajpat Rai’s arrest, insisting on his
1. Report of the Indian National Congress. 1908. pp.107-110, 
115-116. “
1
release or some statement as to the reasons for his arrest, 
Gokhale^ anxiety was for two reasons. Pirst, the practice 
of deportation was wrong on principle* Secondly, if the 
Government persisted in the policy,, there was the risk of the 
extremists becoming more powerful thus endangering the 
moderate cause and the Governments contemplated reform 
policy, Minto seems to have been greatly influenced by 
Gokhale in his later policy towards Lajpat Rai.
In England Morley was pressed hard. In the House of 
Commons questions were asked by the radical and Irish 
members about the reasons for the Governments action and 
the causes of this unrest. Dr. V.H.Rutherford, M.P.Middlesex, 
Brentford; J.O'Grady, Leeds, E., William Redmond, Clare, E,, 
Sir Henry Cotton, Nottingham E,, C.J,0fDonnell, Newington, 
Walworth and others asked searching questions to find out the 
real reasons for LajpatS deportation. They even pressed the 
Government to charge him and try him in a Court of Law.
H.C.Lea, member for St. Pancras, E. asked "whether there was
any other place under the British flag where these lettres
2
de cachet obtained as they did in India". Such questions 
were asked frequently and Morley first evaded direct answers, 
then made a statement on 6 June 1907. He justified the
I. Gokhale to Dunlop Smith - 10 June 1907 enclosed with 
Mintofs letter to Morley 18 September 1907. Minto to 
Morley - 29 October 1907. Pull text of Gokhale1s letter 
to The Times of India in the Indian Review, June 1907.
Vol.VIII. No.6. pp.463-464.
2, Hansard. House of Commons. 4 S. Vol.174. Col.1634.
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Governments action and based his speech on Ibbetson's minute. 
Though he did not enumerate the charges against Lajpat and 
Ajit Singh, he suggested that the unrest in the Punjab was 
caused more by their speeches than by any agrarian grievances. 
This remained the Government explanation for some time. The 
Government did not publicly admit that the agrarian 
grievances were the main cause of unrest in the Punjab in 
spite of the fact that Minto vetoed the Colonisation Bill,
On 18 June 1907 P,C.Mackarness, member for Berkshire,
Newbury, then asked whether Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh were 
entitled to appeal to the Governor General and whether they 
had availed themselves of this opportunity* Morley replied 
in the affirmative to the first part of the query but in the 
negative to the second. Thus pestered, Morley, on his part, 
pressed Minto to revise his policy.^
Lady Minto*s account of Minto's attitude towards
2
Lajpat Rai gives an erroneous impression. She implies that 
Minto thought Lajpat Rai to be "the head and centre of the 
entire movement" that excited "discontent among the 
agricultural classes" and tampered "with the loyalty of the 
army". But this was Ibbetson's viewpoint and not Minto's.
1. Morley to Minto - 23 August 1907; telegrams, 30 October 
1907; 2 November 1907. Hansard - 4 S. Vol.174, and ff,
Lajpat Rai knew from the beginning that his 
imprisonment would not be for very long; that his friends 
in Parliament would try to secure his release. He wrote in 
his Story of My Deportation that he decided to petition 
to the Government of India against his detention after he
had learnt that a question in Parliament had been asked as
to his petition - p.199.
2, Mary, Countess of Minto. - op.cit. p.124.
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Minto first took Ibbetson's views at their face value and did 
not ask for more details. If he had done so, it would have 
meant that he had no faith in the Lieutenant-Governor, whom 
he treated as an expert on Punjab affairs. Lady Minto by 
quoting his telegram of 8 May 1907 to Morley does not make it 
clear whether the views expressed in it were those of Minto 
or of Ibbetson.^ Minto trusted Ibbetson's judgment so 
completely that the Government of India before issuing orders 
for the arrest of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh did not even try 
to find out the whereabouts of the two. It was considered 
that Ibbetson knew their whereabouts and it would be easy to 
arrest them. This, however, was not the case as it took a 
long time before Ajit Singh was arrested. Minto informed 
Morley that the Punjab Government even made no attempt to
2
secure all the papers connected with Lajpat Rai's arrest.
When all the facts became clear to Minto and the agitation 
subsided, then he admitted his true feelings to Morley. On 
5 November 1907 Minto wrote "that we must in common justice 
release them [Ajit Singh and Lajpat Rai] and that the sooner 
we do so the better". Ibbettson still objected, but Minto's 
reply was, "there is nothing whatever that I know of to 
justify his assertion that one of Lajpat Rai's main objects 
is to tamper with the loyalty of the Indian Army. I have
1. Mary, Countess of Minto - on.pit, pp.124-125.
2. Minto to Morley - 16 May 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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never seen any evidence in support of this* Ibbetson appears 
to me to entirely misunderstand the position. He appears to 
assume that we can stamp out the unrest. This we can never 
do. It has come to stay, in the shape of new ideas and 
aspirations of which every one who has thought seriously over 
the subject ought to be aware. He confuses this with sedition 
which we are absolutely determined to put down". Minto very 
much regretted his action, but his only consolation was that 
this drastic action had exhibited the Government1s strength 
at that moment. Morley’s persistence in his demand for 
Lajpatfs release must surely have had some influence but he 
was actually released when Minto himself became convinced 
that "Lajpat is undoubtedly a man of high character and very 
much respected by his fellow-countrymen, and if when I was 
asked to arrest him, I had known what I do now, I should have 
required much more evidence before agreeing. Ajit Singh is of 
much lower standing in every way and I shall regret 
associating them in their release".^ Thus Minto admitted
1, Minto to Morley - 5 November 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L. 
Lady Minto omitted the relevant sentences from this letter 
in her book. Perhaps she thought that as she had been 
quoting from Minto fs other letters, which were based on 
reports from the local government, containing statements 
like Lajpat*s communication with the Amir of Afghanistan 
etc. (p.151), it would not do him much credit, if this 
confession was also published. (See p.163). She is 
guilty of creating a wrong impression. Minto had a 
perfectly clear conscience and admitted frankly even 
the Governments mistakes.
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that the Government's action was hasty, unjustified and based
on slender evidence. Minto's regret in bracketing Ajit Singh
and Lajpat arose from the fact that the former was
definitely of lower social standing than Lajpat Rai. Moreover 
a
there i^ marked difference between the reported speeches of
the two, Ajit Singh, it seems, did suggest that the
Government had become tyrannical and the people should rise
against tyranny. But Lajpat*s speeches were sober, matter of
fact and less provocative. On 4 November 1907, Minto
informed Morley that though Ibbetson still had his objections,
2
he was going to order Lajpat*s and Ajit's release, Morley 
immediately telegraphed the Cabinet's approval,^ Minto 
specially ordered that every courtesy should be shown to
1. Home Progs.Public/Political - July - December 1907. 7590. 
Text of speeches as reported by the C.I.L. given,
Lajpatrs alleged communication with the Amir of 
Afghanistan seems to have been a rumour, No such 
correspondence exists in the Government records. The 
Punjab Government took these rumours seriously and 
accepted them as true without having any documentary 
evidence,
2. Minto to Morley - telegram - 4 November 1907. Morley 
Papers. I.O.L.
3. Morley to Minto - telegram - 5 November 1907# Ibid.
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Lajpat on his behalf."*- On 18 November both were released.
The activities in India of Keir Hardie, the Socialist
? ■a
M.P. and H.W. Nevinson, the correspondent of the the Daily
Chronicle, the Manchester Guardian and the Glasgow Herald,
were not very helpful to the Government either. They attended
1. Minto to Morley - 7 November 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L. 
Compare it with Lajpat Rai's account in The Story of My 
Deportation, p.222 - "The Commissioner added a warning on 
behalf of the Viceroy that in case I was again found 
doing anything seditious, I would be arrested and 
immediately deported," But he admits that he was given a 
First Class Compartment and the Deputy Superintendent of 
Police "was generally courteous" - p.224. On subsequent 
pages he gives an account of the lavishness with which he 
was supplied with foodstuffs etc.
Blunt, in his My Diaries gives an interesting account 
of his interview with Gokhale and Lajpat Rai. (pp.228- 
230). He did not think very highly cf Lajpat and thought 
his book, The Story of My Deportation,"a naive, and in 
places quite childish narrative". He thought that "it was 
really preposterous that its author should have been made 
a national hero". This book might have been a naive 
narrative, but it does present the other side of the story.
2. Home Progs. Public/Political. January - December 1908.
7875T
3. Morley recommended Nevinson to Minto and asked him to 
show him "some trifle of civility", Morley to Minto - 
3 October 1907. Minto sent Morley an account of his 
activities from the weekly report of the Director 
General of Criminal Investigation and suggested that his 
activities - public criticism of the Government, and 
public speeches suggesting that if the Indians wanted to 
achieve anything they must organize protest meetings etc. 
to bring their grievances to the notice of the Liberal 
Government - were such that they would have to send him 
home. - Minto to Morley - 12 December 1907. Nevinson in 
his More Changes More Chances, London 1925. p.229, admits 
that he did not realise then the intensity of bitterness, 
or the weight of stolid opposition of Morley*s India 
Council and Anglo-Indians and the aourage with which 
Morley faced them. He regrets some of his sayings and 
deeds in opposition to Morleyfs Indian policy.
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public meetings and criticised the Government actions. There
were moments when Minto and Morley seriously thought that
their activities were not conducive to good relations between
the people and the government and might lead to public
disorder.^" They very loosely used the words "India" and
"Indians". By 1India' they meant 'Hindu India', and by
'Indians', the 'Hindus' only. Hardie and Nevinson were
chaperoned by the Congress leaders and they saw and expressed
only those views which were held by the Congress leaders.
Throughout the tour Hardie was accompanied by Jagesh
2
Chaudhri, son-in-law of Surendranath Banerjea. Hindu
1. a) Minto to Morley - 16 October 1907 f 12 December 1907*
Morley Papers. I.O.L. 
b) Morley ■fro H.Campbe11-Bannerman, 2 October 1907.
Campbell-Bannerman Papers regarding K.Hardie - 41223 
Vol .Will (ff 26b). ’( B.M.) Morley informed Campbell- 
Bannerman about Keir Hardie's activities and stated 
that if he continued to make these seditious speeches 
the Government of India might have to deport him under 
the Regulations of 1818 and if they did not, they could 
not justify Lajpat Rai's deportation. He hinted that 
the matter, being a serious one, might be discussed in 
the Cabinet. The song Bande Mataram tended to create 
ill-will between Hindus and Muslims in Eastern Bengal, 
but Keir Hardie insisted that it should be sung on the 
boat which took him from the steamer at Serajganj.
(See report in the Sandhya, 28 September 1907. B.N.N.R. 
1907). In 1906, Sir Cilbert Parker had asked the Under 
Secretary of State for India if he intended to adopt 
any measure to prevent the Hindus from singing the 
Bande Mataram song in a provocative manner in the 
interest of communal peace in Eastern Bengal, since 
it was distasteful to Muslims. Sir Henry Cotton had 
interrupted to deny that the song was disliked by the 
Muslims. (See Hansard. House of Commons. 4S.Vol.160.
16 July 1906. Col.I3£3-1324.)
2. Emrys Hughes - Keir Hardie. 1956. pp.149-158.
\
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newspapers welcomed him as a Messiah for the Hindu community
and the Amrita Bazar Patrika expressed the Hindu gratitude
in a eulogistic editorial. The influence of his chaperons
was shown at Mymensingh and Dacca, where he said that the
partition was the root cause of all the unrest, and that
official opposition to the Swadeshi movement and official
patronage of Muslims had increased it. His Indian experiences
were published in 1909 under the title of India; Impressions
and Suggestions. In this book he regretted the policy of
official patronage of Muslims and warned the British people
against the day when all of them in the world "take it into
their heads to try once again to win supreme power for Allah
in the E a s t " H e  felt sorry for the Hindus, whom he had
found much maligned, though, in fact, they were well meaning,
2
loyal and submissive, Hardie asserted that "the Government 
of India in its present form resembles a huge military 
despotism tempered somewhat by a civil b u r e a u c r a c y . A b o u t  
Minto he wrote that "the present Viceroy, Lord Minto has 
won golden opinions for his courtesy and his kindliness of 
disposition, and his very evident desire to ease the strain 
which exists between the educated Indian gentleman and the 
Anglo-Indian officials". He, however, expressed his surprise
1. Keir Hardie - India; Impressions and Suggestions, 1909, 
pp. XV-XVI.
2. Ibid.pp.123-124. He said this in almost identical words
in the House of Commons. See Hansard, House of Commons,4 S. 
Vol.193. 22 July 1908, Cols."iy2-37
3. Keir Hardie- op.cit. p.71.
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that the Viceroy had no Indian secretary and emphasised the 
need for one.*** Nevinson’s hias in favour of the Hindus can
be gleaned through the pages of the New Spirit in India and
2
More Changes More Chances, Such remarks, writings and 
activities were not meant to please the Muslims, and they 
only helped to widen the gulf between them and the Hindus,
On 1 November 1907, the Prevention of Seditious 
Meetings Act was passed.-^ This was based on the Ordinance of 
May 1907. It provided that no political meeting could be 
held in a "proclaimed area" without the permission of the 
local authorities, who could forbid it if they thought that 
it might promote sedition. Sir Harvey Adamson, who piloted 
the Bill, argued that as respectable law abiding citizens 
of India were hesitant to help the Government in prosecuting 
law-breakers by coming forward to testify in the Courts of 
Law against those who preached sedition in public meetings, 
the Indian law about holding meetings had to be made more
1, Keir Hardie - India:Impressions and Suggestions, 1909. 
pp.77-78.
2, Nevinson made speeches at various places to the effect 
that there was no sedition in India and that the Indians 
were unjustly persecuted because there was a national 
awakening among them, (ff.N.NnR. 1908), In the New Spirit 
in^India (pp.191-193, 202; he states that the policy of 
Puller was directed against the Hindus; they were deprived 
of offices etc. Such statements were bound to create ill 
feeling amongst Indians. The Records, on the other hand, 
do not show this discrimination. Puller did make some 
tactless speeches and some of his actions were also open 
to criticism, but this did not amount to a determined 
policy of the Government against the Hindus.
3, Home Progs. Public/Political - July-December 1907. 7590.
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stringent than the English law.^- Gokhale !s and Rash Behari
Ghose1s argument in opposing the Bill was that it would place
very great powers in the hands of the local authorities; that
no parallel measure could be found in any European Country,
viz., Italy, Belgium, Prance or Switzerland though Europe
was "honey-combed with secret societies of anarchists and 
2
socialists", that it was against the spirit of the British 
Constitution and of liberalism;^ but most important-of all, 
that it would strengthen the extremists as they would 
attract more attention by pointing to the Russian methodsA
of government#"
Morley did not like the new Act, but on Minto*s 
pleading, he wrote, "the spirit in which you mean to use 
the powers confided to you by the new Act, are so thoroughly 
remarkable, that I have no fear of being able to make a 
good stout defence". And he did defend the Act in the House 
of Commons against the criticisms of Dr. Rutherford and D.M. 
Smeaton, Liberal member for Stirlingshire, Morley informed 
them that the Act was more of a deterrent against seditious
7
meetings and would not be used autocratically.
1. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor General of 
India, April 1507 - March 1908. Vol.XLVI pp.56-65•
2. Ibid, p.49*
3. Ibid. p.50.
4. Tbid. p.48.
5. Minto to Morley - 5 November 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
6. Morley to Minto - 29 November 1907* "“Ibid,
7. Hansard. House of Commons. 4..S. Vol.183* 1908,
11 February 1908*
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Minto's Government was taking all possible steps to 
suppress what it thought to be seditious. The liberty of the 
Indian Press was to be curtailed next. During the period 
between June 1906 and July 1907, prosecutions were instituted 
against nine newspapers or journals and against three persons 
for publishing seditious pamphlets.^ On 5 March 1907 Minto 
wrote, MI am afraid we must consider seriously how we are to 
deal with the Native Press, for in many cases the utterances 
of newspapers are outrageous, I don't know that we can afford 
to treat them with contempt”, Minto felt that these 
newspapers and pamphlets were not merely an expression of 
impossible ideas, but much of the material in them was a 
direct instigation to the people of India "to get rid of 
British rule”. In this connection he was able to point to 
one pamphlet addressed to "Men of the British Arny" by "the 
Natives of India and Afghanistan who have emigrated to 
America", was found in the possession of some Sikh soldiers 
at the headquarters of the Guides at Mardan. This circular 
was extremely provocative as it urged the Indian soldiers 
to rise against the British Government and fight for Swaraj. 
Stringent action was taken against those soldiers in whose 
possession the circular was found and Pindi Das, the editor 
of the weekly India, was prosecuted for publishing it in his 
paper. But this was not enough. Kitchener was very anxious
1. Minto to Morley - 7 August 1907. Minto Collection , N.L.S.
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to keep the loyalty of the Indian army untampered. Morley had 
earlier sent Minto copies of letters from Sanderson, British 
Consul at New York to the British Ambassador in Washington. 
Sanderson had given an account of the activities of the 
Indians in America on the lines of "clan-na-gael". This 
discovery of the circular naturally made Minto think that 
it might have some connection with the activities of the 
Indians in America, To suppress the further dissemination 
of this inflammatory literature Minto emphasised the 
need of controlling the activities of the Press. He was 
aware of the fact that Morley would not readily agree to 
any control of the liberty of the Press. But he was of 
the opinion that to punish them lightly would make 
matters worse, as it would give the newspapers the 
publicity that a ‘'seditious editor" wanted. He was 
positive that "the influence of this seditious machinery 
is undoubtedly spreading", the question was "whether we 
can count on inflammatory writing falling flat, or 
whether we consider it so dangerous that we must by some
163
means or other put a stop to it, Minto admitted r,that the
fault is not all on one side; some of the Anglo-Indian Press
2
is both low and mischievous", But in his usual persuasive 
style he continued to emphasise the need for controlling the 
activities of the Press, Morley plainly told him, "I doubt 
whether I could persuade the House of Commons to stand it."^
1. Minto to Morley - 5 March 1907. Minto Collections N,L.S. 
See also letter from the Government of Eastern hengal and 
Assam to the Government of India, dated 4 June 1907 - 
complaining of the violence exhibited by the native press 
in Calcutta, the Statesman, the Bengalee, the Amrita 
Bazar Patrika, the Empire, by publishing accounts of 
poli'tical meetings and activities which were "untrue and 
exaggerated," Home Progs.Political, July-December 1907. 
7590. The Calcutta tress, particularly the Congress 
Press, tended to publish coloured accounts of any incident 
in Eastern Bengal, For instance they published rumours 
that the Nawab of Dacca had ordered the Muslims to 
kidnap and marry Hindu widows forcibly. They published 
untrue and exaggerated accounts of "reign of terror" by 
the Muslim 1goondas* in the villages of East Bengal. A 
comparison between the Native Newspapers Reports, Bengal, 
and the East Bengal Government’s fortnightly reports will 
show that the local Government’s letter of 4 June 1907 
was justified. Such reports were bound to aggravate the 
already tense situation in that province.
2. Minto to Morley - 2 April 19075 2 May 1907. Ibid, A 
clear case in this connection was that of the daily
Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore. This paper published 
certain letters which Minto thought "disgracefully low 
in tone". See H.W.Nevinson, - The New Spirit in India, 
London 1908. p.17. The Punjab Indian Association demanded 
prosecution of the paper*, but the Punjab Government 
refused to allow it. Sir Henry Cotton asked Morley 
whether his attention had been drawn to this refusal of 
the Punjab Government to allow prosecution of a paper 
which tended to spread racial discrimination. Morley 
replied that he had seen the press reports and that at 
that time he did not think it necessary to take any 
special action. Hansard. House of Commons. 4 S.
Vol.170, 1907. CoT;T2"28,
3. Morley to Minto - 13 June 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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Not content with private correspondence only, Minto
decided to send Morley an official despatch containing the
reasons for Press legislation* The list of crimes committed
"by the Indian Press was impressive, hut Morley remained
adamant. The reasons given by the government were that
deliberate attempts had been made by a number of newspapers
in India, both English and vernacular, to inflame the minds
of the people, to encourage enmity between classes, to
promote active hostility to the Government, and to disturb
the public tranquility in many different ways, in the
preaching of active rebellion against the British Government,
in attempts to seduce the Indian army from their allegiance
to the Crown and so on.^ Some papers had advised the civil
population of the Punjab to combine to withhold the payment
of public revenue during the Colonisation Act controversy and
in Bengal to employ explosive bombs for the purpose of
resisting the officers of the law. It was also brought to
the notice of the Secretary of State that the Government
had been publicly charged with extinguishing profitable
industries in the interests of foreign merchants; with
instigating and abetting dacoity, sacrilege and rape; and
with disseminating plague by poisoning wells and springs
in order to reduce the native population and replace it by
1. Selections from the Native Newspaper Reports, Punjab and 
Bengal suggest that the Government was not much wrong in 
drawing these conclusions from the passionate writings , 
of papers like the Sandhya, Calcutta, Yugantar, Calcutta, 
the Punjabee, Lahore and a host of others.
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immigrants from Europe* These were very serious charges and 
it had not heen possible to contradict or deny any of them 
without raising further controversy. Nor could they he 
ignored as there was every likelihood that such writings, 
if not suppressed, would influence the half educated Indians. 
Hence the Government suggested some form of press 
legislation.^
Minto, in the meanwhile, sought the opinions of the 
local Governments with regard to the proposed Press Act. All 
governments agreed that legislation should he undertaken for 
the purpose of some degree of control over the newspaper 
press in India. Some even suggested stringent measures; i.e. 
"summary trial without intervention of the courts," of the
p
offending press, some thought that to avoid any general 
excitement among the public, it would he wise to deal with 
the press in the ordinary course of law.
But a wave of crime and political murders ensued which
justified Mintofs fears. On 6 December 1907 an attempt was 
made to blow up the train of Sir Andrew Eraser, the 
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal at Midnapur. On 23 December,
1. Government of India to Secretary of State - Public letter,
11 July 1907, Home Progs. Political. July-December 1907.
7590.
2. (a) Government of Burma to the Government of India, 27
August 1907.
(b) Chief Commissioner of N.W.P.P. to the Government of 
India. 6 September 1907. Home Progs.Public/Political. 
January-December 1908. 7875.
B.C.Allen, a former District Magistrate of Dacca was 
unsuccessfully shot at. But the crime that really resulted 
ultimately in the discovery of hidden bombs, dynamite and 
inflammable literature was the murder of Mrs. and Miss 
Kennedy on 30 April 1908^ at Muzzaffarpur. The bomb, that 
killed these two ladies, was actually intended for D.H. 
Kingsford, who as Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, had 
tried cases against the Yugantar, the Bande Mataram, the 
Sandhya, and the Nabaski newspapers and convicted persons 
connected with these papers, thus incurring the displeasure 
of the revolutionary party. He had sentenced to a whipping 
of 15 stripes a boy named Shusil Kumar Sen. The Alipore 
organisers of the revolutionary movement sent Khudi Ram 
Bose and Profulla Chaki to Muzzafarpur to kill Kingsford.
They mistook the carriage of Mrs. and Miss Kennedy for that 
of Kingsford and threw their bomb. Two days after, both of 
them were arrested, Profulla shot himself, but Khudi Ram 
made a public confession, was tried and hanged. This 
confession led to the discovery of some bombs, dynamite, 
cartridges and correspondence, in Maniktola Cardens,
Calcutta, and other places, which led to the arrest of
2Aurobindo Ghose, his brother and others, Morley immediately
1. S.N.Banerjea, - A Nation in Making, p.248, gives the 
wrong date for tliis ’happening.
Report of the Indian Sedition Committee 1918, pp.22-50; 
Summary of Lord Minto's Administration. Minto Collection. 
¥.r;T. pp.7-10'.
2. Home Progs. Political/Public. January - December 1908. "v 
7875 *
suggested the introduction of an Explosives Act on the lines
of the English Explosives Substances Act of 1883 in India.^
But Minto pleaded very strongly the need of the Press Act
with a view "to control the source from which all this
poison has spread throughout India .,, there is nothing to
be gained in prosecuting a succession of dummy editors. We
must have power to seize the presses. It appears to me sheer
madness to allow the continuance of public instigation to 
2
murder". Morley ultimately dropped his objection because 
"this villainy of the Bombs, the revelations connected with
•3
the Bombs, make a new situation for us". He approved it but 
with the hope that "the vital importance ... of carrying 
English opinion with us" might not be forgotten when the Act 
was enforced.^ So on 8 June 1908, the Press Act was passed.
1. Morley to Minto - 13 March 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - 13 May 1908. Minto Collection N.L.S. 
lord Roberts expressed his grave concern at "the 
discovery of this Bomb movement in Calcutta" and informed 
Minto that he had told Morley "what a very serious affair 
it is", and that "he will give you a free hand. But please
let me know if I can help in any way in this country by
bringing the matter up in Parliament." R.C.Dutt published 
a letter in The Times (14 May 1908). While expressing 
detestation at the outrage, he stated that "crimes in 
this or other form will increase in India until the 
people are admitted to some responsible share in the 
control and direction of the administration of their own 
affairs". Lord Roberts ridiculed the ideas, "Nothing 
could show more clearly how unfitted the Natives are for 
the "share" they aim at ...." Lord Roberts to Minto -
14 May 1908. Ibid.
3. Morley to Mirito - 7 May 1908. Morley Papers, I.O.L.
4. Morley to Minto - 28 May 1908. Ibid. I.O.L.
The object of the Act was to prevent incitements to 
murder and other offences. Adamson, who introduced the Bill, 
explained that such writings, quoting from the Yugantar,1 
would not be considered seriously in England, because of the 
British frame of mind, but that had not been the case in 
India. The Indians were not yet prepared for constitutional 
agitation. They could be easily led astray and the Press 
played an important part in doing so. The press they intended
1. Sir Harvey Adamson quoted from an article which appeared 
in the Yugantar,a few days after the attempt on Kingsfordfs 
life in Muzzaffarpur which resulted in the death of two 
ladies. "Hard-heartedness is necessary to trample the 
enemy under foot. An independent-spirited youth, arrested 
in connection with the Calcutta incident, is said to have 
said; ’The work of the revolutionists, though progressing 
slowly, was very satisfactory; but two innocent women 
having met with violent death, all their attempts have 
been foiled by a curse of Cod’. If any youth aspiring to 
freedom has really said so, then he has not yet become 
fit to obtain freedom. Hard-heartedness is necessary to 
trample the enemy under foot. When during the Treta Yugu 
the Rakshasas were perpetrating frightful oppression m  
the Sandaka forest, Rama extirpated the whole race of the 
Rakshasas. Laksman IThakur cut off the nose and ears of 
Surpanakha, the bqfpC§rtiful sister of Ravana, and then let 
her go. It is not necessary to give illustrations. If in 
the attempt to destroy the enemy a woman is accidentally 
killed, then God can have no cause of displeasure like 
the English. Many a female demon must be killed in the 
course of tiig, in order to extirpate the race of Asuras 
from the b$felrj)$ of the earth. There is no sin in this - 
no mercy, ritraffection", Proceedings of the Council of 
the Governor-Gene rai of India, "VolTSIVlI. April l^Ob - 
March’ T9D9." pVICr;-------------
The Yugantar (New Era), Calcutta, a daily Bengali paper 
was started by Barindra Kumar Ghose with the help of 
two friends. It preached the gospel of revolution and 
carried on the political and religious instruction of the 
masses. It had a complete scheme of action; first to 
arouse hatred of servitude in the minds of educated 
classes by a vigorous propaganda in the Press, secondly, 
to instil the love of freedom and the Motherland and 
thirdly, to keep the enemy busy with demonstrations and 
agitation.
to muzzle was trying^'to bring into hatred or contempt or to 
excite disaffection towards the Government established by 
Law in India** It was intended to provide a more effective 
way than prosecution for dealing with seditious newspapers.
The Bill would give powers to confiscate the printing press 
and to extinguish the newspaper. Minto thought it an 
'•exceptional" Bill "to meet dangerous emergencies"* Nawab 
Syed Muhammad of Madras considered the Bill "too wide in its 
scope" and complained that they were given "no opportunity
to consider the measure carefully and express any decided
1 2 opinion". Gokhale accepted the Press Act as "inevitable"
and Rash Behari Ghose in his presidential address to the
1908 Congress said that though he believed in the freedom of
the press, under the existing conditions, such a measure
"was perhaps necessary",^ But it was earnestly hoped that the
new Press Act would have "only a temporary existence in the
Indian Statute Book.
During the discussion in the House of Lords on this
Press Act of 1908, Earl Cromer, Lord Curzon and Lord
Lamington, a former Governor of Bombay, expressed identical
views. They thought that the working of the Press in Eastern
countries had shown that western ideas of the freedom of the
1. Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-General of 
India, Vol.XLVII, April 190b - March 1909, PP. 12,14,15,22,
2. Morley to Minto - 8 June 1908, Morley Papers. I.O.L.
3. Report of the Indian National Congress, 19O8. Presidential 
address.
4. Ibid. Resolution XI. p.116.
Press were unsuited to Oriental conditions. The latter two 
speakers considered the measure even inadequate. Lord 
Ampthill wondered "whether it would not have been wiser if 
the Press Act had been introduced at an earlier period"# 
Morley stoutly defended Minto*s actions in the House of Lords 
and stated that "between no two servants of the crown is 
there a better understanding and a fuller confidence than 
there is between the present Viceroy and the present 
Secretary of State". He also admired "the manful courage" of 
Minto who had stated during the Press Act discussions in his 
oouncil that, "No anarchical crime will deter me from 
endeavouring to meet, as best I can, the political 
aspirations of honest reformers". Morley declared that 
despite these ’anarchical crimes’ to suppress which this 
repressive Act had been passed, the G-overnment would 
"persevere in the path of reform".^ Thus during the execution 
and pursuance of a repressive policy, Morley and Minto never 
lost sight of meeting "the political aspirations of honest 
reformers". They aimed to suppress sedition but keep the 
loyal moderate Indians in good humour and expectant. Morley’s 
aim was to reooncile liberal opinion at home and to save the
1. Hansard.House of Lords - 4 S. Vol.191# 1908. Debate on 
Indian Affairs - 30 June 1908. Curzon - Col.516-520.
Cromer -Col.536-537. Ampthill - Col.546. Lamington - 
Col.554 - "I earnestly hope the Secretary of State will 
consider the desirabilities of having a more stringent 
Press Laws" Morley - Col.530.
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moderates from the "taunts and reproaches" of the extremists, 
Gokhale and Dutt were in England at that time. They had met 
the members of the Indian Committee of the House of Commons. 
But Morley was able to convince them that any violent 
criticism of the Government policies at that time would 
provide "powder and shot for revolutionaries in India". Thus 
he succeeded in preventing the formation of any group in 
Parliament who might have been extremely critical of 
government policies, thus hampering the administration of 
law and order, ^
The Provincial Governments were busy in checking 
terrorism as well. Though it existed in many provinces,
Bengal was the nucleus of the movement and it was from there 
that most of the terrorist activities were directed. On 16 
May 1908, the Government of Bengal proposed to the Government 
of India to deport Aurobindo Ghose, Abinash Chandra 
Bhattacharji and Sailendra Kumar Bose under Regulation III 
of 1818, for alleged participation in various subversive
p
activities. But the Governor-General-in-Council did not 
find sufficient evidence to agree to deportation. It was 
considered that after Lajpat Rai's release, deportation 
would not act as a deterrent to those who sympathised with 
Aurobindo Ghose and his party, for they would feel confident
1, Morley to Minto - 28 May 1908, Morley Papers, I.O.L.
2, Government of Bengal to Government of India - 16 May 1908, 
Home Progs. Public/Political. January-Deeember 1908. 7875*
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of early release. A vigorous agitation to secure it would
also be pushed on both in India and in Parliament. Moreover
the moderate section of the educated population would view
deportation with strong disfavour. So the Government of India
1
did not accept the Lieutenant Governor's proposal. However, 
as a result of disooveries of bombs, dynamite and cartridges 
at Maniktala Garden in Calcutta, 30 persons were arrested 
and prosecuted. Aurobindo Ghose, his brother Barindra Kumar 
Ghose and others were amongst the arrested persons. The 
Trial lasted till 12 February 1910, when the High Court 
finally sentenced four men to transportation for life, three 
to ten years, seven to seven years and three to five years' 
rigorous imprisonment. Aurobindo Ghose and a few others were 
acquitted by the Sessions Court on 13 April 1909, Narendra 
Gosain, who had become approver, was shot dead by his 
companions in jail, with smuggled arms. This trial 
established that at least 12 persons had collected arms for 
the purpose of fighting the British Government. Their 
confessions showed that they had actually killed Mrs. and 
Miss Kennedy and were prepared to use explosives in order 
to further their purpose. Those concerned were mostly young 
and educated men, of strong religious conviction. They 
belonged to high castes and came from different parts of the
1. Government of India to Government of Bengal - 28 May 1908. 
Home Progs. Public/political. January - December 1908.
7&75 •
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province. The newspaper the Yugantar was "a link of the 
conspiracy", as its teachings inspired them,'*'
In Bombay, on 24 June 1908, Tilak was arrested on 
charges connected with the publication in the Kesari of 
articles containing inflammatory comments on the Muzzafarpur 
murders. In these articles the act of the Bengal revolutionary 
party was applauded, though he suggested that "from the point 
of view of daring and skilled execution, the Chapekar
brothers take a higher rank than members of the bomb party
2
in Bengal", This could have been interpreted not only as a 
taunt but as an exhortation for further courage and improved 
skill. Mr. Justice Dawar, a Parsee Judge, thought that these 
articles were "seething with sedition; they preach violence; 
they speak of murders with approval ,..." Tilak defended his 
own case for 21-2 hours but the jury found him guilty and he 
was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. The Bombay 
Government conducted all these proceedings. Sir George 
Clarke, the Governor of Bombay, was not very willing to 
approach the Central Government in every matter and often 
kept it in the dark in many matters, Minto himself did not 
know of Tilak’s arrest till quite late, Clarke on his own 
initiative ordered Tilak’s arrest,-^ Morley thought the
1, The Alipore conspiracy case judgment - Annexure I, pp. 
i-ii, Sedition Committee Report.
2. These articles were published on 12 May and 9 June 1908.
3* Sir George Clarke, Lord Sydenham, My Working Life,
p.222. also see Minto to Morley - 29 July 1508.
Morley Papers. I.O.L.
179
articles "bad enough to warrant a prosecution if you wanted 
one on general grounds, but not at all so bad as to make ai
prosecution inevitable,n Minto did not agree with Morley on
this point. Actually he had no hand in Tilakls arrest and
trial, but when Tilak was ultimately sentenced to six years 1
imprisonment he thought that the effect of the sentence would
be "excellent". After some disturbances the situation in
Bombay did come under control. He had no doubt in his mind
that Tilak was "the arch-leader of sedition" and unlike
Lajpat Rai, there was ample evidence to prove it. He,
however, again reiterated that "I have never advocated
exaggerated measures if we can do without them, but it is
the plain truth that people here are afraid for their lives,
2not only Europeans but Natives too As later events
were to prove Minto was right in one respect at least - the 
people were scared and a number of murders did occur very 
soon, Morley, though he connived at Tilak’s sentence, he did
1. Morley to Minto - 16 July 1908, Morley seems to have been 
influenced in this, besides his own convictions, by 
Gokhale. Gokhale considered such prosecutions as a 
discouragement to the moderates. Morleyfs letter to 
Clarke - 3 July 1908. Gokhale was evidently very anxious 
to obliterate any suspicion from the minds of the 
extremists that the moderates were in league with the 
Government. It had been suggested that the moderates had 
a hand in encouraging the Government to prosecute Tilak. 
Clarke mentions that "while the ’moderates* gave me no 
public support, some of them - in private - told me they 
welcomed the action taken". See Sir George Clarke, Lord 
Sydenham - My Working Life, pp.223-228,
2. Minto to Morley - 5, 18 August 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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; not in fact like these severe sentences. He was worried that,
however justifiable they might he, these sentences had to he
|
I defended in Parliament. The House of Commons was most
i
! critical and he thought that after he had left for the House
of Lords there was nohody who could face the criticism of
c
Dr. Rutherford, Sir Henry Cotton and F.C. Majkarness, Mint o ’s 
argument was that any criticism of Government actions would 
add fuel to the fire and that the House of Commons should not 
he allowed to meddle in this affair. This Morley would not 
tolerate. He plainly told Minto that these sentences would 
he discussed in Parliament and that if he persisted in 
following this policy he would not defend it. This was a
serious threat and Minto had to pacify him hy reiterating 
that he was very anxious to adopt a policy of reform hut the 
situation at that time required a firm hand."1"
Dr, Rutherford, Keir Hardie, A. Lupton, Liberal Member 
for Lincolnshire, Sleaford, Mackarness, 0 'Grady and Cotton 
asked questions about Tilakfs conviction in the House of 
Commons. Dr. Rutherford wanted the Secretary of State to 
recommend to the King to extend his clemency to Tilak, in 
view of the position he held in the Indian Nationalist
1. Morley to Minto - 26 August, 7 October 1908 and Minto to 
Morley - 14 September 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
See also, F.A.Hirt^al1s diary - 25 February 1907* Home 
Misc. 864. I.O.L. Morley mentioned his intention oIT 
retiring or going to the House of Lords, He was tired and 
wanted some relief. He did not, however, intend to leave 
Indian affairs - "for enormous interest" in India and 
"impending constitutional changes".
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movement and remit a portion of his sentence with a view to 
allaying to some extent the present unrest in India. Buchanan, 
the Under Secretary of State, replied that it was impossible 
for the Secretary of State to do so as Tilak had been 
sentenced by a Judge of the High Court after due trial, and 
his writings for which he was sentenced were such that the 
Government could not recommend any clemency. Keir Hardie 
wanted the publication of these articles as a Parliamentary 
Paper to give the House and the country an opportunity to 
judge these articles themselves. Cotton suggested that 
copies of them should be put in the Library. Lupton 
questioned the composition of the Jury and Mackamess enquired 
whether an appeal could be made against the sentence. Buchanan 
replied that no appeal lay against the High Court decision, 
but the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council might give 
special leave to appeal in cases where grave injustice 
appeared to have been done. These radical members continued 
their fight against Tilakfs release and made J.D.Rees"*" 
wonder whether expressions of sympathy in the House with 
notorious enemies of British rule were likely to have the 
effect of "allaying to some extent the present unrest in 
India".^
It seems that Minto was right in his reading of the
1, Sir John David Rees (1854-1922). I.C.S. Served mostly in 
Madras* Additional member of G. G. fs Council, 1895-1900, 
retired in 1901. M.P. Liberal 1906-1910.
2. Hansard. House of ____ 4.S. Vol. 193# Cols. 1216,
1217, T218, 1483, 1747-1748; Vol.194. Cols. 917, 1392.
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situation. It was very critical* Even these arrests and i
( .
prosecutions did not prevent crime. Attempts on the life of 
the Lieutenant G-overnor of Bengal (7 November 1908) and other 
police officers continued. On 9 November 1908 Nando Lai 
Banerji, a sub-inspector of police employed in the Criminal 
Investigation Department, who had been instrumental in 
tracing one of the Muzzafarpur murders, was shot dead in the 
streets of Calcutta. The existence of Samitis, with the 
intention of spreading revolutionary ideas in the two Bengals 
was also brought to the notice of the Government. Now there 
was less open agitation but there were secret organisations. 
The local Government insisted on handling the situation 
sternly. It demanded strong action against secret societies 
like the jAnu -shilan Samiti. This society was actually 
started for the promotion of culture and physical training. 
Aurobindo Ghose's brother, Barindra Kumar Ghose, was one of 
its founders. Very soon its branches were established 
throughout Bengal. But these societies were not purely 
institutions of physical culture. The ultimate aim was to
equip members with military training in order to raise a
1
national army to overthrow British rule. It was in these 
circumstances that Minto, on 11 December 1908, acting on the 
strong recommendation of the Governments of Bengal and
1. N.C.Chaudhuri - Autobiography of an Unknown Indian, p.245.
Eastern Bengal and Assam, issued orders for the arrest and 
deportation of Subodh Chandra Mullick, Manoranjan Guha 
Thakurta, Kristo Kumar Mitra, Sachindra Prasad Bose 5 
Shamsumder Chakravarti* Aswini Kumar Dutt, Satish Chandra 
Chatterji, Pulin Behari Das and Bupesh Chandra Nag. These 
orders were executed on 13 December 1908. Besides the Indian 
Criminal Law Amendment Act was passed which declared such 
Samitis - like the Anushilan Samiti - unlawful. Again the 
reason for these deportations was the same - that the 
Government had enough evidence to show that the activities 
o'f the deported persons were revolutionary and a danger to 
the peace and tranquility of the country, but that could 
not be proved in a Court of Law. Actually the Government 
wanted to curb their activities without arousing any 
controversy.
Morley connived at these policies but was as usual 
apprehensive. He never liked deportation. He had expressed 
himself very strongly about it during Lajpat Raifs 
deportation. But Minto again resorted to the same method.
Or more truly Minto was again forced to resort to the same 
method. But this time he was on surer ground. However,
Morley protested against the deportations - "that is the 
harder nut for us to crack on this side of the water, and 
quite right too. I understood from your telegram that the 
names were decided on consultation between you, Eraser,
Baker and Adamson, After all, if we press to the bottom of
18'i
things, I conjecture that the active man in this chapter of
1 2business nrusi; be Stuart or Plowden or somebody of the 
Police; and that breed needs searching scrutiny step by step 
in these matters. Lawyers are not always to be trusted; still 
less are Police authorities". Again, "you may take my word 
for it, my dear Viceroy, that if we do not use this harsh 
weapon with the utmost care and scruple- always, where the 
material is dubious, giving the suspected man the benefit 
of the doubt - you may depend upon it, I say, that both you 
and I will be called to severe account, even by the people 
who are now applauding us (quite rightly) for vigour",^
Godley informed Minto that though Morley had taken a "high 
line, and will not hear of any compromise or explanations 
in Parliament," Buchanan, the Under Secretary of State, was 
extremely nervous. To encourage Minto, he added, "if he 
[Buchanan] shrinks from defying the lighting of Messrs, 
Cotton, Mackarness, Rutherford & Co,, Asquith must be 
invoked; and I believe this will probably be done". This
shows that at this stage Morley was less doubtful about this 
policy than Buchanan, His decision to defend it boldly in 
Parliament reflects that he considered that for once "this
1. Sir Harold Arthur Stuart - Director Criminal Intelligence 
Department, Officiating Secretary, Home Department, 
Government of India since March 1908,
2. Cecil Ward Chichele Plowden - Deputy Inspector General of 
Police since April 1906,
3 . Morley to Minto - 6 January 1909* Morley Papers. I.O.L.
4* Morley to Minto - 13 January 1909e™TFTot
5, Godley to Minto - 15 January 1909. Minto Collection
N.L.S.
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harsh weapon'1 had been used with "care and scruple". This 
must have encouraged Minto,
Minto was very sure of his ground and boldly defended 
his policy. "It is easy enough for Mackarness and others to 
assume that the police are corrupt and that here we are cruel 
dictators - views no doubt full of the milk of human kindness 
- but we cannot rule this country by namby-pamby sentiment 
alone. No one dislikes lettres de cachet more than I do.
The whole essence of them is the arrest of persons on 
evidence sufficient to satisfy the Government that such 
persons are guilty, though not sufficient to convict them 
in a Court of Law .... The powers conferred by the 
Regulations of 1818 are not pleasant ones to wield, but their 
value has been incontestably proved under certain conditions 
in India. At the same time one must always bear in mind that 
such powers can never be safely used unless it is absolutely 
clear that the authority which puts them into force is 
completely trusted to do so judiciously, and is perfectly 
free from the risk of enquiry into its action, or from the 
necessity to justify it.""*"
In the House of Commons, the Radicals, however, 
strongly criticised these deportations. Mackarness said 
in April 1909 that the power of deporting without trial
1. Minto to Morley - 4 February 1909. Minto Collection. 
N.L.S.
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was clearly unconstitutional if Magna Carta had anyi
meaning, J.C.Wedgwood asserted that the principle of the
Regulations of 1818 "is the principle of the Bastille. It is
2
the principle of lettre de cachet under Louis XIV", J.D. 
Rees, on the other hand, while admitting that the power of 
deporting without trial was an autocratic one, thought that 
the government had not used this method as much as was 
necessary for suppressing sedition. He hoped that the 
government would deport Aurobindo Ghose, as he excited 
youths by calling them cowards. He opined that in order to 
make the people of the East realise that their rulers had 
power, it was essential to use it autocratically in grave 
and critical situations.
Apart from a few isolated bomb explosions, the 
political situation in the two Bengals showed a considerable 
improvement in the beginning of 1909. But on 10 February 
1909f Asutosh Biswas, who was public prosecutor in the 
Alipore Sessions Court and was engaged in the prosecution of 
the Calcutta prisoners, was murdered. In March certain 
letters, which were discovered in a house in Nasik, revealed 
the existence of two secret revolutionary societies in
1. Hansard. House of Commons. Vol. III. 1909. (29 March 1909-
23 April 1909) 19 April 1909. Col.1270.
2. Ibid. House of Commons. Vol.XIX 1910. 11 July to 3 August,
T9HJ). 26 July 1910. Col.2036.
3. Ibid. House of Commons. Vol.VIII, 1909. 19 July to 
F  August, 1909) 5 August 1909. Col.2051 -2054,
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Gwalior and one in the Deccan with branches in a large number 
of towns. This evidence led to the conviction by the Sessions 
Judge of Nasik of Ganesh*D*Savarkar, the brother of the 
famous Vinayak Savarkar of Shyamaji Krishna varma's India 
House, London. Thirty-nine persons were convicted in Gwalior. 
On 1 July 1909 in London, Sir William Cufzon Iflftrllie, the 
Political A.D.C. at the India Office, was shot dead by Madan 
Lai Dhingra, again of the India House. On 13 November 1909, 
an attempt was made on the Viceroy's life at Ahmedabad. On 
21 December 1909 A.M.T. Jackson, the District Magistrate, who 
had committed Ganesh Savarkar for trial, was murdered. On 
28 December 1909, a bomb was found at the house of the 
Deputy Commissioner of Ambala. On 24 January 1910, Khan 
Bahadur Shmas-ul-Alam, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, 
who was engaged in instructing the Counsel for the Crown in 
the Alipore Conspiracy Case appeal, was murdered. There were 
numerous instances of dacoity in the two Bengals as well,"*'
All these acts of violence horrified Morley but he
continued to insist on the policy of reform and the release
2
of the deportees. Minto remained adamant. He emphasised 
that "my first duty is to look after the necessities of the 
charge committed to me irrespective of public opinion at
1. Home Progs. Political. January - July 1910. 8430.
2. See Morley's telegrams - 30 August, 8, 10, 14 September 
and 20, 27, 31 October 1909 etc. and letters.
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I
home 5M that "it is impossible to convey to you in letters
or despatches the knowledge the Government of India
possesses, and which I possess more than anyone else from a
wide correspondence and intimacy with many Natives, of the
risks we daily run, or of our acquaintance with underground
machinations .... And it is quite impossible to convey to
2you a just impression of the everyday life of India"* He 
even mentioned that the ruling princes had supported him in 
his actions.^ It seems quite natural that Morley!s pride of 
intellect should have induced him to believe that he knew 
better than the man on the spot. While Minto, despite 
doing his best, was unable to translate the intricacies of 
the situation on paper* The apparent changes of view, in 
the case of Morley particularly, were presumably due to 
advisers near at hand.
Surendranath Banerjea suggests that the bomb was the 
result of repression. "Bureaucracy was alarmed, startled at 
the result of its own blunders,"^ While G.N.Singh arrives 
at a different conclusion. To him "It appears that the 
terrorist crime had unnerved the Bureaucracy and the Anglo- 
Indian having given way under the strain they began to
1. Minto to Morley - 21 June 1908. Minto Collection^. N.L.S.
2. Minto to Morley - 21 October 1909* ^ i d . '
3. See Correspondence between H.E.Lord"Minto and certain
Ruling Chiefs. Ibid. Minto sought suggestions from Chiefs
such7as~the Nizam, the Gaekwad, and others, with regard 
to the suppression of sedition. All of them suggested
a stringent policy.
4. S.N.Banerjea, op.cit. p.249.
advocate a policy of revenge and unmitigated repression"."^
But who was actually responsible for that state of affairs 
in India - terrorists or bureaucracy? Morley blames the 
bureaucracy. "It is not you or I who are responsible for
♦unrest' , but the over confident and over-worked Tchinoviks
2
who have had India in their hands for fifty years past." 
Minto, on the other hand, went deep into the problem. The 
very fact that India was ruled by an alien people was enough 
to arouse Indian antipathy towards that rule. Practically 
every British move in every field of life had been resented. 
That resentment turned into open resistance in Curzon's 
time. Minto found India up in arms against British rule. 
Bureaucracy seemed to have lost its nerve and was willing 
to resort to repressive measure to suppress "sedition". In 
that melee it was difficult to distinguish between genuine 
Indian aspirations for reform and terrorism. In the eyes of 
certain local Governments Surendranath Banerjea was as big 
a disturber of peace as Tilak or Pal. Minto's only 
contribution was to make a distinction between the two. He 
aimed to secure and achieved, to a great extent, the 
sympathies of the moderate leaders of the Congress, 
particularly Hindus. As for the Muslims they had not involved 
themselves in any revolutionary activity. He was able to
1. G.N.Singh, op.cit. 1933* p.361.
2. Morley to Minto - 17 June 1908. See Morley's Recollections 
Vol.II. p.265.
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keep 'sedition1 bound to its narrowest limits. Whenever he 
found necessary he never hesitated to suppress it sternly.
The fact is that the local governments were out to suppress 
every movement against the Government - like the Punjab 
Government's actions against agitation in opposition to the 
Colonisation Bill - but it was Minto who checked them. He 
resisted the bureaucratic pressure for repression not only 
because he knew that Morley would not agree to it but because 
he knew that most of it was not based on solid evidence. He 
resisted Morley*s pressure equally boldly because in his 
view Morley was at times ignorant of the real situation. He 
had his own convictions. After the mistake he committed in 
deporting Lajpat Rai at the instance of the Punjab 
Government, he ceased to place categorical reliance on the 
judgment of local governments. On most occasions he required 
much greater evidence than they provided for deportation 
or any such act, before agreeing to it, and many a time he 
refused to sanction it.'*'
1. In 1910 he disallowed the deportation of 53 persons as 
suggested by the Government of Bengal - Government of 
Bengal's letters to Government of India - I, 28 February 
1910 and Government of India's letter to Government of 
Bengal - 7 March 1910. Home Progs, Political. January - 
July 1910. (8430)
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CHAPTER IV
The Growth and Development of the Reforms.
As we have seen, when Minto arrived in India the 
political atmosphere was very tense. He was not inhibited by 
any preconceived ideas about Indian affairs. But immediately 
on his arrival in India he started discussions with members 
of his Council and other prominent officials to find an 
amicable way of meeting the demands of the educated Indians.^ 
The emergence of a separate Muslim political party in 1906 
introduced another factor in Indian politics. Besides the 
Congress and the League, there were the Anglo-Indians, Theirs 
was a powerful voice in Indian affairs. They had an effective 
and vociferous press. There were certain other interests, 
like the landlords, the merchants and the Indian Chiefs, who 
aould not be ignored in the event of any administrative 
changes in the Government of India.
Morley, though very sympathetic towards Indian 
aspirations was sceptical in the beginning about the Congress 
aims. Minto was soon able to convince him that the moderate 
Congress is an important factor and that these demands for
v w
the increased representation in Indian administration should 
be considered sympathetically. While the Congress demand had
1, John Buchan - Lord Minto, London, 1924. p,231. See also 
Lady Minto, My Indian Journal.
i
grown from increased representation to the attainment of 
Swaraj, the League desired separate representation and 
walghtage as it distrusted the Hindu majority. Minto and 
Morley were to work out a policy which should meet these 
demands.
Minto was willing to recognize the genuine wish of 
educated Indians, hut he felt like Curzon, that “it was not 
so much political reform or political ambitions that, in the 
present stage of Indian history, we ought to look to, hut 
the means of giving most happiness and prosperity to the 
everyday lives of its teeming millions“.^ This happiness 
and prosperity would come, he thought, not hy granting 
political demands of the extremist element in the Congress, 
hut hy the aontinuance of the Raj. The Raj would continue 
only if the educated Indians were given a share in the 
administration of the country. The problem was how this 
should he done? Minto thought that a large number of Indian 
interests should he represented on Indian Councils. This 
representation of interests would not only satisfy a greater 
number of people, hut also act as a counterpoise to the 
extreme Congress aims. He dismissed the ideal of self-
p
government as “an impossibility" and in his opinion a 
constitutional autocracy was the best form of government for 
India. Minto was fully conscious that hy its very nature the
1. Minto to Morley - 4 November 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - 13 May 1909. Ibid.
Government of India was autocratic and would remain so for 
sometime. But it could be made liberal by introducing the 
spirit of British democratic institutions and liberalizing 
its policies. Thus a constitutional autocracy combining the 
principles of autocracy of Mughal Emperors and Hindu Rajas 
and British constitutionalism seemed to him a possible 
solution. Both Minto and Morley would have satisfied 
themselves, if they could "hatch some plan and policy for 
half a generation".1
The idea of representation of interests in the Indian 
Councils was not new. Por such a vast country, with its 
numerous races and interests, the only suitable form by 
which the Government could know the opinions of its people 
was through the representation of various interests on its 
Councils. It was the corner stone of the British policy for 
a long time. The Aitchison Committee appointed by Lufferin 
in 1888 specifically mentioned these various interests, 
which it required to be represented on Provincial Legislative 
Councils. These were "the interests of the hereditary 
nobility and landed classes, who have a great permanent 
stake in the country; (b) the interests of the trading, 
professional and agricultural classes; (c) the interests of
1. "If we can hatch some plan and policy for half a
generation that will be something; and if for a whole 
generation, that will be better. Only I am bent, as you 
assuredly are, on doing nothing to loosen the bolts." 
Morley to Minto - 17 April 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
the planting and commercial European Community, and (d) the 
interests of stable and effective administration, Duffer in 
emphasised this point in his despatch to the Secretary of
p
State on 6 November 1888, It was discussed in Parliament
■j
and Lord Northbrook, Lord Salisbuiy and others supported iti 
The Act of 1892 recognized the principle of representation 
of interests on the Legislative Councils, By the time Minto 
reached India the Muslims had beaome conscious that their 
interests had not been properly represented on these 
councils. They asked Minto for safeguards for their interests 
in any new set-up of Indian administration.
With a view to meeti^ie demands of educated Indians 
and after having been convinced that Minto was thinking on 
the same lines, Morley asked him to make a "start in the 
way of reform in the popular direction". Amongst the things | 
he suggested were - the extension of the native element in 
the Viceroy’s and Provincial Legislative Councils, "full 
time for discussing the budget in the Legislative Councils
instead of four or five skimpy hours" and the right of
1. Public Letters from India,1888 -Vol.9* The Committee 
consisted of three members of his Executive Council - 
General Chesney, Sir Charles Aitchison, and J.Westland.
Sir Antony MacDonnell was its secretary. As Home Secretary 
MacDonnell had chalked out a scheme of reform which formed 
the basis of their disaussion. The Committee completed its 
work on 10th October 1888.
2. Ibid. Vol.9. p.1190.
3. Hansard - 6 March 1890. 3•S.Vol.342. Col.98. 15 February 
1892. 4,S.Vol.1. Col.416. For a detailed discussion see -
S.Chakravarty, The Evolution of Representative Government 
in India, 1884^19^9» with reference to Central ancf 
Provincial Legislative Councils, th.t). Thesis, London
Univers'Iliy7^95"4. ’BETTI," TTT'^ fir and V.
moving amendments. However, he wanted the official majority 
to "be kept. He wondered whether there was any scope for an 
Indian on the Viceroy fs Executive Council as it would 
frighten that "nervous animal - the European Indian". Morley 
pointed out that from Minto1s letters he had guessed that he 
had no disposition whatever to look on such changes as these 
in a hostile spirit.^ Morley wanted Mintofs opinion as he 
expected to announce his policy in Parliament to silence 
"the Indian Committee of the House of Commons," and before 
the demands of the Indians became greater. To avoid any 
appearance of forcing the Indian Governmentfs hands, he
wished "the move to be directly and closely associated with
2
yourself [with Minto]."
Minto liked Morley1s suggestion of reform in the 
popular direction. But he suggested that before bringing 
the matter up in Council it would be better if they both put 
their ideas into shape as far as possible. Then after 
discussion in the Council, he would send Morley these 
proposals in the shape of an official despatch. Minto 
emphasised that he attached great importance to the "official 
initiative being taken by the Government of India". "It is 
better in every re spent, both for the present and for the 
future, that the Government of India should appear to 
recognize all that is in the air here, the necessity of
1. Morley to Minto - 15 June 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Morley to Minto - 22 June 1906. Ibid.
meeting new conditions, and that they should not run the
'I
risk of "being assumed to have at l^hst taken tardy action 
out of respect to instructions from home. This suggestion 
of Minto was "based on the fear that in the contrary case the 
Government of India would come into disrepute which would 
not he beneficial for the future administration of the 
country .Morley had no objection to that as he himself wanted 
that Government to take the initiative. He would, then, be 
able to steer through the reform scheme in Parliament by 
saying that the Government of India desired these reforms. 
Even the Conservative House of Lords would have some 
hesitation in attacking the Government of India’s reform 
policy.
Commenting on Morley’s proposals Minto asserted that 
there was no difference between them. But difference between 
them there was. While Morley put the suggestion of an Indian 
on the Viceroy's Executive Council last of all and in a most 
casual way, Minto gave it priority and thought it most 
important. He informed Morley that he had thought of 
suggesting the appointment of an Indian on his Council, but
1. Minto to Morley - 11 July 1906. Minto Collection . N.L.S. 
In a telegram on 14 July 1906, Minto repeated the above 
and stated that these were his points and that his 
colleagues in the Council knew nothing about them.
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dropped the idea as being premature. Being still under the 
influence of official opinion he thought that there was 
risk of leakage of secrets in the event of an Indian 
appointment. He even expressed some doubts as to the 
possibility of finding an able Indian "with a stake in the
country,1' as, again echoing official opinion, one was "not
2to promote anyone of the purely Gokhale type". Still his 
inclination was to have an Indian as "Minister without 
portfolio". The possibility of an Indian Member on his 
Council appealed to Minto strongly. Though doubts lurked in 
his mind, he did not feel sure "that we are not exaggerating 
the risk". He agreed with Morley*s suggestion of an increase
1. It has been mentioned before that Minto did discuss the 
appointment of an Indian and other matters with some 
important officials of the Government of India. The 
suggestion for an Indian on the Viceroyfs Council was not 
new. It was once made to Curzon by R.C.Dutt, president of 
the Congress 1899. In a letter to Hamilton Curzon wrote 
that "I told him [Butt] frankly that the idea was, in my 
opinion, quite out of the question. The notion that the 
so-called "woes of India" are likely to be met by placing 
one or two natives who would be always in a minority in
a cabinet of Europeans, quite apart from its political 
absurdity suggested to me Sidney Smith*s reply to the 
little girl whom he saw stroking the back of a tortoise 
that you might as well expect to gratify the Dean and 
Chapter by tickling the dome of St.Paul*s."
Curzon to Hamilton, 11 January 1900. Hamilton Papers,
Vol.XVI. p.61. I.O.L.
2. Everyone admired Gokhale*s ability, but as he was a 
member of the Congress, the officials would not have 
liked to trust him with state secrets. Minto himself 
would have no objections in appointing him to his 
Council as he did write to Morley that "I am also 
considering the advisability of Gokhale as a member.
There is a good deal to be said in his favour", Minto 
to Morley - 12 September 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
of native representation on the Imperial and Provincial 
Legislative Councils and the prolongation of the budget 
debate with greater liberty for discussion. In addition to 
these he suggested a Council of Princes as well, which 
Morley had thought useless.'*’ Minto was also in favour of
giving greater powers and greater encouragement to the native
2
element on district councils and municipalities,
Morley, in the meanwhile, in a telegram stated that 
he was much inclined to mention the notion of putting an 
Indian Judge on the India Council and asked Mintofs opinion? 
Minto immediately replied that though the suggestion was 
good, it would at once raise questions as to an Indian 
member on his Council, Minto was anxious that no step should 
be taken until the Anglo-Indian opinion in India had been 
softened. Minto, therefore, suggested that it would be 
better not to raise the point at that moment, but to 
consider such points later on. Por the moment Morley should 
make a general statement that the "Government of India are 
in thorough sympathy with the necessities of the hour".^ 
Morley agreed with Minto - "I have hung up the notion of a 
native on my Council, as you wished - quite prudently, I 
think, until you know how things go on with your people.
1. Morley to Minto - 22 June 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - 5 July 1906. Ibid.
3. Morley to Minto - telegram. 13 July 1906. Ibid.
4. Minto to Morley - telegram. 14 July 1906, Ibid.
5. Morley to Minto - 27 July 1906. Ibid.
Three days later Minto informed Morley that Sir E. Baker, 
the Finance Member, was in favour of an Indian on the 
Council and thought that Law Membership was the best for him* 
Others though first taken aback at the novelty of the 
suggestion seemed quite inclined to consider it* Minto 
thought that though there was something in the arguments - 
i.e., susceptibilities of the European population; 
differences between Hindus and Muslims - against the Indian 
member, much more was due to racial prejudice* For a 
detailed study of this proposal, as well as others, he 
proposed to appoint a small committee of his Executive 
Council. He informed Morley that if he thought it fit he 
could announce this appointment of the committee to consideri
the possibility of reforms generally in Parliament. Morley
accordingly made an announcement in Parliament to that
effect, and acknowledged that Minto had authorised him to 
2
make it. "I owe you more, for if I had not been able to 
make the practical announcement so seasonably authorised 
hy you, the thing would have been an affair of sounding 
brass and tinkling cymbals." Gokhale was in the Gallery in 
the House of Commons and he wrote to Morley that he left the 
House "with a load removed from his heart,
Morley mentioned in the House of Commons the proposed 
appointment of the Viceroy’s Committee and generally hinted
1. Minto to Morley - telegram. 17 July 1906. Morley Papers.
I.O.L.
2. Hansard,20 July 1906. 4.S. Vol.161. Col.588.
3. Morley to Minto - 27 July 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
that the questions which could he discussed were ,fthe 
extension of representative element in the Legislative 
Council — not the Executive Council, hut the Legislative 
Council," longer discussion of the Budget and powers to move 
amendments. He scrupulously avoided any hint of an 
appointment of an Indian Member on the Viceroy1 s Executive 
Council or on the India Council. Earl Percy congratulated 
the Secretary of State for this announcement and stated that
the House "would await with great interest the recommendations
2
of the Committee".
The Committee of the Executive Council, which was
appointed hy Minto on 16 August 1906, consisted of Sir A.
- i a 5
Arundel, chairman; Sir D. Ibbetson; E.N.Bakery Erie
6 7Richards; members; and H.H.Risley/ Secretary. For their
guidance Minto wrote a minute. His main emphasis was that
now the time had come when the changing conditions in India
1. Hansard. House of Commons. 20 July 1906, 4.S. Vol.161.Cor.yas.
2. Ibid. Col.589.
3. Sir Arundel Tagg Arundel (1843-1929). Indian Civil 
Service, 1864-1907. Served in Madras. Member Viceroy's 
Council. 1910-6.
4. Sir Denzil Ibbetson (1847-1908). Mainly served in the 
Punjab, member Viceroy's Council 1902-1905. offg. Lt. 
Governor of Punjab 1905. Lt. Governor 1907-1908.
5. Sir E.N.Baker - (1857-1913). Mostly served in Bengal. 
Finance Member, Viceroy's Council - 1905-8. Lt. Governor 
of Bengal - 1908-1911.
6. Sir Henry Erie Richards (1861-1922). Educated at Eton and 
New College Oxford. Legal Member of the Viceroy?s Council 
1904-1909. Counsel to the India Office, 1911-21.
7. Sir H.H.Risley - (1851-1911) I.C.S. Secretary to 
Government of India. K.C.I.E. 1907, Secretary Public and 
Judicial Department India Office,
\
should he seriously considered and an effort be made to meet 
the Indian demands. It is interesting to note that in this 
minute he referred to those very four important interests, 
which the Aitchison Committee had emphasised* as worth 
special proteation. The Muslim deputation had not met him 
yet and he had not been made aware of the Muslim interests. 
This suggests that Minto had no preconceived notions about 
safeguarding the Muslim interests. He desired to secure 
the representation of other interests than those represented 
by the Congress, but he would not create any of these 
interests himself. When the problem was presented to him, 
he certainly gave his careful consideration to it and 
forwarded the Muslim demands to the Committee. The 
appointment of an Indian member to the Executive Council was 
one of the subjects for the Committee^ consideration.^
He was, however, not very hopeful of "very grand 
results", because of the adverse Anglo-Indian opinion 
towards any reforms, though he realised that "it would be
disastrous for any Government to attempt to ignore the signs
2
of the times," The points of reference to the Committee 
were kept secret. But Morley, being a cautious politioian, 
did not want any expression to be used which might appear to 
suggest any "possibility of administrative reform" or "likely
1. Minto*s Minute to his Committee, 15 August 1906.
Morley Papers, I.O.L. Minto to Morley - 15 August 1906; 
telegram, 20 August 1906. Ibid.
2. Minto to Morley - 15 August 1906. Ibid.
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to excite larger expectations that you will find yourself
generally [not] able to satisfy".^ Because sooner or later
the terms of reference, the CommitteeTs report along with
the Government of Indian recommendations were to be
/
presented to Parliament, So the press communique was 
diplomatically worded. It only informed the public that the 
Viceroy had appointed a Committee of his Executive Council 
in consequence of the Secretary of State*s statement in the 
House of Commons in July 1906.
The Committee started its work in earnest, and
Minto was kept informed of the views of its members. Arundel 
described them to him: Ibbetson represented the old Tory,
Baker the advanced Liberal and he himself the Liberal- 
Unionist view, while Erie Richards was sitting on the
p
fence. While the Committee was busy, Minto was making up 
his own mind. He admitted that "the more I think of it, the 
more inclined I am for a Native Member on the Viceroy1 s 
Executive Council" as "it would answer much of the 
accusation against the narrow character of Indian bureaucracy, 
for whilst recognizing that India is unfit for popular 
government it would be the admission of one of her people to 
a direct share in the executive authority of Imperial 
administration. It would be an immense move forward.
The Arundel Committee, even to Minto*s surprise,
1. Morley to Minto - telegram. 21 August 1906. Morley 
Papers. I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - 12 September 1906. Ibid.
3. Minto to Morley - 12 September 1906. Ibid.
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completed and submitted its report on 12 October 1906, With 
regard to an Indian Member of the Viceroy’s Executive 
Council, the Committee were not unanimous. The members, 
however, were agreed as to the great importance of the 
measure, and as to the significance which would attach to it 
in the eyes of all classes of the people. Arundel and Baker 
were of the opinion that the step both could and ought to 
be taken at once, Ibbetson and Erie Richards considered that 
the objections to it outweighed its advantages. The 
objections were that the presence of an Indian would impose 
some restraint on the freedom with which Members of the 
Government expressed their views on cases which came before
p
them; that there was a danger of a leakage of confidential 
matters; that ”at some future time an unsuitable selection 
for the appointment might be made, in which case the Indian 
Member might conceivably use his official influence to 
advance improperly the interest of the class to which he 
belonged;” that such an appointment to the Viceroy’s Council 
would lead to the addition of an Indian Member to the 
Councils of provincial Governors. Arundel and Baker did not
1. Minto to Morley - 4 and 28 October 1906. Morley Papers.
I.O.L. The Arundel Committee’s Report. Public letters' 
from India. 1907. No,35.
2. Kitchener^was against such an appointment. Minto wrote to 
Morley, ”1 found K. decidedly opposed to it, the reason 
he gives me being very amusing. That he had heard Curzon 
say such appalling things about H.M. ’s Government and 
individual members of the Cabinet at Council meetings 
that it had made his hair stand on end, and that it 
would have been too terrible in the presence of a native 
member”. 29 August 1906. See also P. Magnus, - Kitchener, 
Portrait of an Imperialist, London. 1958. p.234.
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consider these very solid objections. They stated that "we 
regard the admission of a native of India to the inner 
Counsels of Government not as the introduction into the 
citadel of an enemy to be feared, but as the addition to the 
garrison of an ally whose advice will be highly valued, and 
whose mere presence will insure the confidence and enhance 
the loyalty of his fellow-countrymen. " The Committee was 
thus divided in halves on this question.1
This divergence of opinion amongst the members of the 
Committee disappointed Minto. He thought that a "native 
member" was by far the best answer that could be made in 
reply to Indian demands for increased representation in the 
Government of India, but "British feeling in this country is 
not yet ripe for such an advance in our methods of
2
administration, and we cannot disregard this feeling."
Morley also felt strongly. He considered that it was the 
cheapest concession^Ehey could make. He told Minto that in 
the event of a majority of the Viceroy's Council being 
adverse to this idea, it would be awkward to put pressure 
on him. The question was whether it was better to have an 
Indian on the Viceroy's Council or the Secretary of State's 
Council? Morley throughout was trying to emphasise that it 
would be much better if an Indian were put on the Viceroy's 
Council. Godley had also in an earlier letter to Minto
1. The Arundel Committee's Report. Public Letters from 
India, 1907. No.35.
2. MiirEo to Morley - 28 October 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
20 i
written "that the thing that ought to be done last is - what
is sure to come in time - the putting of a Native on to our
Council he re".^
Minto*s views and anxieties were similar. He knew
that British feeling in India was against such a move and
people suspected that it would arouse the same sort of
2
controversy as the Ilbert Bill did. But, in his opinion, 
it was wrong to aompare it with the Ilbert Bill case* "The 
Ilbert Bill affected the individual rights of Europeans, 
which the appointment of an Indian to the Viceroy fs Council 
would not in any way do" and "the Executive could not 
possibly be weakened with his presence." He thought that if 
"out of anxiety and respect to British sensitiveness" this 
chance was missed, the opportunity of meeting demands for 
reform, "which we shall be obliged to deal with sooner or 
later," would be lost.^ Arundel was no more the member of 
his Council and of all the others, he knew that only Baker 
supported him. Even then he was inclined to advocate the 
appointment of an Indian member to his Council and suggested 
the name of Dr. Asutosh Mukerji, Vice-Chancellor of the
1, Morley to Minto - 23 November 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L. 
Cfodley to Minto - 20 July 1906. Minto Collection N.L.S#
2, In 1883 Sir Courtney Ilbert, the Law Member, introduced 
a Bill in the Legislative Council to remove judicial 
disqualifications based on race distinctions. It aroused 
vehement opposition and had substantially to be withdrawn.
3, Minto to Morley - 12 December 1906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
Calcutta University and a High Court Judge.'1’ But he
indicated that he was opposed to moving in a hurry and it
would take some time before Morley could receive the
2
Government of India1s despatch. The mention of delay
■3
annoyed Morley and he insisted on an early despatch.
Minto again became influenced by the opinions of the
members of his Council, who were strongly opposed to the
Indian member. He began to have doubts as to the advisability
of such an appointment, even if it was right in principle.
His main worry was how would British public opinion in
4
India take this step. He remained in this state of mind for
1. Sir Asutosh Mukerji (1864-1924)* Judge High Court Calcutta,
1904-1923* Officiated as Chief Justice of Bengal for few 
months - 1920. Member Bengal Legislative Council for the 
Calcutta University, 1899; re-elected 1901; 1903 for 
Calcutta corporation; elected to Imperial Legislative 
Council 1903* Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University, 1906- 
1914 and 1921-1923*
2. Minto to Morley 2, 23 January 1907. telegram, 17 February 
1907. Ibid.
3. Morley-!;0”Mint0 - telegram, 18 February 1907; letter, 22 
February 1907* In a letter dated 1 March 1907 Godley 
explained to Minto that in case of a majority of his 
Council being against the proposal of an Indian Member, 
he must remember the case when in 1882-83, Ripon sent a 
despatch about the Ecclesiastical Establishment in India 
and he was in a minority of 3? with 5 against him. The 
Secretary of State informed Ripon that that would not do, 
he could have over-ruled the majority decision. Ripon 
was asked to send another despetch. Thus Minto was warned 
that in case of a majority of his Council against him, 
would he be able to over rule it? Godley further warned 
him that if a majority of his Council members and those 
of Morley's Council were against the proposal, Morley 
would be reluctant to accept it, Minto Collection 
N.L.S.
4. Minto to Morley - 14 and 18 February 1907. Morley knew 
that his Council would also be against the Indian Member, 
Morley to Minto - 28 February 1907. Ibid.
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about a fortnight, but by 26 February 1907, he made up his
mind to advise the appointment, but asked Morley not to
make public the views of the members of the Council against
it as they were "based almost entirely on supposed
untrustworthiness and possible disloyalty of the Native
and public knowledge of such views might endanger the future
career of the present members in India.^
On 6 March 1907, Mintofs Council met and discussed
the proposed draft of the despatch. The much argued proposal
was the appointment of an Indian, and besides the argument,
which had been already discussed at length, a new argument
was raised that a membership of Council was a perquisite of
Indian Civil Servants, and that "such an appointment would
practically be taking the bread out of their mouths." One 
2
member was of the view that "he would not object to a 
native if he was a Civil Servant, whilst others maintained 
that the employment of natives in official capacities had 
already militated against the supply of candidates for the 
Civil Service whose parents did not approve of their coming 
to India on the chance of their having to serve under 
natives;" that India did not provide a young British officer 
with the type of society such an officer used to have, now 
that he had to associate with natives. Minto considered all 
these arguments "narrow" and they produced a "really
1. Minto to Morley - telegram, 26 February 1907. Letter 27 
February 1907. Ibid,
2. Names of the members who objected could not be traced. 
These were not even divulged to Morley.
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melancholy" effect on his mind.^ He tried to convince them
of the changed times. The very fact that those members, who
bitterly criticised the proposal, were anxious to remain
anonymous suggests that in their heart of hearts they were
convinced that they could not stem the tide of ahange, but
they made their last effort to cling to the old traditions.
This further shows how far advanced Minto was in his
thinking as compared to the members of his Council*Morley
wanted to have minutes of members for his secret personal 
2
guidance, but Minto refused to comply with his request on 
the ground that the members did not want them to be conveyed 
to the Secretary of State, They did not want the Secretary 
of State to form an adverse opinion about them which might 
affect their career.*^
The members of the Viceroy's Council were not alone 
in opposing an Indian member, for some Indians did not look 
favourably upon the idea. Dunlop Smith in one of his notes 
narrates an interview with Babu Moti Lai Ghose, editor of 
the Amrita Bazar Patrika, who told him that he had heard a 
rumour about an Indian's appointment to the Viceroy's
1, See H. Adamson's letters to Minto, 12, 13 March 1907. 
Minto to Morley - 19 March 1907. Minto Collections.
N.L.S. Morley thought the argument that a native would 
diminish the "perquisites" of the Civil Service 
"disgusting, but thoroughly characteristic of all 
bureaucracies and Tfhins all the world over." Morley to 
Minto - 28 March 1907. Ibid.
2, Morley to Minto, telegram. 27 March 1907# Ibid.
3, Minto to Morley, telegrams. 29 March, 1 April 1907, 
letter, 28 March 1907. Ibid.
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Council, "He [Chose] said ... that the agitators had never 
asked for this particular appointment, that they did not 
want it, that it would only result in friction, and that any 
Indian appointed to the post would have the life of a dog.
He said he would he the subject of most terrific pressure 
from all sides and would make bitter enemies either of his 
own friends or of persons belonging to other religions. He 
said that the Indian newspapers would all say that this was 
a mere clever device to stop all agitation, as if Government 
brought in an unpopular measure they oould always turn 
round and say it had been approved by their Indian Colleague. 
He said the thing would be a sham, and he devoutly hoped it 
would not be carried out. Looking at this statement of 
Moti Lai Ghose, it seems that though some of his fears were 
justified most of them were based on misunderstanding of the 
proposal. But coming from a person of his calibre and 
standing, these views must have influenced Minto as well.
The very fact that he passed this note to Morley suggests 
that Minto was conscious of public opinion in India with 
regard to his reform policy and was willing to give due 
consideration to the opinions of all shades of thought.
But the official opinion was gradually changing. Sir 
Andrew Eraser, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, first 
thought the proposal for an Indian Member premature, then 
agreed. Harcourt Butler, the Commissioner of Lucknow, wrote
1. Note by Dunlop Smith - 15 March 1907. Attached with
Mintofs letter to Morley - 19 March 1907. Morley Papers.
I.O.L.
to Dunlop Smith, "At this crisis a bold policy is usually 
the safest policy, You cannot say - there never shall be an 
Indian Member of Council, The concession will be squeezed 
out if it is not given, and that soon. I would give it now 
while you have the opportunity of making many friends by 
doing so. " Minto liked this argument and specially pointed 
it out to Morley, Other important officials were also 
beginning to think seriously of the matter.
Though only Minto and Baker supported the appointment 
of an Indian Member to the Viceroy^ Council as yet, the 
Government of India suggested this proposal in their
2
despatch of 21 March 1907 to the Secretary of State, Minto 
also thought it advisable to inform the Legislative Council 
that a despatch explaining his views and those of his 
colleagues with regard to possible changes had been sent to 
the Secretary of State, He emphasised that he had thought 
it imperative that the "initiative of possible reforms 
should emanate from us" to avoid any misunderstanding that 
the Government of India had failed to recognize "the signs 
of the times" and that its hands had been forced by the
1. Harcourt Butler to Dunlop Smith - 24 March 1907# Ibid,
2. Government of India to the Secretary of State. Public 
Letter Nos- 7 of 1907. 21 March 1907. India Public Letters 
1907. Vol.35. The proposal of an Indian Member was 
opposed by Ibbetson the Lt. Governor of the Punjab; Sir 
J.Hewett, Lt. Governor of U.P.; Lord Lamington, Governor 
of Bombay and Sir Arthur Lawley, Governor of Madras; 
Kitchener; H.Erle Richards; Major General Scott;
H.Adamson; J.P.Finlay and J.O.Miller - all members of 
the Viceroy!s Council.
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Home Government. The Government of India had acted on their 
own conviction and it meant no submission to agitation 
either.^
While the Indian Press welcomed Minto1s announcement 
of the Government despatch with regard to reform proposals 
being sent to Morley, the Anglo-Indian Press naturally 
showed some nervousness. A Correspondent in a letter to the 
Englishman expressed the fear that the "Great Possibilities" 
were nothing but "to hand us up to the tender mercies of 
those English-speaking Babus" and he appealed to "the 
English Press, the Anglo-Indian Defence Association and 
such other public bodies to stir themselves to proteot us 
before it is too late."2 Minto thought it "the first shot 
in the campaign and a good indication of the sort of thing 
we may expect," but he had decided to brave the storm.^
How it was Morley fs turn to gather public opinion in 
England with regard to the reform scheme. Like Minto he 
consulted important members of his Council and other Anglo- 
Indians. Sir Henry Fowler, Theodore Morison and Lord 
Lansdowne were opposed to the idea of an Indian member. Sir 
Bampfylde Fuller, Sir James La Touche and Sir Courteny 
Ilbert were in favour of the reforms and the Indian
1. Minto’s speech in the Legislative Council, 27 March 1907* 
Speeches by Earl Minto, Calcutta, 1911* p.124*
2. the Engli shmanT 1 April 1907* See also Native Newspaper 
Reports.1907*
3* Minto to Morley - 2 April. 1907*
Morley Papers. I.O.L.
\
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member.^- Lord Lansdowne was strongly opposed to the Indian 
member and he even wrote to Minto that "I am a little 
perturbed by a rumour which reaches me that you have some 
idea of admitting a native or natives to the Executive 
Council, That seems to me a formidable innovation, " 
According to him the proposal had two serious objections. 
First, such an appointment would satisfy only the community 
to whom the member would belong; second, it might be 
difficult to find a trustworthy Indian to whom the secrets 
could be confined. His suggestion, therefore, was that
1, Morley to Minto - 17, 26 April 1907. Ibid,
Sir Henry Fowler - (1830-1911)♦ M.P•Wolverhampton since 
1880; Und, Sec, of State, Home Department, 1884-85. 
Financial Sec, to the Treasury, 1886; Sec. of State for 
India, 1894-1895. Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster, 1905; 
Lord Pres, of Privy Council, 1908. Viscount Wolverhampton 
- 1908.
Theodore Morison - (1863-1936). Principal, M.A.0.College, 
Aligarh, 1889-1905. Additional Member of the G. G. fs 
Legislative Council, 1903-4. Member of the Council of 
India, 1906-16. Member Royal Commission on India Public 
Services, 1913-15.
Lord Lansdowne - (1845-1927) Und.Sec. of State for War, 
1872-74, Und. Sec. of State for India, April to July 
1880; G.G. of Canada, 1883; Viceroy of India, - 1888-1894; 
Secretary of State for War, 1895-1900; Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs. 1900-1905.
Sir B.Fuller - (1854-1935). Indian Civil Service till
1906. Additional Member Viceroy’s Council, 1899. Secretary 
to Government of India, 1901-2; Chief Commissioner of Assam 
1902-5. Lieutenant Governor of East Bengal and Assam.
1905-6.
Sir James La Touche (1844-1921A  I.C.S. Member Council of 
India; Lt. Governor of N, WJF. Province May to November 
1898.
Sir Courteny Ilbert - (1841-1924). Law Member of Viceroyfs 
Council. 1882-1886; vice-chancellor of Calcutta University, 
I885-I806; Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury, 1899; 
Clerk of the House of Commons 1902.
instead of an Indian member of the Council, there should be 
appointed some Committees on whom more prominence should be 
given to Indians.
Morley appointed a small committee of his Council to 
consider the Government of Indiafs proposals« The Committee 
rejected the proposal of an Indian member, but hoped that 
eventually an Indian member of the Indian Civil Service 
might be appointed. Even Ripon and Elgin objected to the 
Indian member for secrecy reasons. This opposition to the 
Indian member really worried Morley and he asked Minto 
whether it would be possible to keep secret that that
proposal had ever been made and that Minto supported it and
2
if not, what effects would it have.
Minto rejected the suggestion that an Indian member 
of the Indian Civil Service might eventually be appointed. 
This, he thought, was "the very worst reasoning of the 
opposition". It meant that only members of the Civil Service 
oould qualify for that appointment. This contention would be 
angrily attacked by non-official English as well as by the 
Indians. "More-over the Indian of the Civil Service is not 
the man we want and no one knows it better than the Service 
itself. The class of Indian that should be useful to us 
would not join the Civil Service and the Europeanising
1. Lord Lansdowne to Minto - 21 April 1907* Minto 
Collections. N.L.S.
2. Morley to Minto - telegram, 16 April 1907; letter,
12r 26 April 1907* Ibid.
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effect of its early training and the home political 
associations it seems likely to encourage will not tend to 
produce the high class Indian gentleman whose assistance we 
should I think enlist," He made it clear as well that it 
would not be possible to keep it a secret that such a 
proposal had been made or that he supported it. He realized 
that now he had made up his mind to recommend the 
appointment of an Indian to his Council, it would be 
impolitic to go back on it. A large number of people had 
already known it and if he shrank from it now, it would be 
considered a weakness on his part. It might weaken his 
position before Indian eyes. He, however, felt that if he 
insisted Morley would come round to his proposal. The 
effect of all this on his position, Minto wrote, would be 
that "Anglo-Indian opinion would be divided into two camps 
agreeing and disagreeing with me and that I should be 
violently attacked by the latter both here and at home," If 
the Indian was appointed the opposition would die down 
otherwise there would be a tremendous revival of agitation 
which would be joined by moderate Indians. His view was that 
"notwithstanding the forces ranged against us I think we 
must f i g h t . H e  was willing "to stand the shot;" and 
emphatically said that "it is time to overrule bureaucracy, 
and that though we shall be bitterly attacked at first, 
feeling would subside before long, whilst British
1. Minto to Morley - 17, 25 April 1907. Ibid.
administration would gain in strength and in popular 
1
confidence.n
Minto had to clear away another misunderstanding.
Morison and others, whose opinions Morley had communicated
to him, thought that it was a concession to the Congress
demands. Minto made it clear that "we do not want a Congress
wallah or leader of opposition, but a representative of
moderate Indian thought, who would assist us in dealing with
extremists and in many native questions, as to which we are
2
now dangerously out of touch. " He was more emphatic in his 
letter, "Really the ideas people get into their heads are 
marvellous. Scarcely anyone seems to suppose that the very 
object of suggesting a Native Member is as a counterpoise 
to extreme Congress doctrines. Scarcely anyone seems to 
imagine that there is such a thing as an Indian of moderate 
political views loyal to British rule. Mere possession of 
political views at all is apparently assumed to indicate 
disloyalty,"^ Minto clearly explained that his aim in 
insisting on an Indian for his Council or Constitutional 
reforms was not a concession to Congress demands. He 
genuinely felt that the legitimate demands of moderate 
Indians must be sympathetically considered and met. He 
believed firmly that India was perfectly unfit for 
representative Government and must be autocratically ruled
1. Minto to Morley - telegram, 19 April 1907. Ibid.
2. Minto to Morley - telegram, 29 April 1907. Ibid.
3. Minto to Morley - 2 May 1907. Ibid.
2 U
for many years to come, yet "that ought not, in my opinion,
to prevent her best men from sharing more largely than they
do at present in the executive administration of the 
1
country."
Minto strongly repudiated the objection with regard 
to secrecy. These arguments never seemed to him to hold 
water. "This very letter I am writing you will pass through 
many Native hands in my office before it reaches you, and so 
does every state secret in India that is once committed in 
print. The Government Printing Presses are full of Natives.
I am far from saying secrets do not get out. The issue of 
the warrant for the arrest of Lajpat Rai is said to have
2
been known in the bazaar here long before it was executed, 
and one cannot reasonably doubt that any State secret would 
be far more likely to be kept by a Native Member of Council 
whose known integrity would be one of his first qualifications 
than by the numerous irresponsible Native Clerks through 
whose hands State papers of the greatest importance pass".
Minto fully recognized the weight of the opposition
4
to the Indian Member5 but he had made up his mind to face it. 
And even Morley*s announcement that the Cabinet also did not
1. Minto to Morley - 8 May 1907# Telegram, 6 May 1907* Ibid.
2. Lajpat Rai in his The Story of My Deportation, Lahore,
1908, pp.22-30, testifies that he himself knew about his 
warrant of arrest before it was executed.
3* Minto to Morley - 21 May 1907* Morley Papers. I.O.L.
4. Minto to Morley - 8 May 1907* Ibid.
like it,^ did not deter him from the decision he had taken. 
Yet Morley thought "the possible gain" was "not worth the 
risk", though he admitted that the policy was "wholly 
defensible". He was sure that "if European opinion would 
have stood it, the effect on Indian opinion would be in the 
highest degree and sense conciliatory". But he was afraid 
that the Government would have found difficulty in 
legislation of which most of Mintofs Council and all of his 
would have strongly disapproved. He further regarded the
2
risk of an Ilbert Bill explosion as too grave to be faced. 
More-over there was no legal limitations of appointing any 
Indian to the Viceroy's Executive Council, if there arose 
any need of it. Since it was not essential to pass an Act of 
Parliament for appointing an Indian to the Viceroy's Council, 
this proposal was dropped from the Secretary of State's 
Despatch.J
1. a) Morley to Minto - telegram, 3 May 19075 letter 3 May 
1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
b) In a letter to Lady Minto, Minto wrote that Morley was 
"doubtful as to overruling the opposition" to the Indian 
member. He expressed the fear that if Morley did not 
overrule the opposition, "then I shall be in a position 
of having been overruled, and I shall be 'overruled* and 
'abused' simultaneously". Mary, Countess of Minto, 
op,cit. p.119.
2. HorTey to Minto -16, 17 May 1907* Morley Papers. I.O.L.
3. Secretary of State to the Government of India - 17 May
1907. Public Despatch Nos- 71, para, 17-18. Public 
Despatches 1907# Vol.28. "This proposal in its purpose 
involves no material innovation either in law or 
principle."
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Morley1s assurance that there was no legal 
limitation to appoint an Indian and it was not essential to 
pass an Act, calmed Minto hut did not satisfy him. With a 
view to show how intensely he felt about it, Minto wrote to 
Morley that he agreed with him in his doubts that "with the 
combined forces here and at home against us and certainly in 
the conditions of the present movement I doubt if we should 
have been justified in giving battle. At the same time I 
hope my suggestion will let in a ray of light, and that i
before very long India may recognise the dawn of a new day."
While this correspondence was going on the situation 
in the Punjab and Eastern Bengal and Assam worsened. There 
were riots and the G-overnment had to take strict measures. 
This "crisis" could have affected Minto's zeal for reform, 
but he became more emphatic, His opinions remained the same. 
Though, he admitted recent events, that had accentuated 
"European nervousness in respect to the possible aggrandize­
ment of native political power;" and the impressions he had 
formed from the various letters from home, had made people 
in England more apprehensive than in India, He stuck to his 
point that opposition to the Indian member in India would be 
confined to the official ranks and there was no fear of a 
revival of the excitement that prevailed at the time of the 
Ilbert Bill, He frankly told Morley that "the retired
1, Minto to Morley - 21 May 1907# Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2 1
Viceroys in England and Members of your Council, though in a 
less degree, cannot keep pace with the general move forward 
of Indian public opinion,
The correspondence between these two shows that Minto 
had more courage and persistence than Morley, Minto was the 
person who would have faced the real storm of Anglo-Indian 
opposition in India on this proposal of an Indian member. 
Similarly, Morley, right from the beginning, knew that the 
Conservative forces in England were quite powerful. The 
House of Lords, the Anglo-Indians and above all the King, 
who opposed the appointment till the last minute, were 
against such a step. He genuinely wanted to do something, 
but he had to consider his own position. But his position 
despite these handicaps was not as serious as that of Minto, 
Minto had to face the brunt of the policy. Morley had only 
to learn it from the despatches, newspaper reports and 
private letters. Morley admitted to Lady Minto that though 
he meant to support Minto's suggestion manfully he was 
worried concerning its reception by the country. He could 
have dropped the idea altogether but then there was the fear 
of the House of Commons, who would have said, !,Here is a 
Liberal Secretary of State refusing to go as far as the 
Viceroy who is not a pronounced Liberal. " He was afraid that 
the radical members of the House of Commons as well as the
1, Minto to Morley - 5 June 1907. Morley Papers.I.0.L.
2 2 0
members of the Indian Committee of the House would be 
critical of his policy. That was why he enquired from Minto 
if the proposal and that the Viceroy had supported it, could 
be kept a secret. He, however, declared that "before I 
retire this measure will have to be brought forward for good 
or ill," and in his usual way, said, "Mind you, it might 
lead to incurable evils. Minto1 s courage and boldness to 
stand up to it put heart into Morley and the policy was 
ultimately carried out. Slackness on Mintofs part might 
have changed the course of events.
On 6 June 1907 Morley briefly announced in the House 
of Commons the Government of India*s proposals and his 
reply to them. Though he did mention that he had the 
intention of appointing one or more Indians to his Council,
he omitted any reference to an Indian on the Viceroy*s
2
Council. Morley stated that the Secretary of State "may 
safely, wisely and justly nominate one, and it may be two, 
Indian members to his Council." But he did not secure a 
favourable reception for this proposal either. Earl Percy 
thought that this proposal had some advantages as the 
Secretary of State would have "a readier access to the 
opinions of those who would look at Indian questions from a 
somewhat different standpoint from those who form the large
1. Mary, Countess of Minto - op.cit.p.116.
2. Hansard, House of Commons, 4.S. Vol.175. (30 May - 13 
Tune"T907)• 6 June 1907. Col.883-885.
majority of his Council". But he saw two practical 
difficulties. First the present number of the Council did 
not permit an addition and second it might not be possible 
to induce the right type of men to abandon their 
professional career in India to serve on the Council in 
England for five or ten years.^ The radical member, Dr.
V.H.Rutherford, thought the policy of reform was a step in 
the right direction. India had been waiting for it for a 
long time. His objection was that "it was neither wide nor
extensive". However, he saw in it "the opening of the door
2
to better things." There were a number of people in 
England who were extremely critical of Morleyfs decision to 
appoint an Indian to his Council. Sir Austen Chamberlain had 
many an argument with Morley. Minto, who had at one time 
been sceptical, on the other hand, welcomed the idea. When 
Morley informed him of his decision to appoint K.G.Gupta, 
I.C.S. of the Revenue Department, and S.H.Bilgrami, at that 
time in the Nizam of Hyderabad^ service, to his Council, he 
immediately sent his approval.^" In order to implement this 
decision Morley introduced a bill in Parliament to amend the 
constitution of the India Council, which became an Act on 
28 August 1907. Gupta and Bilgrami were nominated to the
1. Hansard, House of Commons. 4.S, Vol.175. (30 May - 13 
Tune"'T907) 6 June 1907. Col. 892-893.
2. I^d. Col.913.
3- Sif Austen Chamberlain, - Politics From Inside - An 
Epistolary Chronicle 1906-1914. London 1936.
4. Minto to Morley - 31 July 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
Council.'1' While Morley thought these appointments "a great 
2
move”, his choice of persons was not approved hy even the 
moderate Congress newspapers. It was thought that both these 
gentlemen would adopt the civil service point of view. The 
Hindustan Review suggested that these appointments were no 
encouragement to the Congress and that the aim of the 
Government was to rally the bureaucrats and thus hoodwink 
the real Indian representatives. It was like giving with the 
right hand and taking with the left. Surprise was also 
expressed at the necessity of passing an Act for such 
appointments. It was suggested that the Act was passed so 
that no Anglo-Indian might be called upon to surrender his
A R
seat to an Indian. R.C.Dutt did not like the choice of 
these two, as he told Morley later on. Morley, however, 
remarked that "I could only rejoice that other people, and 
very likely himself [Dutt] also, would have said just the 
same thing of any other Indian brace on whom I might have
1.Bilgrami took up his appointment on 11 November 1907 and 
Gupta on 9 March 1908.
2. Morley to Minto - 18 July 1907. Mor le y P ap e r s, I.O.L.
See also Morley*s Recollections. Vol.II. p.22o.
3. The Behari, Calcutta, 23 August 1907; the Bengalee,
31 August, 1 September 1907; the Indian Mirror,
1 September 1907 5 the Indian Empire , 3 September 1907 5 
the Hindu Patriot, 3 September 1907; the Amrita Bazar 
Patrika, 4 September 1907. See B.N.N.R. 1907.
4. The Hindustan Review, September 1907. pp.285-286.
5. Romesh Chandra Duti (184-8-1909). Passed I.C.S. in 1869 
Became Divisional Commissioner, Orissa, 1894-95. Lecturer 
for some time on Indian History at University College, 
London, President of the Congress in 1899. Revenue 
Minister of Baroda State, 1904-1906. Prime Minister of 
the State, 1909.
laid my hands,"1 Minto reported that the Muslims had
welcomed the appointment of Bilgrami and that he had
received numerous telegrams from them, "but that the Hindus
2
had not done so.
It was on Minto*s suggestion that the Government of 
India made public the circular issued to the Local 
Governments on 24 August 1907 for their views and comments. 
Minto was very anxious to take the Indian public into their 
confidence,1 He considered "the criticisms on our reforms", 
which had begun to appear in the newspapers, "on the wholeA
very satisfactory".
Minto had not forgotten the possibility of appointing 
an Indian to his Council. He again wrote to Morley about the 
importance of such an appointment and stated that he was not 
afraid of the personal criticism with which he would have 
been attacked if suoh a step had been taken. But he could 
wait and recollected an old racing motto - "wait in front" 
meaning that one should not do too much running, but always
5
be in the place from which one could win if one wanted to. 
Morley replied, "you refer to an Indian Member on your 
Council, by way of a case where you were bold, and I was 
less bold. The illustration is perfectly fair ... I do
1,Morley to Minto, 21 May 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2, A large number of telegrams were receivecT by the Governor 
General from the Muslims. See Public Letters from India, 
1908, Vol.36. ~
3* Minto to Morley - 12 June 1907* Morley Papers. I,O.L.
4* Minto to Morley - 29 August, 4 September 1907. Ibid.
5* Minto to Morley - 9 October 1907* Ibid.
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believe if a vacancy should occur on your Council when I am
in office, you shall have an Indian, I am in excellent hopes
of turning out well on the Council here," But the matter
remained hanging till Minto again wrote on 29 January 1908
and praised Dr,A, Mukherji. On 26 March 1908, Morley
enquired from Minto if there was any Indian to fill the post
of Finance Member, He admitted that "I sometimes blame
myself for defect of energy in carrying on this part of our
policy - the promotion of Natives. You cleared yourself of
any such defect by the fight you made for an Indian Member
in the first draft of your Reforms, though I still hold that,
at that period, neither you nor I was strong enough in
public confidence to face the popular outcry either in India
or from the Tory opposition here. Now things are different.
People have learned that we both of us know what we are
about 5 and, without saying that we can do what we like, I am
persuaded that anything we like to do, will stand a very
2
good chance of securing all the assent we need." Despite 
all these expressions of confidence, the position, as later 
events were to show, was not as favourable as to secure "all 
the assent we need." Morley was conscious of it. His policy 
was to mark time and wait for the opportune moment. Mintofs 
insistence continued. On 17 June 1908, he informed. Morley 
that in his discussions with H.H.Risley "a possible candidate
1. Morley to Minto - 31 October 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Morley to Minto - 26 March 1908, Ibid.
occurred to us in Sinha,^ the new Advocate General ..." and 
in his subsequent letters he continued his pressure on 
Morley, Harvey Adamson, the Home Member, had been converted 
to a belief in the advantages of an Indian Member on the 
Council, Now was the chance to appoint somebody to succeed 
Erie Richards, the retiring Law Member, Minto thought that
p
either Sinha or Mukherji would do. On 10 August 1908 
Morley wrote, "you need not fear that I shall be deterred 
from putting an Indian on to your Council, by anything that 
may be said or done here. I shrank from seeking a bill last 
year, because a bill against a man in Lansdowne^ position, 
might have proved an awkward and tiresome affair. But my 
executive competence to fill a vacancy by an Indian will be 
undisputed, because law gives that power clearly."*^ Morley, 
nevertheless, remained unsure and indecisive. On 3 September 
1908, he wrote that he had been thinking about the 
possibility of a law member. There was one advantage. It
1. Satyendra Prasanno Sinha, First Baron Sinha (1864-1928). 
Born in June 1864 at the village of Raipur in the Birbhum 
district of Bengal, Called to the bar by Lincoln1 s Inn in 
1886. Counsel to Government of Bengal 1903. Offg. Advocate 
General of Bengal 1905 ; Confirmed in the post in 1908.
Law member to Government of India, 1909. Resigned 1910. 
Knighted 1914. K.C.S.I. 1921. President of the Congress 
1915. Member Bengal Executive Council, 1917. Member 
Imperial War Cabinet and Conference 1919. Parliamentary 
Under Secretary of State for India, raised to Peerage, 
piloted the Government of India Bill of 1919 through the 
House of Lords. Governor of Bihar and Orrisa - 1920-21. 
Appointed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
1919? Freedom of City of London. 1917.
2. Minto to Morley - 17 June, 1, 14,21 July,
12 August, 1908, Morley Papers, l.O.L.
3. Morley to Minto - 10 August 1908. Ibid.
would not take "the bread out of the mouth of the Indian
Civil Service", but the Congress might object to this
exclusive appointment. Why should he not be given some other
1
department, Finance, Commerce or Home? Minto informed 
Morley that it would be a flimsy objection, for all 
departments were open to Indians. What they were trying to 
do at the moment was to appoint an Indian to the department 
he was best suited to handle. It was not supposed to be a 
racial appointment, but the inauguration of a principle that 
an Indian might not be debarred from holding an office, for 
which he was suitable simply because he was an Indian. Under 
the Queenfs Declaration of 1858 all offices were open to 
Indians, but in practice they were deprived of most of these 
offices. In the past years they had acquired great prominence
in legal profession. So in Minto*s opinion Law Membership
2
was the most suitable post for an Indian.
Since all these points pertaining to reform scheme 
were discussed in their private correspondence, Minto thought 
it advisable to send Morley privately a brief outline of the 
reforms he would like before the Government of India’s 
reform Despatch reached him. In this outline, which was 
purely for Morley, he mentioned the appointment of an Indian 
to his Executive Council, though such a suggestion was not 
made in the despatch. On the receipt of the Government of
1. Morley to Minto - 3 September 1908. Morley Papers, I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - 24 September 1908 and subsequent 
letters. Ibid.
3. Minto to Morley - 12 August 1908, Ibid.
India!s despatch of 1 October 1908, Morley appointed a 
committee of his council to consider the proposals. It 
consisted of Sir David Barr, chairman and Lord MacDonnell, 
Sir James La Touche, Sir James Thomson, Sir Lawrence 
Jenkins, K. G.Gupta, Sir Walter Lawrence and S.H. Bilgrami, 
His committee was, as he himself said, "a very strong one". 
MacDonnell and La Touche had had uncommonly wide experience 
of provincial administration, Jenkins had Ma well trained 
judicial mind", Bilgrami and Gupta were Muslim and Hindu 
representatives, Lawrence had had "an inside view of Simla" 
and Sir James Thomson was a Madras man."1* He was also 
conscious that the subject was grave and that it was 
important to keep in step with Minto, Moreover "to present 
a front that won't offend the Bureaucracy; nor the non­
official Anglo-Indian, nor the Mohammedans, nor the right
2
wing of the Congressmen, is no joke". But the Committee
1. Morley to Minto - 1 October 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L. 
Sir David Barr, (184-6-1916) Indian Army - Served in 
Foreign Department of Government of India; member Council 
of India - 1905.
Sir James Thomson, (1848-1929) I.C.S.- Served in Madras, 
acted as Governor of Madras from 30 April 1904 to 12 
December 1904; member Council of India, 1908.
Sir Lawrence Jenkins, (1858 1928). Appt. Judge, High 
Court Calcutta; 1896. Chief Justice Bombay, 1899; member 
Council of India, 1908-1909. Chief Justice Calcutta 
High Court, 1909.
Sir Walter Lawrence, (1857-1940). I.C.S. Under Secretary 
to Government of Punjab 1885-86. Under Secretary to 
Government of India, 1886; offg. Sect. 1888; Private 
Secretary to Lord Curzon; member Council of India 1907.
2. Morley to Minto - 5 November 1908. Ibid.
submitted its report on 5 October 1908. The India Council 
deliberated on it and the proposals were passed by the 
Cabinet, which "took the thing on trust, having rather
1urgent business of much domestic moment on their hands".
The Committee had rejected by 5 votes to 3 the 
proposal for an Indian Member on the Viceroyfs Council.
2
Bilgrami voted against and Gupta in favour of the proposal. 
Minto objected to this reference to Morleyfs Committee. It 
had long been assumed that there was no need to pass any 
law and the matter rested with the Secretary of State and 
the Viceroy to find and appoint any Indian capable of 
holding such office. Morley's reference to his committee, 
thus, was most surprising.^ But Morley was trying to get
A
moral support for his subsequent announcement in Parliament, 
On 27 November 1908 the Secretary of Statefs despatch was 
on its way to India.
On 17 December 1908 Morley announced in Parliament 
his intention to appoint an Indian to the Viceroy's 
Executive Council in case of a vacancy. He admitted that
1. Morley to Minto - 27 November 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Morley to Minto - 14* 16 October 190d. Minto Collections.
N.L.S.
3* Minto to Morley - 29 October 1908. Ibid.
4. Morley to Minto - 19 November 1908, "You speak about the
Indian member for your Council. I only put it to my 
Council, because I like to collect as many opinions as 
possible, without feeling myself in any degree bound by 
them. It will fortify me against hostile views in London, 
About the thing itself, I am quite fixed. Here my two 
Indians have made far less ^ Sdifference, either way, than 
I used to expect ..." Ibid.
"if it were on my own authority only I might hesitate to 
take that step, because I am not very fond of innovations in 
dark and obscure ground, but here I have the absolute and
1
the zealous approval and concurrence of Lord Minto himself," 
But this announcement was met with opposition both inside and 
outside the House of Lords. The Marquess of Lansdowne opposed 
it and stated that it was "a tremendous innovation" and 
"ought not to be introduced until Parliament had had full 
opportunity of discussing the Government scheme in all its 
completeness". He was not convinced with the argument that 
it would be advantageous to have on the Viceroy's Council a 
member who knew the country. He asked Morley "what country? 
There are a great many countries in India. If the noble 
Viscount could discover a native gentleman who knew the 
whole of the Indian Empire, and could speak authoritatively 
on behalf of all the different races and creeds concerned,
I should say by all means give him a place on the Viceroy's
2
Council..." Lord MacDonnell, who was a member of Morley fs 
Reform Committee, agreed with Lansdowne and pointed out the 
vastness of the Empire and racial differences.*^ This 
presented Morley with the situation he was afraid of, but by
1. Hansard. House of Lords. 4.S. Vol.198, 1908. Col.1985-
T 985T..
2. Ibid. Col.1995-1996. Minto exerted all his influence in 
pleading for Indian Member with Lansdowne - Minto to 
Lansdowne, 21 January 1909. M into Collection. N.L.S.
3. Hansard. House of Lords. .4.S. Vol.198.1908. Col,1997*
now he had built up enough aourage to face the storm as he 
wrote to Minto, "It is lucky that my appointment of an Indian 
member on your Executive Council does not need parliamentary 
sanction, for I don't believe the House of Lords would 
agree, "**■
The Government's intentions were now clear. An Indian
would soon be appointed to the Executive Council, ‘Who could
that be? A Hindu or a Muslim. Amir Ali, President of the
London Branch of the League met Morley to find it out and
put forward the League's point of view. A deputation of the
League's London Branch also waited upon Morley in January
1909 and demanded an equal share for the Muslims. But
Morley refused their plea and explained that no other
qualification but personal fitness would be considered in
2
appointing an Indian to the Executive Council.
There was another reason for Morley fs concern. He had 
an audience with King Edward, who expressed his anxiety over 
Morley's proposed, appointment of an Indian to the Viceroy's 
Council. Morley thought that MacDonnell had influenced the
1. Morley to Minto - 21 January 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L, 
Morley respected Sir Alfred Lyall's suggestions and always 
sought refuge in his advice - "the one man to whom I must 
look for counsel in decisions of real moment - Alfred 
Iyall, the friend of a lifetime - entirely approves, 
though characteristically his eyes are wide open to 
drawbacks. So are mine, but it has to be done." See also, 
Sir Mortimer Durand, - Life of the Right Hon. Sir Alfred 
Comyn Iyall, London, 1915• p.42b.
2. Address of the deputation and Morley's reply - Morley 
Papers. I.O.L.
King.^" In the "beginning Morley had very friendly relations
with MacDonnell and it was he who influenced Morley to
insert the Electoral Colleges Scheme into his despatch, hut
soon they fell apart, so much so that he called MacDonnell
2
"a hard-mouthed b r u t e M o r e o v e r  Godley suggested another 
influence on the King, Sir Walter Lawrence had wanted to 
join the P. & 0, as director, but Morley had not permitted 
him to do so. He resigned from the India Council and stated 
that he did not agree with Morley's policy with regard to 
the Native Member, Since he was a frequent visitor to 
Marlborough House, he might have influenced the King against 
the scheme.*^ Minto tried to encourage Morley by saying that 
all those people who were opposing this appointment were 
old Anglo-Indians with no knowledge of the present condition 
in India, and even pleaded with the King who, when the time 
came, gave his sanction "reluctantly”,^
1. Morley to Minto - 12 January 1909. Morley Papers, I.O.L, 
See also Morley to Minto - 12 March 1909. Recollections. 
Vol.II. p.302.
2. Sir Arthur Bigge to Minto - 11 March 1909. Minto 
Collection t N.L.S. Morley to Minto - 18 December 1908. 
Morley Papers. I.O.L.
3. Morley to Minto - 5 March 1909; Oodley to Minto - 5 March 
1909, see Mintofs reply - 25 March 1909. Minto Collection 
N.L.S.
4. See Minto's letters to Morley and to the King. Minto 
assured the King that the appointment would really mean 
the removal of racial disability in case of an Indian 
possessing the necessary qualifications and it was in no 
way intended to satisfy a claim for racial representation. 
These letters must have done tremendous good to allay the 
King's fears. Ibid. The Prince of Wales also expressed his 
fears to Minto- with regard to the appointment of an Indian 
- 26 January 1909. Minto assured him $s well. Ibid.
4Though the appointment of an Indian had almost become 
certain,^" irrespective of the opposition by the Lords and 
the Kingfs dislike, some of the members of the Viceroy’s 
Council still opposed it. Lord Kitchener kept silence, but 
General Scott, Military Member, opposed it on grounds of 
secrecy. But it was Eleetwood Wilson who "with a fine old 
British obstinacy" declared "that an Indian Colleague would
be the admission of the thin end of the wedge which is to
2
bring about the downfall of British administration".
It is interesting to note how the candidate was 
ultimately chosen. Minto personally liked Dr. A.Mukherji and 
was insisting on his appointment to his Council. But when 
Sinha’s name was proposed to him, it was impressed upon him 
that Sinha stood high in public estimation because of his 
professional skill and ability. Besides Sinha and his family 
were more in touch with European society. Being a barrister, 
his appointment to the Council would require no legislation, 
and the upward step from Advocate General would not seem 
unnatural. Minto wanted to take the line of least resistance 
in making this great change. "Moreover please do not think 
me terribly narrow! but Sinha is comparatively white, whilst
1. Godley to Minto - 22 January 1909* Ibid."his [Morley’s] 
performance on this particular subject [appointment of an 
Indian to the Viceroy's Executive Council] was so clear 
and decided that any one who heard, or had read, his 
speech, must know that it is a settled thing".
2. Minto to Morley - 4 March 1909. Ibid,
Mukherji is as black as my hat! and opposition in the
official world would not be regardless of mere shades of
colour, 1 Minto wrote to Morley.1 Hence Sinha was appointed
on 23 March 1909. His appointment was generally welcomed;
even the Muslim League did not object much though it was
disappointed that a Muslim had not been appointed. But the
Muslims had been assured that a Muslim's turn would come in
due course, and Sinha's successor was actually a Muslim,
Syed Ali Imam. Minto and Morley were surprised that there
2
was no voice raised against Sinha's appointment. The
1. Minto to Morley - 9 November 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Morley to Minto - 25 March 1909. - 11So far, - that is to
say, twenty-four hours after the event - the launch of 
the Indian member had produced no shock. The Times... 
shakes its head a little solemnly, but without scare ..." 
Morley to Minto - 15 April 1909 - "It rejoices me that 
Sinha has produced no Anglo-Indian storm. You were 
evidently most right in declining to believe that the 
fuss would be violent; so much is certain, and is to be 
counted to your credit. You ask whether the King said 
anything about your letter to him. No, he did not. And I 
half gather that you suppose his "approval" meant that he 
approved in other than a formal sense. Not in the least.
His last word was a definite "protest" to me against the
whole thing, coupled with a pious hope that the Almighty 
might perhaps prevent mischief - with the pretty plain 
implication that the divine powers would do nothing of 
the sort. Whether my last letter, enclosing the formal 
submission, melted the spirit of "Protest'^ away, I have 
no means of knowing for the submissions ofime back with
no word beyond the single talismanic sign inscribed upon 
it." But to Minto the King wrote - "I unwillingly assent, 
but wish that my protest should remain on record -" King 
Edward VII to Minto, 22 March 1909. Minto Collection . 
N.L.S.
surprise is understandable because they had entertained 
enormous fears. Minto had had a tough fight in securing the 
appointment and Morley had encountered bitter opposition 
from the Conservative section in British political life and 
the old Anglo-Indians.1
But the appointment of an Indian to the Executive 
Council was not the only proposal which Minto had asked the 
Arundel Committee to consider to meet the nationalist 
demands. They had to consider advisability of a Council of 
Princes, increased Indian representation on the Viceroy's 
and Provincial Legislative Councils, prolongation of the
budget debates and procedure as to presentation of the
2
budget and powers of moving amendments. The Committee 
realised the advantages of a Council of Princes, but was 
not prepared to reaommend a formal constitution or any 
definite public pronouncement at that stage. It was not a 
new proposal. Lord Iytton in 1877 had thought of a Privy 
Council of Ruling Princes. Though the scheme was rejected 
by the Secretary of State, titular Counsellors from amongst 
the Chiefs were appointed. Curzon also wanted a Council
of Princes - which, in the Committee's eyes, was "too
1. Morley never forgot this opposition. When Sinha wanted to 
resign from the post for private reasons, he refused to 
grant him permission as he thought that his resignation 
would be misunderstood and dubbed as the failure of their 
policy. When Sinha ultimately did resign, Morley refused 
to put his name on the list of honour which Minto had 
sent, because he was very angry with Sinha, Minto even 
approached Sir A.Bigge, the King's private Secretary to 
get Sinha's name included in the list. Minto to Sir, A. 
Bigge. 20 December 1910. Minto Collection . N.L.S.
2. Mintofs Minute to the Arundel Committee. Morley Papers.
I.O.L.
narrow and would prove ineffectual in practice," Its 
suggestion, therefore, was that "it would he desirable for 
the Viceroy to summon for purposes of consultation selected 
chiefs from time to time to discuss particular subjects, and 
on occasions to associate with them leading landholders from 
British territory, whose high status would justify their 
admission", Ibbetson did not concur wholly in this 
recommendation. He realized the importance of enlisting on 
the side of the Government the conservative elements as a 
counterpoise to the advanced party, and he accepted the idea 
of an Advisory Council, but not a Council of Chiefs. He 
would make it a Council selected from among the Indian 
aristocracy and great landowners of India, on which the 
chiefs would be represented in some such proportion, say, as 
six Chiefs in a Council of thirty. He thought a Council of 
Chiefs would be politically dangerous as very soon they 
would exhaust the topics for discussion and their bringing 
together might lead to their political union.^
The Government of India, however, suggested a 
Council of Princes to the Secretary of State, though the 
members of the Viceroy fs Executive Council were not 
unanimous on points of detail. They were at one in holding 
that the idea of associating the Indian aristocracy with 
the Government of India was one that contained great promise
1. The Arundel Committee 1s Report- op.cit.
not n
and ought/to he abandoned. Morley did not like this
proposal and informed Minto that Lord Ripon and Sir A.Lyall
were "provisionally" adverse to the scheme and Sir Charles
Elliot, ex-Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, "pretty entirely
p
adverse". But Morley’s reform committee agreed with the
suggestion of a Council of Notables with an increased number
of territorial magnates. Morley, however, did not much 
appreciate the idea of a Council of Princes. The main 
purpose of setting up any Council was to elicit public 
opinion on administrative measures, as also to afford the 
government adequate facilities to explain their measures and 
policies to the people, Por that purpose a Council of
Princes was not enough. Morley, however, concurred in the
general line of the scheme and considered the Advisory 
Councils more advantageous. But he was doubtful about the 
utility of the Councils, as proposed by the Government of 
India, because much weight was cast in the direction of 
enlisting the advice of the nobles and great landholders. 
Nevertheless he left the matter open for further discussions 
with the local Governments.
1. Government of India to the Secretary of State. Public 
Letter No,7. 21 March 1907. India Public Letters. 1907. 
Vol.35.
2. Morley to Minto - 28 March, 4 April 1907. Morley Papers.
I.O.L.
3. Secretary of State to Government of India. Despatch No.71, 
17 May 1907. Public Despatches 1907. Vol.No.28.
Para.8-12,
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The Government of India in their circular letter to 
the local Governments dropped the proposal of a Council of 
Princes hut instead asked their opinion on Imperial and 
Provincial Advisory Councils."1' Minto, like Morley was 
doubtful as to the attitude the ruling chiefs would take 
towards the idea of sitting with other representatives. The 
opinions of the local Governments were not due till 1 March 
1908, and were actually received even later than that.
Minto, in the meanwhile, started collecting information 
regarding the views of the Indian Princes. The Nizam of 
Hyderabad and the Gaekwar of Baroda had already objected to
2
sit with minor princes; the Maharaja of Mysore was lukewarm. 
The general attitude of the ruling chiefs towards this 
proposal, which Minto had ascertained, gave him a feeling 
that they did not want anybody else besides themselves on 
such an assembly. Minto also suspected that the political 
officers were prompting these Ruling Chiefs, because in the 
event of their coming together and having a direat contact 
with the Viceroy, the importance of the political officers 
would be diminished.^
Morley in his despatch of 27 May 1907> had hinted 
that he was willing to consider the proposal of Advisory
1. Government of India to Local Governments - circular 
letter nos-2310-2317 dated 24- August 1907. Public Letters 
from India. 1908. Vol.37. Paras. 4-7.
2. Minto to Morley - 14 November 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
3. Minto to Morley - 26 December 1907* Tbifl.
Councils for the Central and Provincial Governments. The 
local Governments did not like it; nor did Minto like it.
MI have never liked. Advisory Councils, but swallowed them 
in the shape we have submitted them to you for the sake of 
showing a united front here, which I considered very 
i m p o r t a n t T h e  opinions of local governments on the 
advantages of an Advisory Council were divided. The 
Lieutenant-Governors of Bengal, the United Provinces, Burma 
and Eastern Bengal and Assam generally approved the scheme. 
The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab was opposed to a mixed 
Council and so was the Chief Commissioner of the Central 
Provinces. The Governor of Madras was wholly adverse; the 
Governor of Bombay agreed with the principle involved but 
demurred to the combination of chiefs and territorial 
magnates. The main objections were that Ruling Chiefs would 
not sit with subjects of the British Government; that they 
had no knowledge of the conditions of British India and so 
would be useless in either advising the Government or 
diffusing information to the people. Territorial magnates 
were out of touch with the people and their interests were 
adverse to those of the great body of agriculturists. Thus 
their association would also serve no purpose. There were 
objections as to the powers and functions of this Council.
1. Minto to Morley - 14 October 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
Since it would have no legal recognition and no formal
powers, the Government would be under no obligation to
consult it or be guided by its advice. It was also doubtful x
if its views would command the same respect as that commanded
by the views of the elected members of the Legislative
Council,'*' Thus the Government of India suggested the
abandonment of the idea of the Imperial Advisoiy Council,
2but substituted for it that of Council of Princes,
Minto personally and the Government of India generally
seem to have been influenced in dropping the proposal of an
Imperial Advisory Council by the opinions of the local
Governments, prominent Indians and Indian associations. They
had invariably expressed their doubts and suspicions with
*
regard to its composition, functions and powers. So he 
reverted to his original proposal of "a Council of Princes,
1. Replies of the Local Governmentss-
Government of E.B. and A, to Government of India,
No,9460, dated 14 March 1908. Para.13.
Government of Bengal to Government of India. No.1746A, 
dated 29 February 1908, Paras. 3~H.
Government of U.P. to Government of India. No.447, dated 
16 March 1908. Paras, 4-9.
Government of Burma to Government of India. No.860, 
dated 24 February 1908. Paras, 4-5.
Government of Punjab to Government of India. No.40,dated 
6 July 1908.Paras, 6-20.
Government of Madras to Government of India, No,222, 
dated 13 March 1908, Para.5
Government of Bombay to Government of India. No,1768, 
dated 28 March 1908. Paras. 5-10, Public Letters from 
India, 1908. Vol.37.
2. Government of India to the Secretary of State - 1 October 
1908. Paras. 6-8. Public Letters from India. 1908, Vol.37.
3. Ibid.
Kt 1 \j
small in number to begin with, to deal with questions 
affecting Native States and their relations with British 
India, for the express purpose of recognizing the loyalty of 
Ruling Chiefs and enlisting their interest in Imperial 
affairs.
Morley accepted the rejection of the proposal of an 
Imperial Advisory Council, but doubted the necessity of a 
Council of Princes. This proposal was also full of 
insurmountable difficulties and though he refrained from 
placing "any obstacle in the way of a full and fair trial" 
he was not very sympathetic to it, because he thought a 
Council of Princes would serve no useful purpose. He
explained to Minto that the matter had been left open in
2deference to his views. Minto, however, soon made up his 
mind and wrote to Morley that "I think after all it is 
wiser to drop it [Council of Chiefs]
Similarly after careful consideration the proposal of 
Advisory Councils for Provinces was dropped. Because Morley 
thought that the creation of Provincial Advisory Councils 
was not "likely to prove an experiment of any marked actual 
value". There was also the risk of a rivalry between these 
Councils and Legislative Councils and their creation might
1. Mary, Countess of Minto, op.cit. p.214*
Minto to Morley - 12 August 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Morley to Minto - telegram, 27 November 19Oo. Ibid.
See also Secretary of State to the Government of India,
No.193? 27 November 1908. Public De spatehes, 1908. Vol.29.
3. Minto to Morley - 5 December l90b. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
be suspected "as designed to be a check upon the old.
Along with the creation of new Advisory Councils,
Minto and Morley were thinking of extending the existing 
Legislative Councils with an increase in members1 powers.
The Arundel Committee had suggested that between 1893 and 
1906 the working of the elective principle had not justified 
the expectations that all the more important classes and 
interests should as far as possible be represented and that 
it had given a prominence to the legal profession to which 
it was not entitled. Its suggestion, therefore, was that
special interests should be represented on the Viceroy's
2
Legislative Council.. This suggestion was very near to 
Minto's heart. Quite early Minto had made up his mind that 
r,the only representation for which India is at present fitted 
is a representation of Communities, ... and only to a very 
small extent in that direction."^ Morley did not disagree.
When in 1893 the Councils were enlarged and the 
elective principle was introduced it was recognized that 
territorial representation was not suitable to India, and 
an endeavour should be made to secure on them the 
representation of all the more important classes and 
interests. But the results had not justified the expectations,A
at least in two cases - the landholders and the Muslims.
1. Secretary of State to the Government of India, 27 
November 1908. Public Despatches, 1908. Vol.29.
2. The Arundel Committee Report, op.cit.
3. Minto to Morley - 23 January 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
See also Mary, Countess of Minto - op.cit. p.102.
4. Questions relating to the lepresentation of the Muslims 
have been discussed in Chapter 5.
Out of 54 members elected by the District Boards to the 
Provincial Councils only 10 had been landholders while 36 
had been barristers and pleaders. Similarly out of 43 
members elected by the District Municipalities 40 had been 
barristers or pleaders and only two landholders. The 
Government had made an attempt to remedy the deficiency by 
nomination but out of the 338 non-official members who had 
been appointed, whether by election or nomination, to the 
Provincial Councils since 1893 as many as 123 or 36 per cent 
had been lawyers and only 77 or 22 per cent landowners. Thus 
it was clear that the elective system had given to the legal 
profession a great prominence in the Provincial Councils,
The Government was naturally concerned because "the more 
stable elements of the communityM had not been able to secure 
proper representation on its Councils, The landholders had 
shown their dislike for standing against any one lower than 
them in social position for election because of their pride 
and prestige. The Government of India, therefore, suggested 
to Morley that without denying the due share to the 
professional classes, they intended to create an additional 
electorate for the landed and monied classes. The reason for 
this suggestion was that though the number of these 
professional classes was small, their influence was large 
and the Government was not willing to allow them a virtual 
monopoly of the power exercised by the Councils, Thus the 
creation of this additional electorate was thought to be
"the soundest solution of the problem" as it would supply
"the requisite counterpoise" to the excessive influence of
1
the professional classes.
Morley agreed with the Government of India’s views 
that the legislative Councils in India should be enlarged 
and so constituted in respect of non-official members as to 
give due and ample representation to the different classes 
and interests of the community. With regard to the creation 
of an electorate for the landholders Morley stated that "I 
have no difficulty in accepting your conclusion that the
member elected to represent this class must himself belong
2
to it," The matter was accordingly referred to the local 
Governments for further consideration.^
The local Governments did not oppose the representa­
tion of the landed classes. The Government of Bengal, 
however, pointed out that it was wrong to assume that the 
lawyers did not at all represent the landed interests. On 
the contrary, many of them were themselves fairly large 
landowners. Some had intimate connections with the 
landholders and owed their election largely to the support 
of that class.^ The Government of the U.P. stated that in
1. Government of India to the Secretary of State. Public 
Letter No. 7 of 1907. 21 March 1907* Para. 43* Public 
Letters. 1907.Vol.35 *
2. Secretary of State to Government of India despatch.No.71>
17 May 1907. Paras, 21-26. Public Despatches, 1907. Vol.28,
3. Government of India’s circular to Local Governments,
24 August 1907# Paras. 9-14.
4. Government of Bengal to Government of India. N0.1746A, 
dated 29 February 1908. Para.14. Public Letters from 
India 1908. Vol.37.
U.P. far from the local bodies being dominated by the
lawyers, the representatives elected by the district boards
in the course of the last fourteen years have invariably
been landholders. Similarly half of those elected by the
municipalities had substantial stake in the land. But it was
also pointed out that the representation of the Muslims and
the commercial interests other than those of the Upper India
1Chamber of Commerce had been inadequate. On the whole the 
local Governments agreed that the interests of the landed 
classes should be safe-guarded in the new set up.
The Bombay Presidency Association deplored the 
underlying policy r one of 'counterpoise1 against the 
influence of the professional classes. It was thought a 
retrograde step in many respects as it betrayed "a prejudice 
against the professional classes". They suggested to the 
Government that "the aim of the reforms should not be 
cleavage or counterpoise but the re-adjustment and expansion 
of the proportionate representation of the different 
communities so as to enable the Government to secure the 
benefit of the knowledge, experience, advice and oo-operation
of the most capable and the best trusted representation of
2
all classes and interests," The landholders, on the other 
hand, welcomed the separate representation of their
1, Government of U.P. to Government of India. No.447 of 1908. 
dated 16 March 1908, Para.12. Public Letters from India 
1908.
2, Bombay Presidency Association to the Government of Bombay, 
24 Pebruary 1908, Para.51-53* Ibid.
interests. The Government of India, encouraged by the replies 
of the looal Governments and the response of the landholders 
incorporated the proposal of separate representation of the 
landowning classes in their saheme,^ Morley agreed with the 
Government of India in principle. But he differed from Minto 
on the method through which the representation of interests 
be secured to the Legislative Councils. Though the details 
had yet to be worked out in accordance with the local 
conditions, Minto wanted through election and nomination to 
secure representation of the landholders and the Muslims;
Morley, on the other hand, suggested joint electoral
2colleges. The Muslims took strong exception to Morley*s 
suggestion and vigorously fought for separate representation 
for themselves.-^
What were Minto*s intentions in suggesting the 
separate representation of the interests of the landholders 
and Muslims on the Legislative Councils? Was it really 
intended to find a ’counterpoise * to the influence of the 
professional classes? It has been explained that he 
genuinely felt the need of meeting the demands of the 
educated Indians, but he did not think that they were the 
only people in India whose demands should be met. There were
1. Government of India to Secretary of State, 1 October 1908, 
Para. 27-29. Ibid.
2.Secretary of State to Government of India, 27 November 
1908, Public Bespatches 1908. Vol.29# Para. 8-14.
3. Por detailed discussion see Chapter 5*
other communities and interests who were perfectly loyal and
adequately
equally important, but their views had not been/represented 
in the Legislative Councils. But he never underrated the 
significance of the Congress either and always thought it an 
important factor in Indian political life. But for the 
betterment and continuation of the Raj,it was essential to 
give other communities and interests their proper share in 
the administration and representation on the Legislative 
Councils, 'Counterpoise*, was perhaps the wrong word used by 
him. His policy was more of recognition of other interests 
without prejudicing the existing ones for consultation on 
government affairs. His policy could have been a policy of 
Counterpoise' if he had been thinking of any other form of 
government than a constitutional autocracy. For a 
constitutional autocracy, a semblance of the support of all 
classes and interests was not only essential but was by far 
the best policy. He never tired of declaring that 1 We are 
ready to accept Indian assistance, to share our 
administration with Indians, to recognize their natural 
ambitions, but, for their own sakes, the supreme guidance 
must be British... 1,1
The Arundel Committee had unanimously recommended 
that there should be more opportunity to discuss the Budget 
and that the discussion should be more real than at present.
1. Minto to Morley - 17 June 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
Bat there was difference of opinion as to the number of non­
official members on the Legislative Councils* Baker saw no 
objections to a non-official majority in the Legislative 
Councils.^ This alarmed even Minto* He thought that this
would mean the frequent use of the veto by the Viceroy or
2the Secretary of State and hindrance to administration.
Under the Indian Councils Act of 1892 an official majority 
had been maintained in the Provincial Councils, except that 
in the Bombay Legislative Council* for some years* the 
Government was run with a non-official majority and quite 
smoothly. The Government of India was conscious of the fact, 
yet they suggested that the official majority should be 
maintained in these Councils. They, however, recommended 
that it could be reduced to its narrowest limit by making 
the number of officials and non-officials (excluding the 
head of the Government) equal. In the event of the full 
Council being equally divided, the vote of the head of the 
Government would turn the scaled Morley, on the other 
hand, decided that official majority in Provincial Councils 
might be dispensed with, provided that a substantial 
official majority could be permanently maintained in the 
Imperial Legislative Council. With a view to alleviate any 
fears that might be entertained by the Government of India,
1. The Arundel Committee Report, op.cit.
2. Minto to Morley - 12 September ±906. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
3. Government of India to the Secretary of State -
1 October 1908. Public Letters from India. 1908. Vol*37# 
Para.34.
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Morley suggested a number of safeguards. He pointed out that 
the first safeguard for the smooth running of the 
administration would be the power of the Head of the 
Government to withhold assent from legislation he disapproved* 
Secondly, there already existed certain important 
restrictions on power of local councils to legislate; 
thirdly, if Council was sufficiently representative, it was 
unlikely that some non-official votes would not be cast on 
side of Government, If, however, all the non-officials 
opposed a measure it would probably be open to grave 
objection, but if absolutely necessary, it could be carried
j
by means of official majority in:Imperial Legislative
Council,^ Thus in his view there was no need to have an
official majority in the Provincial Councils, Minto whole-
2
heartedly agreed with Morleyfs suggestion.
Morley approved of the Government of Indiars 
proposal for increased discussion of the budget and an
extension of the right of members to ask questions, He also
suggested an increase in the Executive Councils of Madras 
and Bombay with the addition of two more members of whom one 
at least should always by usage be an Indian, though this 
need not be provided by Statute; and that power should be 
acquired for creating Executive Councils for Lieutenant-
1. Secretary of State to Government of India - 27 November 
1908. Public Be spat che s, 1908. Vol.29* Para.19.
2. Minto to Morley - telegram. 22 November 1908. Morley
Papers. I.O.L.
Governors, not immediately, but when it might be considered
desirable in any particular case.^ Morley, again, in making
this suggestion showed how cautious he was* He realized the
significance of the Executive Councils for provinces and the
presence of an Indian on them, but was not in any hurry to
provide them, at least to the Lieutenant-Governor's
provinces, immediately* Personally Minto liked the idea and
2
agreed with Morley but when it was discussed in his Council, 
the members were unanimous that there should be an addition 
of one member instead of two in the Executive Councils of 
Madras and Bombay. Both Madras and Bombay strongly opposed 
the obligatory appointment of an Indian to their Council. 
Lawley, Governor of Madras, informed Minto that he could not 
possibly find a suitable man. Clarke, Governor of Bombay, 
opposed the recognition of race representation instead of 
individual efficiency and personal suitability, and Minto 
agreed with him in that regard* Morley kept these objections 
in his mind while incorporating the suggestion of Executive 
Councils for the Provinces in his Bill.
Thus after careful consideration and wide 
consultation the reform scheme was ready for presentation 
to Parliament.
1. Secretary of State to Government of India, 27 November 
1908, Public Bespatches, 1908. Vol.29* Paras. 39-41.
2. Minto to Morley - telegram, 22 November 1908, Morley 
Papers. I.O.L.
3. Minto to Morley - 9 February 1909. Ibid.
CHAPTER V
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The Muslims Secure Separate Representation
1906 - 1910
Minto in reply to the Simla deputation said, "the pith 
of your address, as I understand it, is a claim that, in 
any system of representation, ... in which it is proposed 
to introduce or increase an electoral organisation, the 
Mahommedan Community should be represented as a Community....
T am entirely in accord with you. Please do not misunderstand; 
I make no attempt to indicate by what means the 
representation of communities can be obtained, but I am as 
firmly convinced as I believe you to be, that any electoral 
representation in India would be doomed to mischievous 
failure which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement 
regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities 
composing the population of this continent....
It was an explicit endorsement of the principle of 
representation of communities laid down in the address.
Morley approved of Minto*s commitment and the press, with 
few exceptions, both in India and in England, applauded 
Minto*s statesmanship and thought the Muslim demands just, 
moderate and practicable. Minto's reply was no departure 
from his general policy. It has earlier been explained that
1. Minto*s reply to the Deputation. 1 October 1906.
Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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he firmly believed that the best method to secure Indian 
representation on Indian Councils was through representation 
of interests and communities. Minto accordingly forwarded 
the address and his reply to the Arundel Committee which 
was, at that time, sitting to oonsider the impending changes 
in the Government of India.
The Arundel Committee finished its work early in 1907 
and its recommendations were discussed by the Viceroy^ 
Executive Council and later on incorporated in the Government 
of India1 s despatch of 21 March 1907. The Government of 
India Qjoncurred with the presenters of the address that 
neither on the Provincial nor the Imperial Legislative 
Councils had the Muslim community hitherto received the 
measure of representation to which its numbers and its 
political importance entitled it. It agreed with the 
Viceroy that "any electoral representation in India would 
be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a 
personal enfranchisement regardless of the beliefs and 
traditions of the communities composing the population of 
this continent". It further stated that under the systems 
of election hitherto in force, Hindus had largely 
predominated in all or almost all the electorates, with the 
result that the few Muslim members that had been elected were 
not true representatives of the Muslims. The Government had 
supplemented them by nominations. But the total 
representation thus effected had not been commensurate with
the weight to which the Muslim community was entitled. It 
further recognized the strength of the argument that even the 
system of nomination had frequently failed to secure the 
appointment of the type of Muslims, whom the community 
desired to represent their cause.^
Its suggestions, therefore, were firstly, in addition 
to the small number of Muslims who might be able to secure 
election in the ordinary manner ... a certain number of seats 
be filled exclusively by Muslims. Secondly, for the purpose 
cf filling the latter, or a proportion of them, a special 
Muslim electorate might be constituted. While any 
reaommendation as to the precise number of seats to be 
assigned specially to Muslims in the Provincial Councils 
was deferred pending the fixation of the total strength of 
each of the Councils, for the Viceroy*s Council four seats 
for the Muslims were suggested to be set apart, two of which 
were to be filled by nomination by the Viceroy and the other 
two by election by rotation by Bengal, Eastern Bengal and
2
Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab, Bombay and Madras, 
Morley received the despatch early in April, Sir 
Arthur G-odley informed Minto that Morley had taken ten to 
twelve days1 complete holiday to think about it. He had made 
arrangements that no one should see the despatch or learn
1. G-overnment of India to the Secretary of State. 21 March,
1907. Para. 52. Public Letters from India. 1907, Vol.35,
2* Ibid. Para, 52~55'. ......
3, Morley to Minto - 4 April 1907, Morley Papers. I.O.L.
its contents until he had thought over it. Though Godley 
suspected that some of the Government of India*s suggestions, 
like that for the appointment of a Native Member to the 
Viceroy's Executive Council, went "somewhat beyond what 
Mr. Morley expected of you","** none at the India Office 
foresaw the complications that would arise with regard to 
Muslim representation. The Secretary of State accepted the 
principle of separate representation, but with regard to
the details he stated "that your proposals on this head
2
tifforded a sufficient basis for discussion".
After the Secretary of State's approval the reform 
scheme was circulated amongst the Local Governments for 
their views. With a view to avoids giving any prominence to 
this recognition of Muslim interests the word "Mahomedan" 
was cut out "wherever its omission did not affect the spirit 
of the draft".^ The Local Governments thoroughly considered 
the whole scheme and gathered the opinions of their officials, 
prominent members of the public and public associations,
1. Godley to Minto - 5 April 1907. Minto Collection. N.L.S.
2. Secretary of State's despatch - 17 May 1907. Para,26, In 
the Minto Collection in the National Library of Scotland, 
Edinburgh, there is a scheme for representation of the 
principal communities of India by Sir W.Lee Warner with a 
note by Theodore Morison dated 18 April 1907. Both agreed 
with the Government of India's view. This seems to have 
influenced Morley as well.
3. Circular letter to Local Governments. 24 August 1907.
4. Minto to Morley - 21 August 1907. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
All local Governments approved of the proposals for 
the special representation of the Muslims. No Government 
disputed the principle, though there was difference of 
opinion regarding the method of selecting the Muslim 
representative. This difference was mainly due to local 
conditions. While some of the provinces wanted to form Muslim
electoral Colleges,others preferred to use the recognised
2
Muslim associations. Madras and Bombay preferred simple 
nominations.^ The Government of India in their despatch of 
1 October 1908, however, explained that the Hindus 
adversely criticised the proposals as they regarded them "as 
an attempt to set one religion against the other, and thus 
to create a counterpoise to the influence of the educated 
middle class. Some Hindus, however, recognise the expediency 
of giving special representation to the Muhammedan community, 
and the Bombay Presidency Association, while they object 
strongly to the creation of a special Muhammedan electorate, 
make provision in their scheme of a Council for the election 
of two members by the Muhammedan community.
1. Government of Bengal to Government of India. No ,1746A 
dated 29 Pebruary 1908. Para.19. Government of U.P. to 
Government of India - No,447 of 1908 dated 16 March 1908. 
Para, 16, Government of Punjab to Government of India - 
No.40 dated 6 July 1908, Para.38. Public Letters from 
India, 1908, Vol.37.
2. Government of E.B.&A. to Government of India No,946 C 
dated 14 March 1908. Para.9 Ibid.
3. Government of Bombay to Government of India - No.1768 
dated 26 March 1908. Para.13. Government of Madras to 
Government of India - No.222 dated 13 March 1908. Para.8 
Ibid.
4. Government of India's despatch - 1 October 1908. Para,30. 
Ibid.
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The whole scheme had hitherto heen progressing
smoothly. Though, of course, none amongst the Indians
except a few officials knew much about the details. Many
Hindus had indeed expressed nervousness at the Viceroy’s
acceptance of the principle of separate representation, but
a few enlightened ones amongst them did not much resent it,^ ~
2
Many Muslims had expressed great pleasure. But now Morley
changed his mind under the influence of Lord MacLonnell and
 ..................................
some Hindu pressure, Morley had appointed a Reform
Committee of his Council consisting of Sir David Barr,
chairman, Lord MacDonnell, Sir James La Touche, Sir James
Thomson, Sir Lawrence Jenkins, K.G-. Gupta, Sir Walter
Lawrence and S.H.Bilgrami. It unanimously passed the
following resolution regarding Muslim representation - "The
Committee think that the best plan for securing the
representation of the Mahommedan Community (as of all other
communities) in the various Councils would be by a system of
1, Minto to Morley - 5 November 1907* Gokhale recognized the 
Muslim claims. In an address delivered in Marathi under 
the auspices of the Deccan Sabha on the Hindu Muslim 
question G-okhale stated that he "had all along been in 
favour of special separate electorate for important 
minorities" The Indian World, August 1909* pp,610-613, 
See also Gokhale's letter to Sir H.Risley - 12 January 1909* 
Home Progs.Public 1909* 8150-8151* But the Hindustan 
Review, September 1907 - pp*279-285 - criticised the idea 
of special Muslim representation and said that "every 
honest and intelligent Indian, who earnestly cares for the 
future prosperity of his country, must utter an emphatic 
protest against this new-fangled policy, and not rest 
content till the idea of caste representation is given up", 
p,283*
2, Minto to Morley - 3 October 1907* Minto Collection,N.L.S.
3* Minto to Morley - 9 February 1909, 27/ ivlay l9oy. TBid, The
electoral colleges scheme as formulated by Lord MacDonnell
is in the Minto Collection at Edinburgh,
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eleatoral colleges, and cumulative voting in case of mmmear 
minorities, where “by the representation of each great division 
of the population in accordance with its proportion to the 
whole population would he preserved; such system to be 
supplemented , when necessary, by nomination". A Scheme for 
the formation of electoral colleges was presented by Lord 
Macdonnell and it was supported amongst others by Bilgrami,
p
who opposed it bitterly later on. In his despatch of 27 
November 1908 Morley suggested that "the object 
[representation of important Indian classes like the Muslims] 
in view might be better secured, at any rate in the more 
advanced provinces in India, by a modification of a popular 
electorate, founded upon the principle of electoral 
colleges*
This was a complete departure from the Government of
1* Morley to Minto - 14* 16 October 1908.Minto Collection 
N* L.S.2* Bilgrami had never been able to present Muslim views 
properly to the Secretary of State. It was Morison who 
championed the Muslim cause and helped to safeguard Muslim 
interests - The Minto-Morley correspondence contains ample 
evidence to this effect.- Bilgrami's work at the India 
Council was praised by the Hindustan Review,December 1909, 
Vol.XX, No.124- p.732. " - That during the two years that 
he has served as Councillor, Mr. Bilgrami never betrayed 
his trust as an Indian, and never took advantage of his 
great position to press the claims of his own community, 
at the expense of those of his non-Muslim fellow-subjects" 
Gupta, on the other hand, forcefully presented the Hindu 
point of view in his minutes.
3. Secretary of State to the Government of India. 27 November 
1908, Para.12. Public Despatches. 1908. Vol.29-
India1s proposal for separate electorates, to which the 
Secretary of State had agreed in principle. The new proposal 
threw overboard the Government of India’s scheme for the 
representation of communities and replaced it with joint 
electoral colleges to which would he returned a fixed 
proportion of Muslims and Hindus in the ratio of population, 
and these would later on elect to the Legislature of the 
province representatives for the two communities in like 
proportion. Morley did not think the introduction of this 
system would he a novelty as it already existed in the 
groups of District Boards and of Municipalities which in 
several provinces returned members to Provincial Councils. 
Moreover, he thought, it had certain advantages; it would 
meet the Hindu objections by bringing the classes together; 
it would eliminate any danger of further claims for 
representation by classes; it would create a healthy interest 
in local self-government by linking up local bodies; "it 
would ensure the person chosen being actually drawn from the 
locality that the electoral college represents". He, of 
course, realised that the system was not a simple one and 
that the primary vote would be removed by more than one 
stage from the ultimate choice.^
The scheme was not, however, welcomed either by the 
Government of India or by the Muslims. It produced a great
1. Secretary of State to Government of India - 27 November
1908. Paras. 11-14# Public Despatches 1908, Vol.29.
controversy and the Muslims both in India and in London 
lodged vigorous protests when the despatches of the 
Government of India and the Secretary of State were published 
on 17 December 1908. In India the Muslim press expressed 
concern and tools: it as a political abandonment of the Muslims 
in favour of the Hindus. The Paisa Akhbar, Lahore, stated 
that Morley had tried to please the advocates of Swaraj at 
the expense of minorities and the Muslims had not been 
considered worthy of attention on account, perhaps, of their 
being a peaceful people and keeping themselves aloof from 
the prevailing agitation and crime. It,however, expressed 
complete faith "in the sense of justice of British 
Government" and felt confident that "Lord Minto's vigilant 
Government will not fail to do justice to t h e m . The Watan, 
Lahore, also thought that Morley had been influenced by the 
Hindus, and feared that the Muslims "being in a minority
p
will not fare well at the elections". The Zamindar, 
Karamabad, congratulated the 'Congress wallah* for Morley's 
scheme. In its opinion "while the opposition of Muhammadans 
to the National Congress has had the effect of creating 
estrangement between them and Hindus Lord Morley's reform 
scheme has alienated them from Government also (Government ki 
taraf ka bhi na chhora) and has dispelled all their dreams
1. The Paisa Akhbar, Lahore, 25 December 1908; 3>15,27 
February, 1909. P.N.N.R. 1909.
2. The Watan,Lahore" 8 January 1909. P.N.N.R. 1909.
of English help and protection, of which they 'had heen 
assured by Sir Syed Ahmed, Mr, An$r Ali and other leaders of 
their community, as also by Anglo-Indians and their organs11. 
It suspected that perhaps Morley did not know of the faith 
which the Muslims reposed in the British Government and on 
the strength of which they had offended their Hindu fellow- 
countrymen by not joining their agitation against the
Government,'1' The Observer, Lahore, also bitterly criticised
2
Morley's scheme. M.Shafi, a prominent Punjab leader, also 
wrote a series of letters to Dunlop Smith expressing his 
own views and conveying the Muslim ooncern over Morley*s ■ 
reform Scheme. In his opinion Morley*s scheme had created 
dissatisfaction amongst Muslims and was contrary to the 
promise made by Minto.^
At its Amritsar Session, the Muslim League viewed the 
electoral college scheme with great alarm and announced that 
its implementation would ’’mark the first breakdown of that 
implicit faith which Muslims have for so long placed in theA
care and solicitude of the Government. " Syed Ali Imam,
1. The Zamindar, Karamabad, 8 January 1909- P.N.N.R. 1909-
2. The Observer, Lahore, 23 December 1908, 14 April 1909- 
P.N.TO
3. M.Shafi to Dunlop Smith - 8,10,13,18, 26 January 1909. 
Minto Collection. N.L.S.
4- Ife solution 3 - the All-India Muslim League Session, 
Amritsar 1908. Letter from offg. Hon, Secretary of 
A.I.M.L.to the Viceroy’s Private Secretary. 22 January 
1909- Home Progs,Public 1909. 8151-
the President of the Amritsar Session, denounced the scheme 
as dangerous to the vital interests of the Muslims and 
contrary to the suggestions made "by Minto, who, as the man 
on the spot, knew the situation "better than Morley. He urged 
the Muslims to protest strongly against Morley*s scheme."^
In the following months numerous protest meetings were held 
throughout India and many resolutions and petitions were 
sent to the Government of India; hut the most vigorous 
campaign was carried on in London, where Ameer Ali was very 
ective. The London Branch of the League published various 
pamphlets explaining the Muslim demands and the promise 
given to them by the Viceroy* A number of letters for and 
against the scheme were published in the Times, Lord 
Macdonnell supporting it, Ameer Ali, Bilgrami, A.C*Murray,
o
Liberal M.P., opposing it* The Times supported the Muslim 
view point and agreed with their fears that under this 
scheme the Muslim representation would be illusory* MThe 
type of Muslim who secures Hindu support secures it by 
virtue of his utility to Hindu rather than Muslim interests; 
yet this is the type most likely to be elected under the 
provision of Lord Morley*s scheme*1.
The Congress, which was me sting at Madras when the
1. Speech by S.Ali Imam. 31 December 1908. Public Letters 
from India. Vol.38. 1909.
2. The Times - 26 December 1908, 4,5,January 1909.
3. Ibid. 29 December 1908.
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scheme was announced, expressed its approval of it and 
hoped "that details of the proposed scheme will he worked 
out in the same liberal spirit in which its main provisions 
as outlined in the Secretary of State’s despatch have beeni
conceived," Malaviya suggested that "we should leave
Lord Morleyfs proposals as they stand in this matter and
not ask that any different principle of representation should
2
be introduced". Gokhale, being more realistic, admitted
that there were acute: differences amongst Indians and
stated that for the promotion of "unity in the country", any
scheme of representation which secured to important classes
proper representation should be welcomed. His view was
that in order to alleviate the "unjust fear" of the Muslims
that "they would be swamped by Hindus", they should be
allowed to elect their own representatives themselves.^
Minto was doubtful whether this scheme would work
and he informed Morley that there was a fear "that the
cleverness of the pleader class, may enable them to
manipulate the machinery of the Electoral College so that
whenever representatives of minorities are elected they
will be, whether Mahommedan or otherwise, as a matter of 
0
fact representatives of the pleader political section".
There was also some suspicion that G-okhale by some means
1. Report of the I.N.C. 1908. Resolution II. p.46.
2. TbTa;” t67--------
3. Ibid. p.137.
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possibly through Lord Macdonnell, had suggested the scheme, 
thus making it all the more unpalatable for the Muslims.^ 
Minto was definite that the Muslim objections to the 
scheme were perfectly sound and that any attempt to introduce 
it would increase the Muslim storm that was already raging.
He informed Morley "that though the Mahommedan is silent
2
he is very strong". Minto*s intense dislike of Morley*s 
scheme is apparent £rom what he wrote to Lansdowne, "The 
electoral colleges are absolutely impossible - mad and 
distinctly contrary to pledges I had given to the 
Mahommedans and of which the Government of India approved.
We simply can't have them.
Minto was not the only person who disliked the 
electoral college scheme. Arundel considered this suggestion 
for electoral colleges "the waak point in the whole 
Despatch", as it destroyed the Viceroy’s promise to the 
Muslims; he thought it would be "a thousand pities to 
disgust and alienate the Mahommedan community by deviating
1. Minto to Morley - 24 December 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. (a) Minto to Morley - 31 December 1908; 12 January 1909.
Morley did not like Minto*s admission of the just 
claims of Muslims. "Your language to the Islamites 
about their * just claim to something more than 
numerical strength' was perhaps a trifle less 
guarded than it might have been if you will allow 
me to say so" ... Morley to Minto, 21 January 1909. 
Ibid.
(b) See also Minto to Arthur Elliott - 24 May 1909*
Minto Collection. N.L.S.
3* Minto to Lansdowne - 21 January 1909. Ibid.
a hair’s breadth from the promise given to them in 1906,...
The Prince of Wales thought Morley ’ s reforms "on the whole
sound" hut saw "considerable difficulties" in settling the
2question of Muslim representation. Sir A.H. Fraser
discussed at length the electoral colleges scheme with
Morley. Later on he informed Minto that Morley had shown
"no disposition to stand strongly by the idea of the
Electoral College", Fraser, therefore, suggested to Minto
"that the direct representation of Mahommedans, apart from
p11 interference by Hindus, must be insisted on".^
Morley, too, realised that his suggestion had not been
received in good humour. Of the various objections to it,
two were most prominently put forward by the critios of
Morley's scheme. Firstly that proportional representation
on a purely numerical basis violated the assurance given to
the Simla Deputation in 1906 . Secondly, that in electoral
*
colleges Hindus might run opposition Muslim candidate 
of their own and carry his election. Minto thought both 
objections "perfectly sound".^ When Morley was pressed to
1. Sir A.T.Arundel from Woking to Minto - 8 January 1909* 
Minto Collection. N.L.S. See also Sir A.T.Arundel, "the 
TIew Iteforms in India", National Review, February 1909 - 
pp.1032-1033$ and Sir A.0.Elliott*s "lord Morleyfs Indian 
Reforms", N ineteenth Century, February 1909, p.190.
2. Prince of Wales -fco Minto - 26 January 1909. Minto 
Collection. N.L.S.
3. Sir A.fi.L. Fraser to Minto - 29 January 1909. Ibid.
4. Viceroy to Secretary of State - Telegram 8 January 1909. 
Ibid,
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receive a deputation from the League’s London Branch, he 
sought Minto' s advice."*' Minto saw no objection to his 
meeting the deputation and explaining the Government1 s 
policy. He, however, asked Morley to make it clear that the 
scheme was merely a suggestion* Being convinced of the fact 
that the scheme was unworkable, Minto impressed upon Morley 
that all Local Governments would unanimously oppose it. Sir 
George Clarke, Bombay’s Governor, who was not favourably 
inclined towards Muslims also opposed it, and even Gokhale 
saw no justification in insisting on its introduction in 
the face of Muslim opposition.
On 27 January 1909, Morley received a deputation of 
the London Branch of the League, Ameer Ali led it and 
Bilgrami was one of the members. Morley, in the company of 
T.R.Buchanan, Sir A.Godley and Sir C.Iyall,^ received them. 
Ameer Ali and Bilgrami spoke on behalf of the deputation. 
Their demands were simple. All they wanted was that the
1.' Secretary of State to Viceroy - Telegram 14 January 1909* 
Minto Collection. N.L.S.
2. Minto to Morley - Telegram 15 January 1909* Minto to 
Morley, 14 September 1909 - ’’Clarke is somewhat anti- 
Mahommedan". Ibid.
3. Sir Charles James Iyall (1845-1920). I.C.S. Pirst served 
in N.?/. Provinces (later on U.P. ) then in the Central 
Secretariat and in Assam and Central Provinces. Retired 
in July 1898. On his return joined the India Office as 
Secretary to the Judicial and Public Department and 
remained there till 1910, A well-known Orientalist, 
attended three Oriental Congress^(l899, 1905, 1908). 
Played an important part in the formulation of the 
reform scheme and in the foundation of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies,
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interests of the Hindus and Muslims should he co-ordinated; 
that neither the one nor the other should he in a position 
to say that its interests were either sacrificed or 
subordinated to the interests of the other. The hest way to 
safeguard their interests was the introduction of the 
principle of separate representation - of Muslims hy Muslims.
Morley*s reply was cautiously worded. It is very 
difficult to pick out any sentences which may he looked uponi
as constituting a definite pledge: the reason was that "in
picking up the Mussulman", he did not want "to drop our
2
Hindu parcels". But he did explain that his 1 electoral 
schemer,"was merely a suggestion thrown out for the 
Government of India, not a direction of the Medes and 
Persians stamp;" and he made use of a number of phrases 
which indicated a disposition to accede to their requests.
"It would he no departure in substance from the principle 
of our suggestion that there should he a separate 
Mahommedan electorate - an electorate exclusively
1, In a letter to Minto, Morley wrote, "the honest Moslems 
went away decidedly disappointed. I never expected that 
it would he otherwise. How could I satisfy them hy 
straight declaration off my own hat?" 28 January 1909* 
Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Morley to Minto — 28 January 1909* As early as June 13, 
1908, Dunlop Smith wrote from England to Minto that 
Morley was obsessed with the idea that the promises to 
Muslims "might look as if we wished to set race against 
race". This obsession led Morley to make many changes 
in his scheme. Ibid.
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Mahommedan; and in view of the wide and remote distances 
and difficulties in organisation, in consequence of those 
distances in the area constituting a large province, I am 
not sure that this is not one of those cases where election 
hy two stages would not he in the highest degree oonvenient, 
and there might he a separate electoral college exclusively 
Mahommedan;M and "I repeat, I see no harm, from the point 
of view of a practical working compromise, in the principle 
that population, numerical strength, should he the main 
factor in determining how many representatives should sit 
for this or the other community; hut modifying influences 
may he taken into account in allotting the numbers of such 
representatives.
The Muslims were naturally not satisfied, nor was
the Times, with the expressions used hy Morley in his reply
to the deputation. The Times pleaded that no reforms which
left the Muslims with a just cause of grievances could
ppossibly work for the good of India as a whole.
A number of articles supporting the Muslim views 
were published in English journals, Amongst those who 
favoured the Muslim cause were Sir Charles Bruce,^ A.H.L.
1. Morley*s reply to the deputation. 27 January 1909. 
Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. The Times, 28 January 1909, 9 Pebruary 1909.
3. Sir Charles Bruce, "Crown and Congress in India*', 
Empire Review, Pebruary 1907.
A.E. Duchesne Sir V.Chirol
Moore These writers were almost
all agreed that because Hindus and Muslims differed in their
attitudes to life and religion, the Muslim demand for
separate representation was justified, for without it the
Muslim minority would be swamped by the Hindu majority. The
electoral colleges* scheme would not solve the problem but
aggravate it. Chirol forecast that "the more we delegate our
authority in India to the natives of India on the principles
which we associate with self-government, the more we must
7
necessarily m  practice delegate it to the Hindus,"' but 
Muslims were afraid of this.
Sir Henry Cotton (Liberal), Lord MacDonnell (Liberal), 
Charles O'Donnell (Liberal), K.Hardie (Labour), Ramsay 
MacDonald (Labour), and the Manchester Guardian opposed 
these views and thought that the recognition of separate 
Muslim electorates would offend the Hindus.
1. A.H.L.Eraser, "Lord Morley*s Indian Reforms" - Empire 
Review, March 1909.
2. A.E.Duchesne, "The Indian Muhammadans and the Reforms", 
Ibid, May 1909.
3. J. D . Re e s, Modern India, 1910, pp.184-185.
4. V.Chirol - Indian Unrest, 1910.
5. R.A.LaMoore, Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, 
January, 1911.
6. T.W.Holderness - People and Problems of India, 1911,
pp.127-8.
7. V. Chirol - p. 128
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In the correspondence that followed Minto and Morley 
discussed the scheme thoroughly. Minto explained that the 
scheme had heen disliked hy all the Local Governments and 
the Government of India and that "their [Muslims] reasoning 
as to their own representation cannot in fairness he 
disregarded".’*' Morley pointed out that "this scheme of 
obtaining Muhammedan representation hy means of exclusively
Muhammedan electoral colleges I described to the deputation
. . . . . . . . .   p . . .
as not outside the terms of my Despatch".
The result of all this agitation hy the Muslims and 
controversy in the press^ was that Morley had to make a 
much more definite statement and gave an unequivocal pledge, 
when moving the second reading of the Indian Councils Bill. 
"The Mahommedans demand three things. I had the pleasure of 
receiving a deputation from them and I know very well what 
is in their minds. They demand the election of their own 
representatives to these Councils in all the stages, just as 
in Cyprus, where, I think, the Mahommedans vote hy themselves. 
They have nine votes and the non-Mahommedans have three, or
1. Minto to Morley, 4 February 1909, 4 March 1909, Telegram 
8 February 1909. Minto even suggested dropping the word 
•colleges' to avoid misunderstanding hy a population 
ignorant of electoral terms (9 February 1909;. Morley 
Papers. I.O.L.2f Morley to Minto - Telegram. 2 February 1909. Ibid.
3. Native Newspaper Reports. 1909 Punjab; U.P., "Bengal; 
Eastern Bengal and Assam; Bombay are full of selections 
from the papers which discussed the whole scheme 
exhaustively.
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the other way about. So in Bohemia, where the Germans vote 
alone and have their own register. Therefore we are not 
without a precedent and a parallel for the idea of a 
separate register. Secondly they want a number of seats in 
excess of their numerical strength. Those two demands we 
are quite ready and intend to meet in full".1 The third 
demand was for a Muslim member of the Viceroy's Executive 
Council, if a Hindu was appointed. This Morley rejected 
outright, because this appointment was not supposed to be a 
racial one. It would go to a suitable Indian whoever he 
might be,
The reference to the deputation is important, because 
it meant that when Morley promised "to meet" the Muslim 
demands "in full", he had in his mind the demands which 
the Muslim deputation had made to him* Thus Morley had 
conceded that the Muslims were to have more representatives 
than they were entitled to upon a calculation of their 
numerical strength, and that all those representatives 
were to be returned by separate Muslim electorates "in all 
the stages".
The pledge was reiterated by Buchanan while moving 
the second reading in the House of Commons on 1 April 1909*
1. Hansard. House of Lords. Vol.I. ( 6 February - 26 May 
1909). Col.125. Morley's Speech - 23 February 1909. 
P.Mukherji, Indian Constitutional Documents,
( f 1918).' Vol. I, Calcutta, 1918, PP7SJ5-337. He
however, gives "4th March 1909" as the date of the speech 
on p.333* It is incorrect.
He said, "And more than that, particularly with regard to 
the Mahommedans, they have a special and overwhelming claim 
upon us, namely, the solemn promises, given hy those who 
are entitled with full responsibility to speak for us, that 
they would get adequate representation to the amount and of 
kind they want - a promise given to them by Lord Minto 
specifically in October 1906, repeated in a Despatch by the 
Secretary of State in 1907, and again repeated by the 
Secretary of State to a deputation here and in a speech in 
another place, Prom that promise we oannot go back, ought 
not to go back, and we will not go back".^ The Prime
Minister also emphatically said that Undoubtedly there
2
will be a separate register for Mahommedans11. Privately
tt
Minto, too, emphasised that Mahomedan electorates are 
absolutely necessary - if we retreat at all from that view, 
we shall have an infinitely worse trouble than anything 
that can arise from Hindu opposition".*^
Morley's statement in the House of Lords was received 
with much relief by a number of Muslims, but some Hindus 
denounced it. Surendranath Banerjea, Madan Mohan Malaviya 
and others disapproved of the "innovations" and declaredA
them to be dangerous. Malaviya had earlier expressed his
1. Hansard. House of Commons. Vol.111(29 March - 23 April 
19U9J - Buchanan's Speech - 1 April 1909. Col.500.
2. Ibid. Asquith's Speech - 1 April 1909. Col.533.
3. Minto to Morley - 7 April 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
4. The Indian Mahoimnedans and the Government, issued by the 
London Branch of A.T.M.L. Morley Paper s."“"1.0. L.
2 ? i
strong disapproval of separate representation of the Muslims 
in a telegram to the Government of the United Provinces.^
In Parliament C.J.0'Donnell tabled an amendment, though it 
was not moved, asking the House not to approve of 
"legislation hy which it is intended to establish sectarian 
discrimination, and to apply sectarian tests both to members
2
of Legislative Councils and the voters who will elect them".
But the real controversy started when, after making 
that statement regarding the abandonment of the electoral 
college scheme and the fulfilment of "solemn promises", 
Buchanan unfolded the details of the scheme based on the 
Government of India*s despatch of 1 October 1908. According 
to that the Muslim representation would be obtained in 
different ways in different provinces. "In some by a system 
of Mahommedan electorates specially constructed; in other 
cases by asking Mahommedan associations to name 
representatives; in other cases, at any rate, for a time, 
by nomination." Earl Percy, Lord Ronaldshay and Balfour 
pointed out the inconsistency between the scheme and the 
promises so far given, as according to it the number of 
Muslim representatives would fall far below the number they
1. Telegram 23 January 1909# Prom M.M.Malaviya to the Chief 
Sect. to the Govt, of U.P.
2. The Indian Mahommedans and the Government, issued by the 
London Branch of A.I.M.L. " Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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had been promised.^" On 19 April 1909, Hobhouse, who was 
speaking for Buchanan who had been taken ill, made another 
statement reiterating the promises and hiding behind a 
telegram from Minto which further confused the issue. It 
said, "the method proposed is simply that in general 
electorates such as municipalities, district boards and 
members of provincial Councils, all sects and classes, 
including Mahommedan, will vote together. By this means 
some, but not sufficient, representation will be obtained 
for Mahommedans. In addition a certain number of seats will 
be reserved for Mahommedans, and none but Mahommedans will
have a voice in filling these". These seats would be filled
2differently in different provinces. Minto himself admitted 
in another telegram that "the telegram puts the cart before
1. No definite number of Muslim representatives had been 
promised but they were assured that they would be given 
adequate representation in the new Councils to enable them 
to safeguard their interests. When the details were 
announced the number of Muslims proposed for various 
Councils was far below their percentage to the population. 
Por example, for the Viceroy*s Council 28 elected members 
were proposed, of whom 6 would be Muslims, their 
percentage being 21.4, while their percentage to total 
population was 23. This was thought to be a betrayal
of promises. The Government of India was of the view 
that the Muslims would win some seats in the general 
electorate as well. But the Muslim leaders were not 
thinking in terms of the general electorate. The India 
Office did not probe into the details of the Government 
of India’s scheme, and so were unable to satisfy the 
opposition. The discussion in parliament further aroused 
Muslim fears.
2. Minto to Morley - Telegram - 12 April 1909. Morley Papers. 
I.O.L.
the horse and is badly worded, in as much as it would lead
any one not acquainted with the whole history to assume
that Mahommedans must depend upon the general electorates
in the first place, and that their own electorates would
only give them a sort of second chance," The Government
of India's recommendations were, on the other hand, as
Minto put it, "separate Mahommedan electorates in the first
place, which were to secure for them their proper
proportion of representation, and beyond that again was their
chance of winning seats in the general electorates, and
1
also nomination". Por some obscure reason this second 
telegram was not read before the House,
Realising the Government's predicament the opposition 
in the House made capital out of it. Hobhouse was pressed 
hard and he had to admit that there was some divergence 
between the pledges given by the Viceroy and the Secretary 
of State and the views expressed in the telegram of 12 April 
1909 from the Government of India. But in order to avoid 
further ejm^irrassment he added that "that does not mean 
that the telegram necessarily closes discussion" and 
emphatically said, "Before I sit down I would add one 
sentence, and it is that where ever elections are found 
possible they shall be conducted on the bases of separate
1. Minto to Morley - Telegram - 20 May 1909* Minto 
Collection. N.L.S.
representation of the Mahommedan community M. ^
In their nervousness the Government blundered again
when they presented to the House another telegram from Minto
in which he stated, "I do not understand any Muhammadan
here to claim concession suggested hy Hobhouse, namely, that
where ever elections are found possible they should be
conducted on basis of separate representation of the
Muhammadan community. If interpreted literally that would
involve having separate Muhammadan electorates within the
various electorates proposed, such as presidency corporations,
district boards and municipalities, universities, landholders,
and the commercial community. This is manifestly
2
impracticable and has never been suggested”, Minto sent 
this telegram in reply to a charge by Morley that the 
Muslims had all along been considering the Government of 
India!s proposals as worse than the electoral college scheme.^ 
The publication of these conflicting and contradictory 
telegrams and statements re-kindled the Muslim agitation.
Ameer Ali in London, particularly, became very uneasy and the 
London Branch of the League produced many pamphlets in whioh 
they clamoured for fulfilment of promises. The confusion 
arose simply because neither the Muslims nor the India
1. Hansard, House of Commons, Vol.IV, (26 April-14 May 1909) 
'S6”April 1909. Col.5.
2. Minto to Morley - telegram. 2 May 1909* Morley Papers.
I. 0• L•
3. Minto to Morley - 27 April 1909. Ibid.
2-75.
Office had really understood the Government of India’s 
scheme. To agree to a principle may have heen easy, hut to 
work it out in detail the Government of India had to take 
into consideration many other administrative difficulties. 
The Viceroy had promised separate representation and 
weightage to the Muslims, hut had not committed himself as 
to the form it would take. The Government of India’s scheme, 
while giving the Muslims separate representation, did not 
dehar them from taking part in the general electorate. 
However, the Muslims never seem to have cared much ahout 
that. But Morley’s scheme of electoral colleges aroused 
the Muslim fears anew, Morley, who had earlier agreed to 
separate Muslim representation, seems to have felt that too 
much had heen promised to them5 that if that promise had 
to he fulfilled it would annoy the Hindus and would appear 
aa setting race against race. When the Muslims started their 
agitation and Minto kept firmly to his promise, Morley, too,
reverted to the old position and even went a little further
Now this was contrary to the Government of India1 s proposals, 
hy promising separate electorates Min all stages"•/ Some
Muslim leaders, particularly of the London Branch of the
League, thought that the Government of India’s scheme did
not give the Muslims the right of exclusive Muslim
representation and was not aompatihle with Morley’s
promises. In the beginning the India Office did not attach
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much importance to the whole problem and never tried to 
understand it.^ Morley, though he liked Gokhale, did not
2
have a good opinion either of Ameer Ali or of the Aga Khan* 
The India Office did not much heed the Muslim protests and 
thought that "like most people they were asking for more". 
The opposition was, on the other hand, properly coached by 
the London Branch of the League and made the Government 
"look rather foolish"^ when the inconsistency in their 
pledges and in the scheme for their actual implementation 
was pointed out* The mere mention of the words "pledges" 
and "promises" later annoyed both Morley and Minto. ^  Morley 
put the blame on Minto for starting fThe Muslim hare*. But 
the position was that promises had been given and pledges 
had been made. Ronaldshay impressed upon the Government that
1. Sir Charles Iyall was the India Office expert, who dealt 
with the question of separate representation. He was 
responsible for all the confusion as he could not advise 
Morley properly. Hirtzel, Private Secretary to Morley, 
wrote to Dunlop Smith. "The real fact is that the man here 
whose business it was to keep us straight failed to do
so .... " That is why Morley asked Morison to look into 
the problem, Hirtzel to Dunlop Smith, 30 April 1909#
Minto Collection. N.L.S.
2. Morley called Ameer Ali a "windbag" and a "conceited
egotist". Morley to Minto. 21 May 1909- See MorleyMvUfc 
18 February 1909# "He [The Aga Khan] does not really 
attract me". Morley Papers. I.O.L.
3. (a) Hirtzel to Dunlop Smith. 30 April 1909# Minto
Collection. N.L.S.
(b) Morley to Minto. 28 April 1909# Ibid.
4# (a) Morley to Minto, 6 August 1909# Ibid.
(b) Minto to Morley, 9 September 1905# Ibid.
5# Morley to Minto. 6 December 1909# Ibid.
unless they were able to clear up the mess created by the
telegram two beliefs of very serious import would arise in
India - first, that the only way. to obtain the ear of, or
satisfaction from, the Government was to adopt the method of
agitation; secondly, that the word of the British Government
was no longer its bond which was incapable of violation.'*’
Many Hindus viewed the whole agitation as an Anglo-
Indian move which had its support in the Times, the Times
of India, and the Statesman with men like Lovat Fraser at
their back. It was suggested that these Anglo-Indians made
use of the Muslims "because they found the Mussulman name
eminently fit to do duty for (a) a good stick to beat the
Hindus with, (b) a good factor to work the principle of
divide et impera, and (c) a sound rock upon which to
2
wreck the good ship of Lord Morley". Even K, G.Gupta, 
commenting on Morison’s note on the f pledges1,^  stated 
that "to take advanatge of the loose language that may have 
been used in and out of Parliament in order to magnify the 
Muhammedan claim may be the work of partisanship, but true 
statesmanship requires that no undue favour is shown to one 
ajommunity at the expense of another.
Hansard. House of Commons, Vol.VIII (19 July to 6 August 
1909). Ronaldshay - Speech - 5 August 1909. Col,2068.
2. The Indian World, Vol.IX. No.47 and 48. February and 
'March' T90'9’.-----
3. "Note upon the Pledges given to the Mahommedans", by 
T.Morison. Ibid.
4. Note by K. Gf. Gupta. 10 August 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
Morley was on the horns of a dilemma. On the one side 
was the Muslim agitation and on the other the fear of 
dropping "our Hindu parcels". What could be done? He again 
sought Minto1 s help to pacify the Muslims in India*" and 
asked Morison to look into the whole problem at the India 
Office.
Morison in his note pointed out that the scheme under 
consideration would not give the Muslims the type of 
representation that had been ^ rgjomised to them. Confusion had. 
arisen over the details of the scheme that had caused grave 
misunderstanding. Now that the Muslims had been aroused 
nothing would satisfy them except complete fulfilment of
p
the promises given them. This produced a severely critical 
note by K.G. Gupta who believed that "the proposals of the 
Government of India not only amply redeem whatever pledges 
may have been given, but in so far as they keep the mixed 
electorates open to Mahomme dans, they give an additional 
advantage to that community which the other peoples have 
a right to resent",^ These notes instead of easing worsened 
Morleyfs nervousness.^
1. Morley to Minto - 28 April 1909* "The thing is no doubt 
horribly difficult to manage. I am sure of that ... I 
can only ask you to make what you can of the Sphinx fs 
riddle", Morley to Minto - 20 July 1909. Ibid,
2. "Note upon the Pledges given to the Mahommedans". by 
Morison. Morley Papers, I,0.L.
3. "Mahomme dan Rep re sentat ion" - No. *e by Mr, Gupta.
3 August 1909. Ibid.
4. Sir H.Adamson to Dunlop Smith - 24 September 1909*
Minto Collection. N.L.S.
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Minto all along remained sure of the stand he had
earlier taken in this controversy despite Morley*s wavering,
JL
Muslim protests for ai^Hindu expressions against separate 
representation. He was convinced that the Muslim claims were 
just, hut that they had misunderstood the details of thei
scheme and the policy of the Government, that they appeared
2
to have "got hold of the wrong end of the stick;" that the 
whole agitation was the work of Ameer Ali, a frustrated man 
for not heing knighted  ^and that Lord Macdonnel’s scheme had 
much to do in giving it a start.^ In the beginning he did
*5
not think much of this agitation, but with its growth grew 
Morley's nervousness which resulted in enormous 
correspondence between the two. Minto knew that the best way 
of escape from this dilemma was to parley with the Muslims, 
but there was the risk of "Hindu dissatisfaction" with him 
for doing so. He was, however, obliged to call some 
prominent Muslim leaders to Simla and discuss with them the 
details of the proposed scheme. In May 1909j letters were
1. Minto to Godley - 29 April 1909* Minto Collection. N.L.S.
2. Minto to Morley - 29 April 1909* Morley Papers. I.O.L.
3* Minto to Morley - 28 June 1909* 1.0. See also Minto to
Lawley, Governor of Madras, 28 June 1909* Minto was, 
however, wrong in this observation, because the Muslims 
were genuinely worried as to their future as is apparent 
from the enormous number of public meetings held 
throughout India. Ibid.
Minto to Morley - 28 June 1909. Ibid.
5* Minto to Morley - 29 April 1909."THbld*
6. Minto to Morley - 23 June 1909* Ibid.
sent to all Local Governments asking them to suggest the 
names of prominent Muslim leaders and out of the suggested 
names seven were called, the Nawab of Dacca, Ali Imam, the 
Raja of Mahmudabad, Abdul Majid, a barrister of Allahabad, 
M.Shafi of Lahore, Ibrahim Rahimtoola of Bombay, and Abdul 
Aziz. The selection of the names is also significant as only 
those who were expected to be moderate in their views were 
called for this meeting. Minto and Sir H.Adamson, a Member 
of the Viceroy's Council and of the Committee for Rules and 
Regulations, deoided to be firm with the Muslims and "not 
to go beyond the increase in Mahpmmedan representatives the 
Committee now thinks possible," as it was impossible to give 
the Muslims "an entirely separate communal representation, 
During their stay at Simla they called on Kitchener, 
who pleaded their case in the Viceroy's Council without
2
much success. Minto thought he knew nothing of the problem. 
The Congress owned or inspired press strongly 
resented these consultations with the Muslims. The Tribune 
of Lahore, amongst numerous others considered this whole 
movement "a childish scramble for Council seats irrespective 
of the justice or righteousness of the demand, and regardless 
of the rights of other and far more important classes of 
His Majesty's subjects",*^
1.Minto to Adamson 20 June 1909 and Adamson to Minto - 
19 June 1909. Minto Collection. N.L.S.
2. Minto to Morley - 22 July 1909. Ibid.
3. The Tribune, 2 July 1909. P.N.N.R. p.612. 1909.
The discussion centred round three proposals - first
the electoral college scheme; secondly separate electorates
conferring exclusive representation, the Muslims not voting
in any mixed electorates; and thirdly separate electorates,
supplemented to the full extent of their legitimate claims
by further representation either through mixed electorates,
or by nomination where they failed to obtain a fair share
of the elective seats, The first one had been dropped, for
the second a majority of Muslims were insisting, but the
third was the proposal of the Government of India,
Minto was able to convince these handpicked Muslim
leaders that their insistence on exclusive Muslim
representation would mean their aomplete separation from
political life. This perpetuation of rigid exclusiveness
would be detrimental to their interests. He was of the
opinion that "whilst they [the Muslims] certainly must have
a certain number of seats guaranteed as a community, it.
would be suicidal for their political future to be rated on
a lower standard than Hindus and to be completely debarred
from competing with them".'3' These Muslim leaders went away
agreed that the principle of entire Muslim separation would
not be pressed for, if they were given six fixed seats on
2
the Imperial Council instead of five. But when Ali Imam
1. Minto to Kitchener - 28 June 1909. Minto Collection 
N.L.S.
2. Minto to Morley - 1 July 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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called a special meeting of the league at Lucknow to
endorse the decisions reached at Simla, he failed because
the elder leaders like Viqar^ul-Mulk did not think the
suggested solution a right one.**" Minto, however, stuck to
his decision that it was in Muslim interests not to be
divided into a "watertight compartment", "no matter what
2
Ameer Ali says".
The Government of India's despatch of 22 July 1909 
discussed the whole problem and practically guaranteed 
eight seats to the Muslims, i.e. six fixed seats and two by 
nomination, if they failed to gain that number in general 
electorates. The despatch, however, purposely avoided the 
appearance of such a guarantee with a view to disarming 
Hindu accusations of favouritism to Muslims.
In the meanwhile Ali Imam went to London to persuade 
Ameer Ali and the Aga Khan to come round to his views.
Morison was entrusted to brief him before seeing Ameer Ali.^
5 6The Aga Khan was won round ^  but Ameer Ali remained adamant.
1. (a) Off. Hon. Secretary of the A.I.M.L.'s letter to
Dunlop Smith. 15 July 1909* Minto .Collection. N.L.S.
(b) Ali Imam's letter to Dunlop Smith,14 July 1909. Ibid.
2. Minto to Morley - 15 July 1909. Ibid.
3. Minto to Morley - Telegram. 24- July 1909. Morley Papers.
I. 0* L.
4. Morley to Minto - 26 August 1909. Ibid.
5. (Adamson to Dunlop Smith - 28 October 1909. Minto
Collection N.L.S.
(Morley to Minto - 29 October 1909. Ibid.
6 . (Adamson to Dunlop Smith - 24 September 1909. Ibid.
(Morley to Minto - 17 September 1909. Ibid.
?-a
Since Sir V.Chirol, of the Times, was advocating the Muslim 
cause, Morley thought it necessary to bring him round as 
well. He was invited to luncheon, along with Adamson, and 
Morley hoped that "the fj^ kfendly meal will do good, and at 
all events keep the Times from being over-ferocious, when 
the Regulations come out for discussions in the open.
Along with these manoeuvres Minto also suggested
2
that it was time for the government to put its foot down 
and stop listening to the Muslim demands, as there was the 
fear of the growth of Hindu hostility which the Government 
could not risk any longer. The result of all this activity 
was that Sir Richmond Ritchie (the new Permanent under 
Secretary of State for India) gleefully wrote to Minto, "An 
outbreak of 'Ghazi' Csic] on the part of the Mahommedan 
sympathizers on the staff of the Times and in Parliament, 
which at one time seemed imminent, has been averted."*^ A
The Rules and Regulations were published in November, 
and were well received by the Muslims. The Aga Khan claimed 
that they were accepted not because they contained "all that 
we could have desired, or that they constitute an ideal 
solution of the problem", but because "of our readiness to
1. Morley to Minto - 7 October 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - Telegram. 24 July 1909. Ibid.
3. Ritchie to Minto - 12 November 1909. Minto Collection. 
N.L.S.
4. East India (Executive and Legislative Councils)
Regulations etc., for giving effect to the Indian CouncilsTofv T ^w .'T r^y.’ v&. m r.  --------------------------------
■C
O
co-operate with our rulers and to help them in their
difficult task of introducing the principle of constitutional
government in so diversified a country as India, and also as
exhibiting our cordial goodwill towards other communities".^
The Times, which had fought the Muslim battle, welcomed
2
them as well. There is no denying the fact that these Rules 
and Regulations fulfilled to a great extent Minto*s promise 
to the Simla Deputation. Morley wrote to Minto, "I am very 
sure of one thing, and this is that, if we had not satisfied 
the Muhammedans, we should have had opinion here which is
now with us - dead against us," and that "nothing has been
sacrificed for their sake that is of real importance".*^
But the Congress did not like this grant of separate 
representation to the Muslims. In 1909, it recorded "its 
strong sense of disapproval of the creation of separate 
electorates on the basis of religion ...." It objected to 
"the excessive and unfairly preponderant share of 
representation given to the followers of one particular 
religion; the unjust, invidious, and humiliating distinctions
1. The Aga Khan, Letter to the Times, 18 November 1909.
2. The Times - 16 November 1909.
3. Morley to Minto - 18 November 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L. 
In the new edition of the Cambridge History of ""India,
Vol.VI, (Delhi, 1958), p.6l8  ^ it is stated that Minto 
was "the real father of communal electorates". V.Chirol, 
India Old and New. London, 1921 - states that "Morley 
yielded to a pressure".
made between Moslem and non-Moslem subjects of His Majesty 
in the matter of the electorates, the franchise and the 
qualifications of candidate , . ♦ * Speaker after speaker 
condemned the provision of separate representation for 
Muslims, The number of Muslim delegates in this session was 
5 out of 243.
Thus ended the controversy which occupied and agitated
the minds of the officials and Muslims for more than a year.
The reasons for this controversy were three. There was,
first, Morley’s electoral college scheme. Morley in one of
2his letters blamed Minto for starting "the Muslim hare", 
but it was Morley who was responsible for turning the 
Muslims from a loyal, slow moving, politically immature 
Q.ommunity into an agitating one, G,N.Singh is surprised 
1 that a sapling of hardly two years should have succeeded 
in browbeating one of the most powerful and experienced 
among the modern Secretaries of S t a t e , S u r p r i s i n g  though 
it does seem, yet it happened perhaps because Morley refused 
to listen to Minto*s warning that "though the Mahommedan 
is silent he is very strong".^ Secondly, there was the 
confusion created at the India Office by the experts who did 
not understand the Government of India’s scheme. Conflicting
1. Report of the I.N.C., 1909. Resolution IV• p.47.
2. Morley to Minto - 6 December 1909. Ibid. I.O.L.
3. G.N.Singh - Landmarks in Indian Constitutional and 
National Development, 1660-1919 - Delhi. 1930. p.211,
4. Minto to Morley - 31 December 1908, Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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and contradictory statements and schemes infuriated the 
Muslims who were beginning to think that for the satisfaction 
of their claims the promises and pledges given by the 
Viceroy and the Secretary of State were not enough. Thirdly, 
the Muslim leadership, being extremely immature, was unable 
to grasp the significance of what it was demanding. These 
Muslim leaders interpreted ’separate representation* 
differently. The London Branch of the League led by Ameer 
Ali wanted exclusive Muslim representation, to which Morley 
had committed himself, A large number of Muslim leaders in 
India supported this view. Minto and some moderate leaders 
like Ali Imam were of the opinion that while the Muslims 
should be given special representation as a community, they 
must not be deprived of the right to vote in general 
electorates in competition with the Hindus. While a number 
of moderate Hindu leaders were willing to accept the Muslim 
claim for larger and better representation, they did not 
like the principle which, they thought, would create more 
problems.^ Nevertheless Minto's view prevailed over all 
others ultimately.
1. See Proceedings of the I.N.C., 1909-1910.
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CHAPTER VI
Enactment and Enforcement of the Indian Councils Act of 1909
On 17 December 1908 Morley announced the reform scheme 
in the House of Lords with the remark that "If I were 
attempting to set up a Parliamentary system in India, or if 
it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or 
necessarily up to the establishment of a Parliamentary system 
in India, I for one, would have nothing at all to do with it." 
As he was speaking in the Conservative House of Lords, he 
naturally emphasised that the reform scheme was a "well- 
guarded expansion of principles that were recognised in 
1861" and stated that he had no wish "to set up some sort of 
Parliamentary system in India, it is no ambition of mine, at 
all events, to have any share in beginning that operation.
If my existence, either officially or corporeally, were 
prolonged twenty times longer than either of them is likely 
to be a Parliamentary system in India is not the goal to 
which I, for one moment, would aspire".^ On the other hand 
Buchanan in explaining the reform proposals in the House of 
Commons stated, "the proposals are a real step forward, and 
go a long way to meet in Lord Minto’s words ’the political 
aspirations of honest reformers’. They are intended to
!• Hansard. House of Lords. S. Vol.198; (7 December - 
21 December 1908). Morleyfs Speech, 17 December 1908.
Col,991-1001.
associate a much larger body of Indians in the work of
government to throw greater responsibility upon them, both
in the higher and in the lower ranges of government, to
maintain British supremacy clear and unchallenged at the top,
but to endeavour to secure that under our guiding, directing,
and restraining hand, the Indians shall learn the work of
administration and government in the only school worth
anything, the school of experience,11^
The Congress’s first reaction to Morleyfs
announcement of reforms was one of overwhelming satisfaction,
2
The moderates were generally jubilant. The Congress leaders 
were in close touch with the government officials 
particularly Dunlop Smith, Through him Minto was kept 
informed of the views of the Congress leaders. Dr, Rash 
Behari Ghose went to consult Dunlop Smith about his opening 
speech at the Madras Congress of 1908 and told him that 
possibly reforms might even win over the extremists. Rash 
Behari Ghose in that speech welcomed the reforms while 
remarking that some people thought that a fair share in the 
government of the country for the people of India was 
impossible. This was a taunt at the extremist view that the
1. Hansard. House of Commons. 4 .S. Vol.198; (7 December - 
21 December 1908) Col. 2160.
2, Minto to Morley - 29 October 1908, Earlier in a talk with 
Erie Richards Rash Behari Ghose had asked him earnestly 
"not to go in too much for election as*my people are quite 
unfit for that". This coming from "the great Congress 
leader I" amused Minto very much. Minto to Morley -
14 July 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
moderate constitutional methods would achieve nothing. He 
hoped that relations between India and Great Britain would 
improve because Morley*s declaration had opened "a chapter 
of constitutional reform which promise to unite the two 
countries together in closer bonds than ever", India was "on 
the threshold of a new era", he declared. He boasted that 
this "grant of representative government" was a step "for 
which the Congress had been crying for years," and hoped 
that the extension to India of a Colonial type of government 
would not be far away. In the opinion of Bewan Bahadur 
K. Krishnaswazni Rao, the chairman of the Reception Committee, 
the reforms were a substantial step towards Swaraj. 
Surendranath Banerjea considered them "the crowning triumph 
of constitutional agitation," and he urged the audience to 
rise to their feet to express their "deep gratitude to the 
Government of India for what it proposes to do."^“
The Congress passed the following resolution, "This 
Congress desires to give expression to the deep and general 
satisfaction with which the Reform proposals formulated in 
Lord Morley*s despatch have been received throughout the 
country; it places on record its sense of the high 
statesmanship which has dictated the action of the Government 
in the matter and it tenders to Lord Morley and Lord Minto 
its most sincere and grateful thanks for their proposals/*
The proposals contained in the Reform scheme "constitute a
1. Report of the I.N.C. 1908. p.48.
large and liberal instalment of the reforms needed to give 
the people of this country a substantial share in the 
management of their affairs and to bring the administration 
into closer touch with their wants and feelings." The 
Congress also hoped "that details of the proposed scheme will 
be worked out in the same liberal spirit in which its main 
provisions as outlined in the Secretary of State’s despatch 
have been conceived.""*" Surendranath Banerjea proposed the 
resolution and Malaviya seconded it. It was supported by 
many delegates, including M.A. Jinnah from Bombay, who spoke 
very briefly and hoped that more Muslims would join the 
Hindus in this struggle. While neither the President nor any 
other delegate thought it wise to touch the delicate topic 
of the representation of various interests, Malaviya did 
mention this "important question". He thought that the 
interests of Hindus, Muslims, landholders and merchants did 
not conflict with each other and were alike and he saw no 
need of "having such class representation as has been given 
a prominent place in the reform scheme". When "a voice" 
reminded him that "there are certain questions," he said 
"there are questions; it is perfectly right, but these 
questions do not come before the Legislative Council either 
of the Viceroy or of the Local Governments". The President 
did not want him to go on in order to avoid controversy at
Repopi of ike 1908. Resolution II. p.46.
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that time, so under the pretext of shortage of time, he was
asked to terminate his speech. Being aware of the delicate
nature of Morley's proposal for electoral colleges, Malaviya
suggested that "we should leave Lord Morley’s proposals as
they stand in this matter and not ask that any different
principle of representation should he introduced".^
Gokhale was more realistic. He admitted that there
were acute differences amongst Indians and for the promotion
of "Unity in the Country", any scheme of representation
should be welcomed. In his view the aim of both Hindus and
Muslims was the same, but the methods of approach were
different. He moved a resolution of thanks to Hume,
Wedderburn and the British Committee of the Congress, for
2
the work they had done during the past years. Gokhale had 
an interview-with Dunlop Smith and Minto informed Morley 
that "the pith of it was that he had prevented the discussion 
of the boycott, deportation, and partition at the Madras 
Congress, and that he is now about to start on a tour with 
the object of preaching co-operation with the Government in 
the furtherance of our reforms ,...
The same enthusiasm was shown by other important 
members of the Congress. Dr. G.B.Clarke, a former M.P. and a 
supporter of the resolution on the Reform Scheme, remarked
1. Report of the I.N.C. 1908. Resolution II. p.56.
2. Ibid. p.ITTT
3. Minto to Morley - 7 January 1909. Morley Parers. I.O.L.
that "one could not fail to be struck with the warm 
appreciation accorded to the Secretary of State and to the 
Viceroy,"1 Morley appreciated this feeling of the Congress. 
"The Congress has done all that we had a right to expect, and 
will do a good deal to justify our policy, both in
2
persevering with Reforms and in making them liberal. " In a 
letter to Godley, Minto also wrote, "Dr. Ghose, Gokhale and 
other leaders will, I know, do all they can now to support 
the Government, whether Cotton & Co, will have the sense to 
follow their lead of course I don't know.
The reforms were generally welcomed. The Englishman, 
an Anglo-Indian paper, who was very doubtful in the 
beginning about the reform policy, published a favourable 
editorial regarding the proposed appointment of "the Legal 
Member" on 24 December 1908. Minto was pleased with the 
reception of the reforms. He received a deputation of about 
100 prominent Hindus and Muslims, representing various shades 
of thought, which presented him with a congratulatory 
address on the Reforms, He wrote to Morley, "After all I 
have not been too sanguine as to the reception our reforms 
would meet with. The welcome they have received is far 
better than anything we were at all entitled to expect.
1. G, B.Clarke - "Impressions of the Madras Congress", The 
Indian Review, January 1909* pp.20-21.
2. Morley to Minto - 31 December 1908. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
3. Minto to Godley - 7 January 1909* Minto Collection. N.L.S.
4. Minto to Morley - 24 December 1908, Ibid.
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Morley was very satisfied with the reception of the Reforms, 
He wrote to Minto, "I never have had, and I never shall have, 
a more splendid Xmas box than when I opened the Times on 
Christmas morning, and read about the famous deputation toi
you about Reforms, " Morley proudly stated in the House of
Lords that the Reforms had received a wonderful welcome in
2
India,
The reforms were well received in England as well.
In Morley's words, "Here the chorus of approval has been 
very satisfactory indeed. The pig-headed section of the 
Ultra-Radicals pretend to think that our chances were ruined 
by deportation; that the Congress counts for little because 
it excluded the Extremists; that Chandra Pal is the live man, 
not Gokhale; that without the release of Tilak, etc., and the 
undoing of Partition, all the Reforms are no good. But the 
croaks of these few sour-blooded critics count for nothing".
Only the Muslim League did not approve of the Reform 
Scheme, It was not satisfied with Morley's scheme of 
electoral colleges and started a vigorous campaign against 
it. ^
Morley presented the Indian Councils Bill in the House 
of Lords on 17 February 1909. He moved for the second reading 
of the Bill on 23 February 1909. It was sent to Committee
1. Morley to Minto - 31 December 1908. Minto Collection.N.L.S
2. Hansard. House of Lords. Vol.I (16 February - 26 May 1909) 
23 February 1909. Col,117-118.
3. Morley to Minto - 31 December 1908. Minto Collection.N.L.S
4. See Chapter y
on 24 February and the debate continued on 4 and 9 March, It 
was read for the third time on 11 March and passed as 
amended on the same day."1’ Explaining the necessity of 
introducing the Bill, Morley stated that there were two 
schools of thought regarding the government in India. One 
school represented by Curzon believed that better government 
depended on efficiency of administration. The other, with 
which he associated himself and Minto, not ignoring the cause 
of efficiency, "looks also to what is called political 
concessions". In his view, without political concessions, 
"true, solid endurable efficiency" could not be ensured. He 
admitted that he was aware of the risks dependent on a policy 
of political concessions. But once occidental education had
2
been introduced in India, occidental machinery must follow.
His claim was that the Bill did not make any violent 
departure. It was a modest attempt to extend the principles 
embedded in the Indian Councils Act of 1892, Morley 
evidently did not want to arouse suspicions in a Conservative 
House, "to whom of course the very word "reform" is of evil 
savour, " fy declaring that this Bill was a revolutionary 
step.
The debate in the House of Lords was quite lively. 
Godley was surprised at the number of peers able, "both
1. Hansard. House of Lords. Vol.I. (16 February - 26 May 1909) 
fcols. 70j 117-216; 255-304; 409-428.
2. Ibid. Col.122-123.
3. Morley to Minto - 25 February 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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by understanding and "by personal knowledge and experience, to 
make speeches about Indian administration".^ While MacDonnell, 
Ampthill, Midleton, Reay and Cromer agreed with Morley that 
Western education had inspired Indians "with the idea of
1. Godley to Minto - 26 February 1909. Minto Collection.N.L.S. 
The following took part in the debate
Lord. Ampthill (1869-1935), Conservative, Governor of 
Madras 1900-1906; acted as G.G. of India in 1904 during 
Curzon*s absence.
Courtney of Penwith (1832-1918), Liberal, journalist, 
statesman, leader writer of the Times 1865, contributed 
to the Fortnightly Review; a friend of Morley; a great 
opponent' of spirix of imperialism.
Lord Crewe (1858-1945), Liberal, Lord Privy Seal, 
1908-1911 and 1912-15. S. of S. for India, 1910-1915. 
Earl Cromer (1841-1917), no pronounced party leanings, 
Financial member of Ripon*s Council, April 1880-1883. 
Mostly served in Egypt.
Viscount Cross (1823-1914), Conservative, S. of S. for 
India, 1886-1892.
Lord Curzon (1859-1925), Conservative, Under S. of S. 
for India - piloting Indian Councils Bill 1892. G.G. 
of India, 1898-1905.
Lord Harris (1851-1932), Conservative, Cricketer,
Under S. of S. for India, June 1885- February 1886. 
Governor of Bombay, 1890-1895.
Lord Lansdowne (1845-1927)
Lord MacDonnell (1844-1925), Conservative, I.C.S. 
served in Bengal and Bihar, Chief Commissioner of 
Burma; Central Provinces, Lt. Governor of Bengal for 
some time; Member Viceroy *s Council; Lt. Governor of 
N.W.Provinces and Oudh; member S. of S. 's Council. 
.Viscount Midleton (1856-1942) Conservative, S, of S. 
for India.
Lord Northcote (l846-191l)Conservative, G. of Bombay, 
1900-1903. G.G. of Australia 1903-1908.
Lord Reay (1839-1921) Liberal, G. of Bombay, 1885-1890. 
Lord Ripon (1827-1909), Liberal. Under S. of S. for 
India, 1861; S. of S. for India, 18665 G.G. of India, 
1880-1884. Died on 9 July 1909.
Lord Sandhurst (1855-1921), Conservative. G. of Bombay 
1895-99.
Lord Wenlock. (1856-1918) Conservative. Served in the 
army, mostly in Africa.
Lord Wolverhampton (1830-1911)
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political activity" and the political demands were "the 
natural and inevitable result," But most of the speakers 
did not think that the Bill was an extension of the Act of 
1892.^ Lansdowne stated that it was "not merely a step 
forward, it is a plunge forward, and a plunge which will 
lead us we cannot tell w h e r e M i c l l e t o n  thought that the 
Bill introduced "some of the very worst features of our own
Parliamentary practice" despite Morley's denial of any
■ ■ 3
intention of introducing parliamentary government in India.
In Curzonfs opinion there was "a great difference" between
the Act of 1892 and the new Bill, which created "almost
representative government". It introduced some of "the
features inseparably attached to a parliamentary system"
which system would "inevitably be the consequence" of the
new measure. He strongly objected to the enlargement of the
Legislative Councils, which in his opinion was a
"revolutionary change".^ Thus in the words of Godley, the
Conservative Lords criticised the bill "as a rash and
revolutionary measure". The impression that these speeches
created in the India Office is worth noting. Godley wrote
to Minto that Curzon1s speech was "full of knowledge, and
very able, though not lively reading; Broderickfs excellent
1. Hansard. House of Lords, Vol.I. (16 February-26 May 1909). 
Cols. 149, 157, 170, 178, 185.
2. Ibid. Col.417.
3. TET3. Col,175.
4. T5T3. Col.135.
5. Godley to Minto - 26 February 1909. Minto Collection.N.L.S.
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- so everyone says, including Lord Morley", In his opinion 
Curzon did "show himself off" and narrated his own Indian 
achievements and experiences, hut the Government was able 
to carry the day. Wolverhampton, though very old and knowing 
nothing, made a "useless" speech. Crewe stood up many times, 
said "a few graceful words", made "a good point" against 
the opposition but did not understand the Bill, nor 
pretended to do so. According to Godley there were 20 other 
Liberal peers who knew nothing and cared little about the 
matter. The Archbishop of Canterbury told Godley that there 
were about 16 peers who were qualified to speak on Indian 
matters and all of them except 4 or 5 were Unionists.
Morley was handicapped because he was not very familiar 
with some of the matters he was dealing with and had to 
consult the India Office representatives who were standing 
on the steps of the throne and he was also "not in good 
voice".^
Curzon was the strongest opponent of the Bill. In 
Morley's words, "he hates the Bill and the whole policy of 
which the Bill is the instrument .... His arguments ... all 
of them rest on the view that the whole attempt is a 
blunder, and that we ought to have persisted in his policy
of shutting eyes and ears to all "political concessions"
2
whatever." But despite Curzon's and the Conservative
1. Godley to Minto - 26 February, 5 March 1909. Minto 
Collection. N.L.S.
2. Morley to Minto - 5 March 1909# Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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Peers' dislike of the Bill it was not thrown out for it had
the support of the Government of India, There was also the
House of Commons which would have passed the Bill in any
case. Relations between the two Houses were already strained
and no one wanted to shoulder the responsibility of adding
further bitterness. Besides as Lansdowne wrote to Minto,
"Morley and I settled the [sic] matters out of Court after
a somewhat stiff deal".'*’ It seems that the opposition had
promised that they would make all "attempts to nag and
2
whittle it away," but would not throw it out.
But in the Committee stage, it became apparent that 
the Conservatives would not compromise on Clause 3 of the 
Bill, which empowered the Government to create an Executive 
Council in any province under a Lieutenant Governor, Morley 
had emphasised that it was purely permissive and did not 
necessarily mean the creation of compulsory Executive 
Councils in Lieutenant Governor's provinces. MacLonnell 
did not agree with this view and thought it an "unnecessary 
innovation", Curzon and Lansdowne supported his view. 
Morley, Wolverhampton and Crewe tried to save the clause 
but the motion was carried out by 59 to 18 votes. This 
happened on 4 March 1909.^ Morley tried to restore the
1. Lansdowne to Minto - 11 May 1909. Minto Collection.N.L.S.
2. Morley to Minto - 5 March 1909. Ibid,
3. Hansard.House of Lords. Vol.I. (T^February - 26 May 1909) 
3017295-298.
4. Ibid.Col.314-315.
clause on 9 March when he presented the Government of 
India1s telegram in which Baker's demand for an Executive 
Council for Bengal had been put forward. But the opposition 
remained adamant and Morley had to give way. The House of 
Commons, on the other hand, passed the clause intact. 
Moreover, the appointment of S.P.Sinha, which was published 
on 23 March 19099 made clause 3 seem in the eyes of its 
opponents a minor incident. Even then an assurance was 
given by the Government that Parliament should have 
effective control as regards the creation of Executive 
Councils in provinces other than Bengal. This compromise 
practically ensured the passing of the Bill intact when it 
again reached the House of Lords.
Thus the creation of executive Councils in Lieutenant 
Governors' provinces was restricted to Bengal in deference 
to the House of Lords, It was only Baker, the Lieutenant 
Governor of Bengal, who had fought for the creation of an 
Executive Council for Bengal, so he was given one. The 
Government of India was not very enthusiastic about these 
executive councils. Its half-heartedness encouraged the 
House of Lords to throw the clause out in the first 
instance.^ C.Y.Chintamani considered this compromise a big
surrender to the House of Lords by Morley and regretted the
2
disallowance of such Council in U.P.
1. Hansard House of Lords. Vol.I. (16 February - 26 May 
I909} Lansdowne's speech, 9 March 1909. Col.340-342,
2. The Hindustanjfteview. Vol. XIX. No.107-8. May-June 1909. 
pp.552-569.
The Bill was read a second time by the House of 
Commons on 1 April 1909 and went to Committee on 19 April. 
T.R. Buchanan, the Under Secretary of State, piloted it, 
hut he fell ill and C.E.H. Hohhouse took his place. The 
second reading in the House of Commons was not very 
impressive. The House took little or no interest. At one 
time there were about 14 M.P.s on the government benches 
and 8 on the other side. The debate was "spiritless11. It 
gave Morley the impression of listening "to a band of 
disembodied ghosts - so far off did they all seem from the 
hard realities and perplexities with which we have been 
grappling all these months
On 25 May 1909 the Bill became an Act. Though it 
modified its predecessors of 1861 and 1892, its text does
1. Morley to Minto - 2 April 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L. 
The following members took a prominent part in the 
debate in the House of Commons;-
Conservatives Liberals.
A.J.fealfour H.H.Asquith. P.M.
Sir P.Banbury 
Captain Guy Baring 
E.H.Carlile 
Sir Henry Craik 
W.Joynson Hicks 
W.J.MacCaw 
E .C.Mey sey-Thomp s on 
Earl Percy 
Earl of Ronaldshay
T.R.Buchanan. Under S. of S
Sir Henry Cotton
Sir Charles Lilke
John Ellis
George Gooch
T.Hart-Lavies
C.E.Hobhouse
Sir J.Jardine
A.Lupton
P.C.Mackarness
C.J.O’Donnell 
J.L.Rees
Dr.V .H .Ruthe rf ord
D.M.Smeaton
Labour 
K!eir Hardie
Nationalist 
John Billon
not seem very revolutionary. But it was a clear step forward.
During the formation of the Rules and Regulations
for election to the newly constituted councils under the
India Councils Act of 1909 the question arose whether
deportees ought to he able to take their seat in the
Assemblies. Morley was of the same opinion as Minto that
some control was necessary over the actions of admittedly
seditious persons, but was not willing to permit any
permanent disqualification to a deported person after he
had been freed. He, therefore, suggested that he was ready
to approve a veto on all elections;'1' and Godley thought it
"a very considerable change - I was going to say, of opinion,
but perhaps I should rather say - of mood on his fMorley's]
2
part". Morley wanted Minto*s opinion in this regard, as 
Buchanan was expected to make a statement in the House of 
Commons.^ Minto did not like any discussion in the House 
of Commons of any part of the Regulations, which were under 
the Government of India's consideration, before they were 
finalised. He also asked Morley "why it is impossible to 
defend attachment of a political disqualification to 
deportation after the deported man is released?" He thought 
public opinion in India would regard such a disqualification 
from standing for election as a natural consequence of
1. Morley to Minto - telegram. 24 March 1909# Minto 
Collection. N.L.S.
2. Godley to Minto - 26 March 1909. Ibid.
3. Morley to Minto - telegrams, 24, 3^ March, 7 April 1909.
Ibid.
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deportation and that the Government of India could not 
disregard it with safety. Moreover, if a deported person was 
admitted to Council, soon after his release, "it would he a 
serious blow to the position of Government and the Council", 
He, therefore, suggested that a complete list of classes of 
persons disqualified should be issued along with "power of 
1 waiver * by the Viceroy, or possibly, for Provincial 
Councils, by the Lieutenant-Governor". He requested Morley 
that pending finalisation of the Regulations, no pledges 
should be given in the House of Commons.'1' Morley replied 
that as the question of disqualification was so important 
the Government could not evade it. Any attachment of a . 
political disqualification to deportation after the deported 
man had been released would turn the Bill into a measure for
widening the scope of the Regulations of 1818. The
Executive Government would then have the power not only of
detaining a person without charge or trial but also of
excluding him, at its own discretion, from effective public 
life without limit of time. Such a wide power in the hands 
of the Executive Morley would not like. He therefore 
informed Minto that "after consulting the Prime Minister, I 
have decided that the Government cannot evade the
1, Minto to Morley - telegram, 17 April 1909, Minto
Collection. N.L.S. Mary, Countess of Minto - op.cit. 
p.301. See' also Minto to Godley - 29 April 190$, Minto
informed Godley about his views as well.
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responsibility of informing the House of Commons plainly
to-day that His Majesty's Government do not intend that the
fact of a man having been deported shall, after his release,
of itself he a ground for disqualifying him for election to
1
a Legislative Council,"
Minto admitted the difficulties besetting the matter
in the House of Commons but insisted that his first duty was
to consider India, He urged Morley to realise that while
Parliament should make the Bill, it was for the Government
2
of India to formulate the Rules and Regulations,
As was expected Mackarness moved an amendment during 
the Committee Stage of the Bill in the House of Commons,
The amendment was to the effect that no one should be 
disqualified from membership of any legislative Council "by 
reason of his having been deported and imprisoned without 
having been charged with and convicted of any offence".^
In Mackarness's view it would be a gross injustice to 
disqualify those persons who had been deprived of the right 
of defending their innocence in a court of law. They had
4
not been charged, convicted and told of their crime. C.E.H. 
Hobhouse, who had assumed the responsibility of piloting
1. Morley to Minto - telegram, 19 April 1909. Minto 
Collection. N.L.S. Mary, Countess of Minto. op.cit.p,301.
2. tainto to Morley - 21 April 1909. Ibid,Morley himseIf 
admitted this fact in his speech in The House of Lords. 
Hansard,House of Lords. Vol.I. 23 February 1909*
Cols. 123-124.
3* Hansard, House of Commons. Vol.Ill, (29 March - 23 April 
1W91T"19 April 1909. Col. 1267.
4. Ibid. Mackarnessfs Speech - Cols. 1268-1271.
the Bill during Buchanan's illness, explained the need of
disqualification and the right of the head of the Government
to waive disqualification in favour of an individual. But
as regards the deportees, he made it "quite clear" that the
government did not intend "that the fact of a man having
been deported shall, after his release, of itself be a
ground of disqualifying him for election to a legislative 
1
Council."
When Minto came to know of Hobhouse's statement, he 
sent a strong protest from the Government of India, He told 
Morley that this pronouncement had been made before the 
Government of India had had a full opportunity to consider 
the matter in consultation with Local Governments. He also 
informed Morley that the Local Governments were unanimous 
in holding that deportees should be disqualified from 
standing for election and that Sinha, the Law Member and a 
member of Minto's Reform Committee, had "taken a very 
strong line, insisting that disqualification was absolutely 
necessary in the case of deportees". The Government of India 
was of the opinion that a general power of veto vested in 
the Governor-General, or the head of a Province, would not 
safely meet the case of deportees. They were afraid that 
"if deportees were put up for election there would be 
violent political excitement during the election. If, after
1, Hansard, House of Commons. Vol.Ill, (29 March-23 April 
I9O9), 19 April 1909* Hobhouse's Speech, Cols. 1273-75.
the election, they were vetoed, their wire-pullers would be 
almost certain to arouse the populace, whether voters or 
not, and the probable result would be dangerous disturbances 
such as occurred in Bombay when Tilak was arrested". As 
regards Morley's objections that the attachment of 
disqualification would widen the scope of the Regulations 
of 1818, and that it would imply that deportation was a 
normal process, the Government of India forcefully contended 
that it could equally well be argued that the 
disqualification of a convict would add to the scope of the 
Penal Code, and that deportation, though not a normal, was 
an actual process, recognized by law and in actual operation 
and therefore a process that it was necessary to provide 
for. The Government of India's recommendations, thus, were 
for the disqualification of deportees from standing for 
election subject to a "waiver" by the Governor-General, or 
the head of the Government which passed the order of 
deportation. They were even prepared to limit this 
disqualification to a period of five years from the date of 
release. They further urged that this application or non­
application of the "waiver" should not be subject to the 
sanction of any higher authority than the head of Government* 
It should be finally decided by the authorities in India.^
It was during the third reading of the India Councils
1. Minto to Morley - telegram, 3 May 1909. Minto Collection.
N.L.S.
Bill that Earl Percy asked searching questions about the 
Government's policy with regard to the deportees. "Are 
persons who have been deported on a charge of suspicion of 
sedition to come under a separate category of disqualifica­
tion?," he asked. He wanted Hobhouse to be more precise 
he
thar/had been when he had told the House in the Committee
stage "that deported persons were not to be regarded ipso
facto as disqualified"."*" Explaining the exact attitude and
intentions of the Government, Hobhouse told the House that
the Government had no intention of sanctioning the
disqualification of deported persons as a class and they
could not allow any regulation by the Government of India
having an effect of that sort. But if the Government of
India desired a power to exclude any undesirable person
from standing for election, His Majesty's Government would
2
not refuse such power, A.J.Balfour agreed with the policy 
of the Government.^
Godley informed Minto that "it is now settled that 
you may, by Regulation, give to yourself and to the Local 
Governments the power of preventing the nomination of any 
irreconcilable; and this is, surely far better than the
1. Hansard, House of Commons. Vol.IV, (26 April to 14 May 
1909). Earl Percy, 26 April 1909. Cols. 95-96.
2. Ibid. Hobhouse, Cols. 98-99.
3. Ibid.Balfour, Cols. 99-100. C.Y.Chintamani, writing in 
the Hindustan Review, Vol.XIX, No.107-8, May -June 1909, 
regretted Hobhouse's statement and stated that any 
disqualification in connection with deportation was an 
"unjust punishment".
exclusion of deportees as such",^
Morley had thus turned down Minto1 s suggestion in
deference to the House of Commons, as he himself admitted,
"we could not have defended the measure which you desired".
The solution to which he was prepared to agree was "a
general power by Regulation to disallow candidature of any
person whose antecedents and character are such that his
election would, in the opinion of the Government of India,
be contrary to public interests, whether he has been
deported or not". Deportation was his sore point as he
insisted that "the Regulations should not mention or refer
2
to deportation". Minto had earlier informed Morley that 
"this is a wider power than we asked for, but our impression 
is that, although the proposal avoids mention of deportation, 
which is a settled fact, it offers a law of political 
restraint exactly parallel to the law of personal restraint 
contained in the Regulations of 1818, and we are convinced 
that it will be regarded in India with greater disfavour 
than our proposals relating to deportees". Minto felt very
strongly about the interference of the House of Commons and
"disregard of the opinion of the Government of India, in 
deference to the wishes of a certain political section at
1. Godley to Minto - 30 April 1909. Minto Collection. N.L.S.
2. Morley to Minto - telegram, 11 May 1909. Ibid.
3. Minto to Morley - telegram, 3 May 1909. Ibid. Mary,
Countess of Minto - op.cit,p.304.
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home unacquainted with conditions here". He considered this
procedure, if taken as a precedent, "as extremely dangerous
1
to the future of this country", Morley argued that "the 
Government of India is no absolute or independent branch of 
Imperial Government, It is in every respect answerable to 
the Cabinet as any other department is5 and if the Cabinet, 
for reasons of its own, decides that no political 
disqualification shall attach to deportation, that ends the 
matter. You are mistaken in laying all the blame on
Parliament. If the Cabinet had gone the other way, nothing
2
would have induced me to assent."
The regulations which were promulgated after all this 
discussion were that "No person shall be eligible for 
election as a Member of the Council if such person has 
been declared by the Governor-General in Council to be of 
such reputation and antecedents that his election would, 
in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council, be 
contrary to the public interest". Thus the Government of 
India obtained a wider power than they had asked for. Now 
they could declare any person, whom they considered 
undesirable, as ineligible for election. Morley had secured 
his point at the cost of making the Government of India 
more powerful. He objected to the word "deportation". He
1. Minto to Morley - 13 May 1909. Minto Collection. N.L.S.
2. Morley to Minto - 13 May 1909. Ibid.
30 S
could not digest and would not like to see it in any form 
in his Bill or Regulations. The Cambridge History of India 
gives an erroneous account of this episode. It conveys the 
impression that the Governor-General in Council was given 
the power he was asking for, "to declare that in his opinion 
a person was of such reputation and antecedents that his 
election would be contrary to the public interest".^ This 
power was not what the Governor-General in Council had 
wanted. It was given to him by the Secretary of State, 
because the latter could not allow the words "deportees" or 
"deportation" in the list of disqualifications.
There were still a number of hurdles to be crossed. 
During the debate on the Address in reply to the King's 
speech in the House of Commons, Mackarness moved an 
amendment to the Address that the success of the reform 
proposals in India "is gravely endangered by the fact that 
British subjects in that country are subjected to 
imprisonment and deportation without having had any charge
made against them, and without having been convicted of
2any crime." Buchanan defended the Government policy and 
the amendment was defeated by 195 votes to 76 - of whom 33 
were Irish, 25 Labour, 3 or 4 Liberal Unionist and other 
liberals. Morley was pleased with the result and wrote to 
Minto, "so, you see, the Mother of Parliaments is not such a
1. The Cambridge History of India. Vol.VI. p.571.
2. Hansard. House of Commons. Vol.I. 1909. I16 February -
5 March 1909) 24 February 1909. Col.807.
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bad step-mother after all"."*' But the question of deportees
could not be postponed very long. The letters and telegrams
that passed between Minto and Morley during the last months
of 1909 and early January 1910 amply show Morley1 s anxiety
as to the effect the continued detention of the prisoners
would have on public opinion in England, He thought that
this continuance of detentions contradicted their policy of
reform and as time passed by his insistence on the release
of some, if not all, grew.
Besides his own dislike of deportation Morley was hard
2
pressed in the House of Commons, Some 150 members wrote to 
Asquith in protest against deportation and Morley informed 
Minto that Asquith would ,fgive them a judicious reply, but 
you will not be able to deport any more of your suspects - 
that is quite c l e a r , A  few days later Morley again wrote, 
"A pretty heavy gale is blowing up in the House of Commons 
about deportation and shows every sign of blowing harder as 
time goes on." He implored Minto that besides Tories and 
Radicals some of the moderate Liberals were becoming uneasy 
and though he intended "to sit tight just where we are, 
uncomfortable as is the saddle," it would be wise to release
1. Morley to Minto - 26 February 1909* Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. J .01 Grady, P .C .MacKarne s s, Ke ir Hardie, A,Lupton and 
others asked questions about deportations - see Hansard 
House of Commons. Vol. IV, April 26 to May 14-, Col. 879, 
880. Vol.V. May 17th to June 4, Cols. 227-229, 996-999, 
1001-1003, 1017-1020, 1030-1031.
3. Morley to Minto - 5 May 1909* Morley Papers. I.O.L.
these deportees.^ Minto did not like this interference by 
the House of Commons. "I daresay you think me oversensitive 
as to the House of Commons action in respect to India, but 
I feel that I cannot exaggerate the importance of saving 
India just now from ill-considered expressions of opinion ip. 
Parliament. Every little twopenny-half-penny question which 
can be taken to indicate sympathy with agitation and 
discredit to the Government of India is magnified a
hundredfold here.1 He told Morley that the "anarchical
2
undercurrent" still existed and the government could not 
afford to neglect it for a moment, but "these p in-pricks at 
home djo shake us".^ Minto was very clear in his mind with 
regard to his policy towards deportees. He had repeatedly 
informed Morley that his duty was "to secure British 
administration in India and the welfare of the populations 
over whom we rule". Indians must be given a share in the 
administration but the supreme guidance must remain in 
British hands. Considering the present ticklish situation 
he was not willing to permit any outside influence, even 
that of Parliament. The release of deportees under 
Parliamentary pressure would not improve the situation. His 
intention was to consider "without a hint to the outside 
world, the possibility of release simultaneously with the
1. Morley to Minto - 27 May 1909# Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Minto presumably used these words loosely, what he meant 
was terrorist undercurrent. The terrorists did not want 
anarchy neither were they anarchists.
3. Minto to Morley - 10 June 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
opening of the New Imperial Legislative Council, after the
e l e c t i o n s T h e  release of deportees before election would
have created an embarrassing situation* Some of the deportees
were prominent Indians and they were likely to stand for
election for the enlarged Legislative Assemblies. Minto did
not want them to stand for election or to influence the
election of others. Moreover with the inauguration of new
Legislative Councils, he wanted to begin with "a clean
sheet" and f'let bygones be bygones", but if the deportees
were released before, "our assent Cto release the deportees]
no matter what the reason for it might be, would be looked
upon as a surrender to political pressure and nothing else 
,.1
« *  *
Though not completely convinced, Morley agreed to wait 
for some time. Morley had never shared Minto1 s views with 
regard to Parliamentary interference. He had repeatedly told 
Minto that Parliament was the real master and a positive 
check on the autocratic actions of the Government of India. 
Minto never disputed Parliament's supreme authority but 
always submitted that his first task was to discharge his 
duty of governing India judiciously and.that as the man on 
the spot he knew better the policy to follow in India than 
the critics of the Government at Westminster. He did have 
supporters of his policies in Parliament. When the radicals 
in the House of Commons criticised some of his repressive
1.Minto to Morley - 17 June 1909* Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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policies, the Conservatives in the House of Lords wished
he had more power to crush "sedition'1. The debates on the
Seditious Meetings Act and the Press Acts in both Houses
clearly bear out this point.^ This counter balancing of
influences was essential, in a way, for Minto's
administration because after all Morley and he differed in
their political training and outlook as well. Morley was not
a radical himself, but he was conscious of the views of his
radical supporters. WherP^ever he, under the influence of
the radicals, put pressure on Minto to revise his policy*
Minto, knowing full well that the Conservatives would
support him, insisted that his views be made public.
Likewise when Minto was insisting on an Indian Member for
his Council, and Morley, because of Conservative opposition,
was reluctant, the possible reaction of radical opinion on
Morley*s refusal, made him ask Minto whether it was possible
to keep it a secret that the suggestion was ever made and
that Minto supported it.
Pear of Parliamentary pressure again forced Morley to
write to Minto in August. He suggested the release of
deportees at the time of the announcement of the Regulations.
"The release of our detenues at such a time would be a mark
2
of our confidence in our policy and our position." Minto 
considered in council the revision of the cases of deportees. 
The Lieutenant-Governors of Bengal and Eastern Bengal and
1. See Chapter III.
2. Morley to Minto - 20 August 1909# Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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Assam had strongly opposed their release for security reasons 
and the Council too came to the same decision. It was, 
therefore, decided that they should not he released for 
some time, Minto's consideration in maintaining their 
detention was that besides Bengali sympathy, he had to 
consider Anglo-Indian opinion, the views of the Rulers of 
Native States and "a huge population whose loyalty to us 
depends largely on their conviction of our strength, and 
that, to Anglo-Indian, Ruling Chief and loyal Native, the 
release of the deportees at present would mean nothing but 
weakness".'*' Minto maintained that to release the deportees 
on the announcement of the Regulations would mean turning 
them "loose on the country at the most inopportune moment 
that could be chosen". It would provide the strongest 
temptation to political agitators to induce them to come 
forward as candidates for the newly constituted councils.
He was afraid that the government would come into disrepute 
because "we might be forced to detract from the generosity 
of our new administration by refusing to accept certain 
candidatures as contrary to the public interest". So in his 
opinion the best time to release them would be after the 
inauguration of the new Councils in January. Morley could 
no longer remain patient. He enquired whether the decision 
was taken by a committee of the Council or the full Council 
and who were the members responsible for the decision;*^ in
1. Minto to Morley - 1 September 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - 9 September 1909. Ibid,
3* Morley to Minto - telegram, 8 September 1909. Ibid.
particular he enquired whether Sinha attended the
proceedings♦^ He also asked Minto to send the reports of the
2
local Governments, Minto sent the reports, and explained 
that the decision was taken by the full Council and that 
Sinha agreed with it.^
Minto had suggested that for the time being discussion 
should not centre round the rights and wrongs of the policy 
of deportation, but this action must be considered in 
respect of the effect their release may have on the safety 
of India, Morley agreed, but suggested that although the 
release of all of them might lead to mischief, at least some 
could be released against whom the case was comparatively 
weak. He did not agree with the views that their release 
might lead to further trouble, expressed by Baker and Hare 
for the continuation of detention, and reminded Minto that 
Ibbetson had had the same sort of view when Lajpat Hai's 
release was being considered. In his opinion Baker and Hare 
would say the same things if they were consulted "six months,
or twelve months or twenty months hence". With regard to
some "unpleasant candidates", Morley agreed that it would 
be awkward to let anyone of them come to the Legislative 
Councils, but maintained that it would be just as awkward
1, Morley to Minto -telegram, 10 September 1909* Ibid,
2, Morley to Minto -telegram, 14 September 1909* Ibid,
3, Minto to Morley -telegram, 9*13*15 September 1909* "Sinha 
declared his inability to criticise reasons of high 
policy affecting deportations, and concluded by saying,
"if the Order of December 190o is held to be right I agree
that the release should be deferred till the new Councils 
are formed", Minto to Morley -telegram, 13 September 1909. 
Ibid,
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f o r  them openly to accept the obligation to co-operate with 
government. They would lose all respect in the eyes of their 
followers "by the fact of their joining the hated Raj, even 
to a moderate extent". He further asked Minto whether he 
had "thought of the possibility of an anti-deportation 
discussion being brought forward in your L.C.?" Thus, in 
his opinion, as a "wise accompaniment of the next stage of 
Reforms," at least two of the men should be released and thei
speedier the better"
Morley returned to the subject later, and again asked
Minto to come to some decision about the release of
deportees soon, as "their continued detention makes a
mockery of the language we are goirgto use about Reforms.
It makes a thoroughly self-contradictory situation". He
2
thought it a "matter of policy of the highest moment".
Minto considered the release of the deportees in 
Council but the Council again decided to stick to its 
previous decision and maintained that their release was not 
justified for eecurity reasons. He did not agree with 
Morleyfs argument that the continued detention of the 
deportees "makes a thoroughly contradictory situation". He 
explained that the main purpose of the Reform Scheme was to
1. Morley to Minto - 30 September 1909# Minto Collection. 
N.L.S. Prom the very beginning Morley was asking for the 
release of Aswini Kumar Dutt and K.K.Mitra, as in his 
opinion the cases against them were weak.
2. Morley to Minto - 20 October 1909. Ibid.
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rally the moderates, hut if these "firebrands" were released 
it would jeopardise the chance that "the reasonable and 
stable elements in Indian society" would come forward. To 
him their release would create a "self-contradictory 
situation". He assured Morley that he realised "the 
difficulties which surround you at home and the pressure 
you have faced so bravely", but it was wrong to assume that 
his main consideration in continuing the detention of the 
deportees was European and official feeling. He was much 
concerned about the effect their release would have on the 
opinions of loyal Indians. In his view they did not want 
them to be released.^ He, therefore, remarked that "it would 
be lamentable if we, at the last moment, ruin the results 
we expect by attempting to meet sentiment quite unsuited to 
the present position in India". This Morley would not 
tolerate. Morley was aroused. He immediately asked if all 
the members of Minto*s Council agreed with him in his policy. 
Furthermore he not only threatened that the Cabinet was 
against it but also asked Minto if he was prepared to 
"reject the unanimous suggestion of the Cabinet". He tried 
to refute all of Minto fs arguments. To his mind they were 
all based on flimsy grounds. All of Minto's fears, i.e. 
Hindu-Muslim disturbances, fears of the Ruling Chiefs; 
British opinion of the opponents of reform in England and 
the fear that the moderate cause would suffer if the
1. Minto to Morley - telegram, 22 October, letter 21 
October 1909. Minto Collection.N.L.S.
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deportees were released, were not valid arguments. He even 
told Minto that "an important moderate leader (Gokhale) 
explicitly says that to aontinue detention would give a 
trump card to extremists". In other words Morley suggested 
that as far as Indian opinion was concerned Mintofs reading 
was wrong and that he knew much more than Minto. Thus if 
they wanted to win the support of the moderates, they must 
do as the moderates wanted. He, therefore, suggested that 
either on 15 November, the day when the Reforms were to be 
introduced, or on 9 November, the Kingfs birthday, an 
amnesty be granted to them. ^  This was the harshest threat 
Minto had received from Morley, but he remained adamant. He 
refused to agree with Morley and frankly said that "there 
can be no question of an amnesty on a certain date". His 
Council and the Lieutenant-Governors were unanimous that 
their release was not in the interests of "the internal 
peace of India". So he took a bold stand against Morley. He, 
however, tried to pacify him by saying that he had always 
served the Government loyally and recognized the importance 
of unity on all matters, but it was the duty of the 
Government of India to express their views with regard to 
the safety of the Empire. In his opinion the views of 
Gokhale, or for that matter any other person, were "perfectly 
valueless and misleading", because they did not possess all
1. Morley to Minto - telegram, 27, 31 October 1909. Minto 
Collection. N.L.S.
the information. The Government of India, being in
possession of all the material against deportees, were the
best judge to decide about their release. He admitted that
he understood "British odium to detaining men without
trial", but "that feeling cannot be expected from Indian
populations - the vast majority of whom desire to live in
peace", and outside Bengal people "would simply marvel at
release". Hence the Government of India thought it was not
safe to release them now. If, however, Morley insisted, the
Government would obey him but "they could not be held
1
responsible for the results." Minto's own view was that 
he could not conceive "at the present moment anything more 
dangerous than that disregard should be had to the matured
p
opinions of the Government of India and Local Governments," 
He further submitted in a letter that, "whilst I and my 
Council would endeavour to do our duty as best we could, 
we should be entitled to ask that our communications to the 
Secretary of State should be made public , . . . But 
Morleyfs anger and pressure subsided even before the 
receipt of the letter. Minto had threatened to absolve 
himself of responsibility should things go wrong, Morley 
could not take the risk of being blamed for forcing the 
Government of India to do a thing which they did not want 
for security reasons. He admitted the force of Mintofs
1. Minto to Morley - telegram, 31 October 1909. Morley 
Papers. I.O.L.
2. Minto to Morley - telegram, 2 November 1909. Ibid,
3. Minto to Morley - letter, 2 November 1909# Ibid.
argument and sought a compromise by asking him to fix a date
for their release. In this connection he pointed out that
Minto had earlier expressed his willingness to release them
on 1 January 1910,^" Now Minto had won his day after great
fight and endless worry, he did not want to make any
commitment so he refused to fix any definite date. His main
objection was that if the date of release was made public
in advance, the Government would be accused of refusing
release simply on account of elections and also that it
would seem to imply amnesty. In his view the release should
appear not as an amnesty, but that the causes for deportation
2
had ceased to exist.
On 13 November an attempt was made on the Viceroy's 
life while he was touring Ahmedabad. On 21 December A.T.M. 
Jackson, Collector of Nasik was murdered. Some minor 
incidents of crime also took place in other places, Morley, 
who had not ceased to ask Minto to release the deportees, 
was informed that because of these incidents it would be 
impossible for the government to modify their orders, Minto 
admitted that the deportees had no hand in these incidents,
1. Morley to Minto - telegram, 3 November 1909. Morley 
Papers. I.O.L. See Minto to Morley, 9 September 1909, in 
"this letter Minto had stated that the deportees could be 
released in January after the inauguration of new 
Councils, provided nothing goes wrong,
2. Minto to Morley - telegram, 5 November 1909. Ibid.
3. Arthur Mason Tippets Jackson (1888-1909) I.C.S. Served in 
Bombay as Assistant Collector and Magistrate; Under 
Secretary to Government of Bombay, revenue and financial 
depts., private Secretary to Governor of Bombay. One of 
the senior Collectors of Bombay Presidency. Murdered at 
Nasik on 21 December 1909.
9 9 1
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but their release would be misunderstood and loyal Indians
particularly would consider it as a weakness on the part of
1
the government.
After the elections to the new Councils, Morley again
took a very strong line. In his opinion Minto had no more
justification for not releasing the deportees because the
Government of India intended to acquire more powers to
suppress 1 sedition* under the new Press Act of 1910.
Moreover, Minto had promised to release them after the new
2
Councils had met. He also threatened that, 11 it will be
intensely disagreeable to me to have to send you an official
instruction, but I fear there can be no alternative if you
should continue your present objection"? Now Minto gave
way and advised his Council to revise its decision. He
informed Morley that they would be released immediately
4
after the passage of the Press Act. Morley heaved a sigh 
5
of relief. The Act was passed on 8 Pebruary 1910 and the 
deportees were released on 9 Pebruary If, however,
Morley had failed to persuade Minto to release them early, 
he had succeeded in convincing him that it would not be 
possible to deport any more. So Minto disallowed the
1. Minto to Morley - telegrams, 6 , 26 December 1909, 2,
5 January 1910. Minto Collection N.L.S.
2. Morley to Minto - telegram, 22,23 January 1910. Ibid.
The new Imperial Legislature Council met on 25 January 
1910.
3. Morley to Minto - telegram, 28 January 1910. Ibid.
4. Minto to Morley - telegram, 5, 8, 9 Pebruary 1910. Ibid.
5. Morley to Minto - telegram, 6 Pebruary 1910. Letter
10 Pebruary 1910. Ibid.
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deportation of 53 persons recommended by the Government of 
Bengal. ^
Lady Minto is wrong when she states that Morley had
2
no prior intimation of their release. A general impression 
was also created amongst officials in India that Minto had 
been forced to take this decision. After all, Shams-ul-Alam, 
the Deputy Superintendent of Police, had been murdered on 
24 January 1910 and the situation had not improved so much 
as to justify Minto*s action, neither had the terrorist 
movement died down* Minto was conscious of it as well* He 
wrote a note in which he stated his reason for taking this 
action. In this note Minto stated that he took the decision 
on his own and that he did not inform Morley beforehand.
1* Government of Bengalfs letters to the Government of India,
1 February - 28 February 1910 and Government of India's 
letters to the Government of Bengal - 7 March 1910*
Home Progs. Political. January-July 1910. 8430.
2. My Indlan Journal. Vol* 1, 1910; p.52* "The announcement 
of the release came as a complete surprise to everyone, 
with the exception of his Executive Council* Neither Sir 
Edward Baker nor Mr. Butler were aware of Roily's 
decision, and one and all imagined that he had given away 
to undue pressure from home* Although Morley has never 
ceased agitating about the deportees for the past year, 
he himself did not know that this moment had been 
selected to release them* Roily is quite certain that 
he had done the right thing from a political point of 
view'1. "Mr. Chirol told me that he had been with Morley 
twelve hours before reading in the papers of the release 
of the deportees, and that Morley had never hinted that 
they were to be released. I told him he could not have 
done so, as he knew nothing about it himself until it 
was a fait accompli"* p*88.
See Minto ?s note about the release in the above 
J ournal as well. (pp. 6 9-72). The account from her 
J ournal, which Lady Minto gives in her book on page 377, 
is not found in the Journal itself.
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Minto is incorrect in saying that he did not inform 
Morley beforehand. He did inform Morley and he was really 
pressed very hard. Morley’s telegram of 28 January 1910, 
threatening him with "official instinct ion" must have made 
him think hard. The decision to release them on 9 Pebruary 
was decidedly his. The reason for this decision, according 
to him, was not Morley*s pressure, but "whether it was 
advisable to refuse release and alienate a large body of 
influential Indian public opinion, whilst at the same time 
having to face a hostile Council in the early days of its 
existence, whose demands we should have eventually to 
recognize - for we could not have kept the deportees 
imprisoned indefinitely". He was also informed that a 
deputation was being organized to wait on him. So 
"independently of any influences in England", he "acted in 
Indian interests alone" and decided to release them. He 
risked even severe criticism of Anglo-Indian society.^* The
1. Note by Minto - 1 March 1910, in Lady Minto - My Indian 
J ournal. 1910.Vol.I. pp.69-72, Vol.II, pp.338-341* This 
note was sent to Dunlop Smith, who was Political A.D.C. 
to Morley at that time. Lady Minto gives two reasons for 
Mintofs decision - to begin "with a clean sheet" and 
before "the Labour members" in the House of Commons" 
"raised a hue and cry", "making martyrs of the deportees". 
Because, according to her, Minto thought that their 
utterances in the House of Commons would be published and 
"copied into every vernacular paper" and would affect 
Indian public opinion. My Indian Journal, 1910, Vol.I, 
p.52.
Minto mentioned in his note that he was conscious of 
the composition of the present G-overnment which depended 
on Labour votes. Questions might have been asked in 
Parliament, compelling the Government to force the 
Government of India and this he thought would have been 
most unfortunate. Ibid. Vol.I. pp.69-72.
way lie had been resisting pressure from home suggests that
there is some truth in his statement that his main
consideration in releasing them was Indian public opinion.
The Indian Press received the news with relief and was
generally pleased. Even the Anglo-Indian papers were not
critical of Mintofs action. The Civil and Military Gazette
stated that "the release of deportees would seem to show
that the Government was willing to trust the influential
classes of the people and to rely upon their co-operation
1
and loyalty".
Minto, no doubt, had stuck to his earlier decision 
that the deportees should be released as soon as the reforms 
were in operation. He resolutely resisted the greatest 
pressure from Morley and felt very strongly about it.
It seems that amongst officials this impression that 
Morley was under great pressure from the Labour members 
was very common. Lady Minto refers to Labour members many 
times. After Jacksonfs murder she wrote in her Journal,
"owing to this [murder of Jackson] Roily will not be able 
to discharge any of the deportees, and I expect this will 
greatly annoy the authorities in England, as unless the
deportees are released the Government will lose many of the
2
Labour votes". Presumably by Labour members she meant the
1, See also The Statesman, 9 Pebruary; the Leader, Allahabad, 
9 Pebruary 1910; the Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore,
9 Pebruary 1910; the Tribune, Lahore, 9 Pebruary 1910; 
the Madras Mail, Madras, 9 Pebinary 1910; the Times of 
India, Bombay, 9 Pebruary 1910.
2. Lady Minto - My Indian Journal, 1909. Vol.II, p.377.
Radical members as well, Minto seems to have felt the same, 
Morley very much resented this when he came to know 
of it. He wrote to Minto, "What I disliked was the pretty 
distinct implication that I was urging release, because His 
Majesty's Government, as you suppose, is "largely dependent" 
on the votes of the Labour Party, and the Labour Party might 
have cried out against persistent and indefinite detention,: 
That is to say, I should not have overruled you because I 
thought indefinite detention bad in Indian interests, as 
lowering Indian respect for British legality and strict 
regard for justice, but simply because I was afraid of being 
turned out of office by Labour men, plus Radical stalwarts, 
plus Irish, plus a certain Tory contingent Then he
recounted various instances - like the appointment of Sinha 
- where he fought for Mintofs policies even "against the 
Palace". He also emphasised that constitutionally he was 
empowered to over rule the Government of India,^
Minto tried to pacify him by saying that he had 
misunderstood him. He informed Morley that he 
wrote the note of 1 March 1910 in reply to an 
accusation by one of his colleagues that "the Government 
of India had lost credit in this country because it 
had surrendered to orders from home". He stated that this 
was the general impression amongst Anglo-Indians. He avoided 
the reference to the Labour Party, but pointed out that 
there was no need to bring in constitutional issues,
1. Morley to Minto - 17 March 1910. Minto Collection. N.L.S.
otherwise it would tempt one to wonder "whether a 
Parliamentary Government, as it now exists, is suitable for 
the administration of a great Empire,"^ Minto had always 
wondered about it*
This incident, however, shows how much Morley 
interfered in the internal policy of Indian administration* 
Instead of suggesting the broad lines of policy only he 
tended to interfere in the details. But this also suggests 
that without Mintofs consent and agreement he was unable to 
alter his policy however distasteful it might be to him.
His threats and his authoritative tone had not much effect 
on Minto. He could not go beyond that because the House of 
Lords would not have let him overrule the Government of 
India. For the success of all his policies co-operation and 
loyal support of the Government of India was essential. And 
Minto could not be persuaded to deviate under any pressure 
from any policy which he thought was justified in the 
interests of the British administration of India.
The Congress mood of jubilation changed into a more 
critical attitude, particularly in connexion with the 
regulations to be issued under the Scheme. In 1909f the 
Congress, meeting at Lahore under Madan Mohan Malaviya, 
passed a resolution which regretted that "the regulations 
framed under the Act have not been framed in the same liberal
1. Minto to Morley - 7 April 1910. Minto Collection, N.L.S.
spirit in which Lord Morleyfs despatch of last year was 
conceived". The Congress objected to "the wide, arbitrary, 
and unreasonable disqualifications and restrictions for 
candidates seeking election to the Councils; the general 
distrust of the educated classes that runs through the whole 
course of the regulations; and the unsatisfactory composition 
of the non-official majority in Provincial Councils rendering 
them ineffective and unreal for all practical purposes".
The Congress urged the Government to revise the Regulations, 
"remove the objectionable features and bring them into 
harmony with the spirit of the Royal Message and the 
Secretary of State fs despatch of last year"."*"
Surendranath Banerjea and Madan Mohan Malaviya, 
who had welcomed with great enthusiasm the Reforms outlined 
in Morley*s Despatch of 27 November 1908, condemned in 
strong terms the Regulations issued by the Government of 
India to give effect to the Reforms. In moving the 
resolution Banerjea put the blame for practically 
wrecking the reforms on the shoulders of the
bureaucracy. In his opinion they had converted "that
2
promising experiment into a dismal failure". Madan Mohan 
Malaviya in his presidential address argued that when in 
Britain at least two persons, Michael Lavitt, once convicted 
of sedition, and John Burns, once sentenced to six weeks*
1. Report of the I.N.C. 1909- Resolution IV. p.47.
2. Tbid. pp.22-23, 48-52.
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imprisonment, could become M.P.s and one of them even a
Cabinet Minister, there existed no reason why Indian
nationalist leaders whom the Government had once deported
should be prevented from becoming members of the Indian
Legislative Councils.'*' The Bengalee criticised the exclusion
of deportees as in entire conflict with the spirit of
2
English political practice.
Despite this Congress criticism, the Morley-Minto 
Reforms were introduced and in Minto!s words they marked 
"the close of a system of administration which ... has 
contributed much to the prosperity of India and to the 
glories of her history," but they also opened "a new era 
with the inauguration of broader principles of government".^ 
Under these reforms the strength of each Legislative Council 
was increased. Election was officially recognized. Under the 
principle of representation of interests, separate Muslim 
representation along with weightage was established. The 
official majority, prevalent in every province except 
Bombay, was done away with. More time was provided for 
budget discussion and supplementary questions were allowed. 
Two Indians in the Secretary of State’s Council and one in 
the Viceroy’s Executive Council were introduced.
These reforms have been praised and denounced with 
equal vehemence. Amongst their bitter critics is the Montagu
-*-• Report of the I.N.C. 1909. Resolution IV. p. 29.
2. The' Bengalee. 28 February 1909.
3. Minto1s Speech in Legislative Council. 25 January 1910.
Chelmsford Report. The Report criticised them for the 
narrowness of franchize, and for giving no power and no 
responsibility to the Legislative Councils. The Report was 
also critical of the composition of the Councils, 
particularly the presence of too many lawyers and the 
introduction of separate representation of various 
communities. It considered the presence of an official 
block in the Imperial Legislative Council a hurdle, which 
irritated the Indian members and created a sort of racial 
discrimination as this block drove the Indians in another 
block.1
Some of this criticism is accurate. But the authors 
of the reforms had no intention of transplanting British 
institutions wholesale into India. Their aim was to admit 
Indians, on a very restricted basis, to consultation and a 
modest share in the administration. The reforms were neither 
calculated nor expected to end the activities of the 
extremists and terrorists, but they were definitely intended 
to strengthen the hands of Government in dealing with them 
by winning more support from the moderate section of the 
Indian people. In this aim they were successful. They also 
showed that however slow and tardy the path of constitutional 
progress was, it was better than the dangers of revolutionary 
violence. These discredited the revolutionists and made it
1. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report. 1918. Cd. 9109. pp.70,71, 
73, 7b, lu6)"188.
easier for moderate Indian leaders like G-okhale to resist 
the extremists in the Congress. Though Morley and Minto 
tried their best to emphasise that these were not intended 
to establish a parliamentary system in India, the Indian 
leaders interpreted them as an advance towards parliamentary 
government* Though the Government of India continued for 
some time to be a ‘benevolent despotism*, even after their 
introduction, these reforms were the high light of the 
policy of association. In this, with all their drawbacks, 
they were a definite step forward.
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Conclusion
Quite early on his arrival in India Minto formed his 
opinion about Indian nationalism. Unlike Curzon he decided 
not to ignore the Indian demands but to listen to them and 
meet them as far as possible.
He reoognised the Congress as an important factor in 
the situation and tried to befriend the moderate leaders, 
who accepted this opportunity and helped the government in 
carrying out its policies. Gokhale, Moti Lal^hose, Rash
Behari Ghose and others were frequent visitors to government
frcra the Congress
officials especially to Dunlop Smith. The exil/ of the 
extremists after the Surat session in 1907 eased the work of 
the moderates and the government, too, decided to back them 
up openly.
One of Curzon's legacies was the Partition of Bengal. 
Minto thought that it was a 'settled fact*. But he realized 
that there was some justification in the agitation against 
it, because of the way the partition had been carried out. 
Unlike the agitators he did not think that both Hindus and 
Muslims were against it. In his opinion mostly the Calcutta 
Hindu leaders had started the agitation and Puller by his 
tactless policies had aggravated the situation. With a view 
to eliminate any appearance of partiality or discrimination 
against any community, he did not hesitate to accept Puller's 
resignation, although he knew that at least amongst the
Muslims Fuller was popular.
To combat the militant nationalism he adopted a firm 
policy. Various repressive measures were passed, but he 
always impressed upon the local Governments that they should 
use repressive measures cautiously. He did not hesitate to 
redress the wrong done and admit his mistakes, as in the 
case of Lajpat Rai. But where he found that his action was 
justified, he resisted the strongest pressures to revise his 
policy as in the case of the nine Bengali deportees.
Minto thought the Congress demand of ♦self-rule1 an 
impossibility. He firmly believed that the character of the 
Indian government must remain autocratic, but it could be 
tempered by giving Indians a larger representation on the 
legislative Councils and more share in the administration of 
their country. He even fought for the admission of an Indian 
to the Executive Council, from which the Indians were 
barred by tradition.
The Muslims, who had gradually become conscious that 
they had been left behind the Hindus in the political race, 
approached Minto for the safeguard of their interests. The 
deputation that met Minto on 1 October 1906 was organized 
by Mohsin-ul-Mulk, who had the support and co-operation of 
other Muslim leaders. Morley1s budget speech of 1906, which 
indicated an extension of the representative element on the 
Legislative Councils, was the cause of this sudden stir 
amongst the Muslims, They demanded separate representation
for themselves. Minto accepted their cogently worded plea.
In agreeing with this demand he was not so much accepting 
a new principle of separate Hindu and Muslim representation, 
as maintaining the old idea that the Indian society consisted 
of ♦interests1 - social groups or hereditary trades - rather 
than territorial areas.
It is not correct to suggest that the Muslim deputation 
and their demands were inspired or engineered by the 
Government. As has been explained, and as Minto's 
correspondence with Hare suggests, the Government was not 
even aware of what the Muslims intended to ask for in their 
address. Minto and Hare were thinking to find ways and 
means to pacify the Muslims, who were agitated at Fuller*s 
resignation. They did not discuss the question of separate 
representation. The organization of the Muslim deputation 
and framing of their demands was solely the work of the 
Muslim leaders under Mohsin-ul-Mulk1s guidance.
When the All-India Muslim League was founded in 
December 1906, it did not receive that degree of government 
patronage which the Congress had received from the hands of 
Lord Dufferin, and amongst its organizers there were not 
present any ex-I.C.S. officers and M.P.s of the calibre of 
A.0.Hume and Sir William Wedderburn. Its main aim was to 
fight for separate electorates, Morley, who had whole 
heartedly approved of Minto1s commitment, subsequently 
changed his mind, but the League presented its case so ably
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that the government after all decided to concede this demand. 
It was a big achievement for such a new political party,
with practically no experience of political tactics. Though
/
Gokhale accepted the introduction of separate representation 
as the only solution of existing differences, other Congress 
leaders interpreted it as an attempt to divide India into 
two hostile camps - Hindus and Muslims.
Minto has been blamed for this ’Machiavellian* policy. 
The question naturally arises whether the decision to concede 
the Muslim demand was because of a policy of * divide and 
rule* resulting in differences between Hindus and Muslims or 
whether it merely recognized the cultural and religious 
differences that already existed between the two. Almost 
every historian agrees that those differences had existed as 
always between the two communities. The Muslims, though no 
less patriotic or nationalist than Hindus, were worried at 
the prospect of their being swamped by the Hindu majority.
The Hindu majority had not been able to satisfy them that 
the joint electorates would help Hindus and Muslims to 
develop a national outlook in political matters. Past 
experience had shown the Muslims that the only possible way 
to secure the safeguard of their interests was to ask for 
separate representation. Hence they strove to achieve this 
aim and were able to convince the government that they must 
be given separate representation.
Moreover, Minto wanted to secure the representation
of various classes and interests on the Legislative Councils? 
There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that his policy 
was based on 'divide and rule1. He sincerely thought that 
separate representation would eliminate the causes of 
irritation between various classes and the Government would 
benefit by the presence of all important interests on her 
Councils. He had two objects in mind. Firstly, it would 
satisfy important classes like the Muslims and without 
separate representation there was no chance of their getting 
sufficient representation* Under the 1892 Act, not only the 
Muslims but other interests like the landholders had not 
been able to secure proper representation on the Legislative 
Councils. Minto was not concerned with the representation of 
Muslim interests only. He desired all those who had a stake 
in the country to be represented in one form or another. His 
proposal of a Council of Princes was based on this very idea. 
Secondly, with larger representation of these interests and 
classes, he hoped^ the causes of unrest would disappear and 
the foundations of the British Baj would be strengthened.
This was perhaps more dominant in his policies because with 
a view to suppress sedition and combat unrest, he did not 
hesitate to veto the Punjab Colonies Bill in opposition to 
his Council and accepted the resignation of Fuller, knowing 
full well that it would not only irritate the Civil Service 
but also the Muslims.
He carried out his policies with tact, sympathy and
firmness. He did not weather the storm completely, hut at 
least mitigated some of its consequences. His policy towards 
the Muslims was successful. They did not join the ranks of _ 
dissatisfied Indians, Even the Montagu-Chelmsford Report 
admitted thist "Throughout the troubled days of 1907-10 the 
Muhammadans, with a few unimportant exceptions, held 
severely aloof from the revolutionary movement, and retained- 
their traditional attitude of sturdy loyalty, secure in the 
feeling ... that their interests were safe in the hands of 
the Gov e rnme n t. " ^
The moderate Congress leaders were also satisfied.
The Congress session of 1908 expressed a deep sense of 
gratification. The 1909 session saw a change in the Congress 
attitude towards the government because of the announcement 
of separate representation, but in 1910 the Congress accepted 
it as a necessary evil. The reforms had encouraged the 
moderate leaders and discredited the extremists.
As to whether Minto or Morley was more responsible 
for the reforms, there is a sharp difference of opinion. 
Morley remained contented with the Times1 verdict that 
"Viceroy and Secretary of State both seem to have come 
simultaneously to very much the same conclusions and both
worked in a spirit of cordial co-operation to carry owkr
2
their joint ideas". Lady Minto did not agree. Eirst she
1. Report on the Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918. p.22. 
c.d. 9109.
2. John Viscount Morley - Recollections, Vol.II. p,340.
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urged upon Morley before and during the publication of his 
Recollections in 1917, that her husband should be given 
priority in thinking out the reform scheme, "I cannot share 
your content to leave the claim for priority and originality 
where it was put by the Times in 1914* I remembered so well 
Minto's letter to you suggesting the Reforms which, after 
living in the country for some time and mixing with all 
creeds and classes, he felt must inevitably come. Your 
answer is also fresh in my memory. The proposal to have an 
Indian member on the Viceroy's Executive Council was surely 
entirely his".'1' Then an attempt was made by John Buchan in 
Lord Minto published in 1924. Still not contented Lady Minto 
herself published in 1934 India Minto and Morley, In her 
My Indian Journal preserved at the Indian Institute, Oxford, 
she criticises the Indian Press for attributing the reforms 
to Morley. In some of his letters to his friends Minto also
1. See Lady Minto's correspondence in the Minto Collection 
in the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, it gives 
an idea of the methods that were adopted by Lady Minto 
and Dunlop Smith to minimise Morley's part in it and how 
they arranged to influence various reviewers of various 
papers, Morley showed the manuscript of his Recollections 
to Dunlop Smith at Lady Mintofs instance and was willing 
to make certain changes, but refused to hand it over to 
another person when she insisted that a third person 
should judge his account. He told her that it was his 
memoirs and as to Minto*s part in this affair, some day 
his biography would be written and that would present 
the affairs from his angle. Minto had died in 1914. He 
assured Lady Minto, "I am convinced that no mischief will 
be done either to truth, or to that loyal good feeling 
which Minto and I were so happy in maintaining'*. Morley 
to Lady Minto - 20 November 1916,
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seemed to have suffered from this obsession that the
credit for these reforms was gradually shifting towards
Morley. E.Montagu, the Under Secretary of State for India,
had said in the House of Commons, "Lord Morley and his
Council, working through the agency of Lord Minto, have
aacomplished much".'1’ Lady Minto thought Montagu's reference
to Minto in his speech as "positively insulting". She states,
"In this I see the hand of Morley, who has never quite
forgiven Roily for having stated publicly that he was the
author of the reforms, for which Morley had hitherto been
2
given the entire credit".
Such an obsession in the minds of both Minto and Lady 
Minto becomes understandable when we look through the pages 
of the Native Newspaper Reports. A great majority of 
vernacular newspapers considered that Morley was solely 
responsible for reforms. They considered that Minto had 
spent his time in big-game hunting and extravagant tours. 
Morley's parliamentary speeches and other utterances were 
fully reported. Unlike Curaon Minto made few public speeches. 
His correspondence with Morley was extremely secret and 
private. Thus it was not possible for the press to follow 
Minto's part in these reforms.
But before laying the responsibility for these reforms 
upon any individual's shoulders, there are a number of 
different questions to consider - who thought of them first
1. Hansard, House of Commons, Vol.XIX.(11 July-3 August 1910) 
26 July 1910, Col.1984.
2. Lady Minto - My Indian Journal,Vol.II. pp.271-272.
9 August 1910.
and then who did more to hring them about or to overcome 
opposition* The climate of opinion was also important* In 
India and in England the Congress and the Muslim league 
were exerting their influences. The role played by the 
leaders of these parties was significant as well. Dunlop 
Smith in one of his notes in Lady Minto's Journal,^ 
explained that the Viceroy initiated the reforms because 
before leaving for Simla in the Spring of 1906* he discussed 
these matters with the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal and 
some members of his Council. Moreover, on 24 May 1906, Minto 
wrote to Morley that he was in favour of "giving the native 
population of India as large a share in the Government as 
we can give". Dunlop Smith's statement has the greater 
significance because the Congress had been urging such 
reforms, and the Bengalee, on 20 February 1906, had suggested 
that certain reforms should be brought forward now - namely 
the enlargement of Legislative Councils, permission to move 
amendments in connection with the Budget; and Indian in the 
Viceroy's Executive Council and in the Indian Council in 
London; separation of judiciary from executive etc. The 
Indian Mirror on 30 May 1906 also advocated such reforms. 
Minto as the man on the spot must have felt the need to 
inform himself of the opinion of his colleagues on these 
matters. Of course, he must have been conscious of the fact
1. Lady Minto - My Indian Journal, 1908. pp.238-242, dated
6 September 1908,
that if he had not prepared himself for such exigencies, he 
would have been unprepared when the new Liberal Ministry 
decided to embark on reform. Moreover, his own inclinations 
as could be deduced from his public and private utterances 
and letters show that he was genuinely interested in 
administering India with "sympathy" and in giving a proper 
hearing to the demands of the loyal, moderate, educated 
Indians, But it was decidedly Morley who on 15 June 1906 
asked Minto to set the ball rolling in the direction of 
reform, Minto did yeoman's work in mastering the details and 
carrying out a remarkable transformation in the conservative 
outlook of his Colleagues. He was faced with more 
difficulties than Morley. His Colleagues, many a time, 
disagreed with him. The Local Governments sometimes kept
him in the dark,1 sometimes fought him tooth and nail on
2
petty details. Over and above all these was the hostile 
Anglo-Indian opinion. Then there were the activities of the
1. See Chapter No.I.
2. Sir George Clarke, Lord Sydenham - My Working I>yg, 
London, 1927, pp.236-237. He was the Governor of Bombay 
and very proudly writes that his government fought hard 
with the Central Government on many details. Even 
Morley had to warn hims "Forgive me for saying so, but 
were I in your place, I would not fight too hard over 
every disputable point with the G. of I ..." Though 
Clarke says, "It was impossible to explain that I was 
not fighting the G. of I, but only two or three 
officials ...."
terrorists and the extremists and the moaning of the 
moderates, who every time brought to his notice that if 
nothing was done, there would be grave consequences. There 
were sectarian and religious differences. Over and above 
all this was the Secretary of State himself. He was 
sensitive, sceptic, autocratic and was prone to interfere 
in petty details. Minto, had a tremendously difficult job, 
Morley had difficulties but those were not so grave. The 
House of Lords was conservative, true, but the House of 
Commons was more radical than the Secretary of State himself. 
The Indian Council was almost a nonentity, so far as its 
powers were concerned. The Times was, at times, angry 2but 
never hostile. Lespite that Morley was slow, at times, to 
react. The influence of the retired Anglo-Indians might be 
one of the reasons.
Amongst the Indian leaders, Gokhale played a prominent 
part. Morley and Minto had confidence in him and he was able 
to keep the Congress in order after the Surat split. Even 
the angry outbursts of the 1909 session were mollified in 
the 1910 session, when the Congress resolution regarding the 
regulations was extremely docile. But there was not a single 
Muslim leader who enjoyed the confidence of either Minto or 
Morley, Whatever the Muslims were able to achieve for 
themselves was because of the pressure through the League 
rather than any policy of favouritism or patronage on the
part of the Government. There was, on the other hand, an 
intense feeling prevalent that the Liberals, like the Labour 
Party, were unsympathetic to Muslim interests, and at one 
time Morley had to explain to the Aga Khan that he was not 
an anti-Muslim whatever other Liberals thought about Islam,"** 
As Morley liked Gokhale and listened to him and as there was 
a strong parliamentary group that expressed the predominantly 
Hindu Congress views, the Muslim leaders felt that Morley 
was more under the Hindu or anti-Muslim influence than any 
Muslim influence,
With all these points before us, it seems quite fair 
to agree with the Times1 view that "Viceroy and Secretary 
of State both seem to have come simultaneously to very much 
the same conclusions," The political climate in India and 
England paved the way for them and despite some hairsplitting 
controversies over details, the reform scheme was the 
result of their joint ideas and remarkable understanding of 
the Indian political condition.
1. Morley to Minto - 18 February 1909. Morley Papers. I.O.L.
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